American Campaign Finance, Can Congress Fix It?

By George Moses

Campaign finance reform is moving to the forefront of the congressional agenda. Growing public revulsion at the present system, amplified by scandals like those involving the "Keating Five" senators, is taking its toll both on the institution and its members.

It is easy to forget that the present system of accounting for political money is itself a reform. By the early '70s, dissatisfaction with the influence of big money in elections was reaching intolerable levels. The success, and excess, of the Nixon presidential campaign financing obtaining large individual and corporate contributions finally pushed Congress into a reform of campaign financing in 1974.

It was this "reform" which brought forward political action committees (PACs), the bete noir of today's financing structure. Then the law of unintended consequences kicked in with a vengeance. PACs sprang up at a dizzying rate. After a few elections, labor quickly reacted to the increased participation by business. Soon PACs, even business PACs, overwhelmingly gave to incumbents. Far from becoming a useful Republican electoral tool, PACs have become a major factor in incumbent preservation.

Most astonishing of all was the fact that so called "unaffiliated PACs," those not visibly associated with any parent organization, became major players. Such "unaffiliated PACs" became the chosen instrument of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and its Zionist supporters. By setting up dozens of such PACs, all with non-descriptive names, supporters of the Israeli government were able to channel millions of dollars into the electoral process in each two-year election cycle.

Worst of all, the same big money continued to flow in even bigger quantities. So, in 1991, we are in for another round of Senate debate on campaign finance reform. Since Democrats control the Senate, their proposal is the one to watch. Its key provisions include:

elimination of PACs;
reduced broadcast advertising rates for federal candidates;
state-by-state voluntary spending limits on campaigns;
subsidized postage and TV ads for candidates who accept the limits;
additional public subsidies for candidates whose opponents break the limits or who face independent expenditure campaigns greater than $10,000.

(An independent expenditure campaign is one which is run to promote a particular viewpoint on a specific policy question without reference to any one candidate.)

The Republican proposal does not contain public financing. Instead, it limits large out of-state contributions. Since both sides seem to have agreed to eliminate PACs, public financing is the key point of disagreement between the parties; Democrats continue to insist on it, Republicans continue to reject it.

The present system is itself a reform.

Regardless of whether there is a compromise or a victory for one side or the other, this is one of those cases where the cure could easily turn out to be worse than the disease. Since money will continue to find its way into elections, the limitations on candidate spending will merely rechannel the money being spent, not reduce it. And where will the money go?

That's not hard to figure out. It will go into independent expenditure campaigns, which will in turn proliferate like sand flies (and be about as pleasant). This will be the "unintended consequence" of the 1991 campaign finance reform. Eyry urban area will sprout a plethora of local committees. Each will have its own fundraiser and each will solicit for its worthy cause, and political spending will continue to skyrocket.

It will be at this point that anti-Arab interests will attack public officials. While no one can predict with certainty the exact form of the attack, some ploys are readily apparent. The numerous anti-Arab "Stealth PACs" with innocuous names can quickly be converted to "committees" with equally innocuous names. Games can be played as to whether such a committee "favors" a candidate or "opposes" him, thereby entitling him to even more federal money.

Alternatively, those same anti-Arab interests could channel their money into committees already in existence. A candidate with a history of sympathy for the Palestinians could, for example, discover that the local committee which is opposing him on an unrelated issue has received a huge infusion of new money from traditional Zionist sources, perhaps coordinated by AIPAC in the same manner presently used to direct Stealth PAC money. It is hard to see how such scenarios represent an improvement over present circumstances.

Two Kinds of Elections

Congress members and senators actually face two kinds of elections in each cycle. In the first primary and general election, they are chosen by their constituents as their representatives in Washington as required by the Constitution. Once in Congress, they face another election, which is of far more importance to most political contributors. Congress members and senators are elected by their colleagues to committees with jurisdiction over specific issues. This is the election in which most special interest money is really interested. Unfortunately, virtually all rules of campaign fundraising, including the present proposals, are concerned only with the first, constitutional election and not the second, institutional one.

Almost alone among special interests, the Zionists have chosen to concentrate their interest on the constitutional election so that, by the time the institutional election takes place, they are usually in the comfortable position of having friends on both sides. It calls to mind Boss Tweed's dictum: "You may elect whichever candidates you please to office, if you allow me to select the candidates. " On those rare occasions when they do not feel in control of such situations, anti-Arab interests do not hesitate to inject themselves. Congressman Dave Bonior was subjected to vicious attacks during his campaign for majority whip on grounds that he was not sufficiently (read absolutely) supportive of all Israeli policies. Nothing in the "reforms" being considered by the Senate will curtail these practices.

Full public disclosure of the flow of money continues to be the only element of solution to draw a consensus, but a way must be found to recognize more fully the interplay of the constitutional and institutional elections.

Does this mean that campaign finance reform is a fool's errand? No, no more than is trying to secure equal treatment for all members of society. But as we learned (again) in 1974, all change is not improvement. And in the end, nothing can substitute for full participation of the electorate. Whatever the rules, democracy will always be government by whoever shows up.

George Moses, a former president of the National Association of Arab Americans, is a legislative and economic consultant based in Washington, DC