Time to Switch Military Aid to Economic Development?

By C. Patrick Quinlan

Foreign aid needs in one regional area rise in direct proportion to relaxations in others. As the Gorbachev revolution takes the pressure off our security budget, our invasion of Panama and the peaceful revolutions in Eastern Europe and Nicaragua generate new needs. Western Europe promises to take the lead in Eastern European aid, but Panama and Nicaragua seem to be our responsibility. A minimum of a half-billion dollars in each country is not a lot of money in relation to our national budget, but is a whole lot in terms of our $15 billion budget for foreign aid.

Senate Republican leader Robert Dole of Kansas suggested pruning just five percent from the five donees (Israel, Egypt, Turkey, Pakistan and the Philippines) who get two-thirds of our foreign aid. This would provide $330 million for Eastern Europe and Panama. The White House might have been consulted before this trial balloon went up.

Since then another new democracy, Nicaragua, has emerged, with another potential claim to US aid. Rounding off the figures, Congressional style, let's say a half-billion each for Eastern Europe, Panama and Nicaragua and we count 1.5 billion dollars, which happens to be half of one year's aid to Israel. A coincidence, since with the exception of Senator Robert Byrd (D-WV), nobody in elective office has proposed more than Dole's five percent cut.

I'm not elected, however, so let's consider what we could save from reduction of tensions with the USSR. Pakistan, Turkey and Greece, strategic allies, receive about $1.5 billion annually in military and economic support, Israel $3 billion and Egypt $2.2 billion. Thus $7 billion, almost half of our total foreign aid budget. Ten percent of that would meet this year's needs in Central America.

Foreign aid is a misnomer, of course. What began as technical assistance and economic aid has become primarily a means of strengthening our strategic allies and a few American favorites, particularly in the last decade (see below). Even the magnitudes have changed radically. At the peak of the post war Marshall Plan, we devoted up to three percent of our gross national product to foreign aid. This year it will be less than a half of one percent. On the list of donors, in per capita GNP, we rank 17th, far behind Western Europe, Japan and several oil-exporting states. There are those who argue that allocation of foreign aid is not a zero-sum game-that we should provide more aid for new needs without penalizing others. But try to convince Congress and the White House, or your neighbor, that we need more taxes.

Still, we could save a lot of money in just the Middle East and South Asia, my area of experience, and I offer specifics:

Pakistan. Forty years an ally against Soviet imperialism and ten years allied with us against the USSR presence in Afghanistan, where the Soviets have admitted defeat in Afghanistan. Cut 10 percent.
Turkey. The largest standing army in NATO and the longest border with the Soviet Union. A centuries-old enmity with Russian expansionists. Cut 10 percent.
Greece. Our bases there are important, as they are in Turkey. But if we're cutting back in Western Europe, why not here too? Cut 10 percent.
Egypt. No bases and no defense agreements. Our $2.2 billion annual aid replaces aid Egypt got from the Arab oil states before Egypt made a separate peace with Israel. An analyst more clever than I might figure out how to get the Arab aid back and the US out from under. Meanwhile, cut 10 percent.
Israel. Making virtue out of domestic political necessity, Congressmen term Israel a "strategic asset," but never explain why this asset merits twice the aid to Pakistan, Turkey and Greece combined. Or why our aid has gone up since Israel's strongest enemy, Egypt, made peace. Cut 10 percent and we have $300 million for Central America. Add this to other savings and we have over $750 million.

Who could object to these sacrifices for the larger interest? For starters, the State Department, which is sometimes a policy planning but more often than not a damage-control institution. Then Defense, which sees Pakistan, Turkey and Greece as front-line extensions of our national security. Finally, despite Senator Dole's courageous proposal and a few approving murmurs from others, Congress remains far more vulnerable than the president to well-organized special interest lobbies.

If the Bush-Baker plan for Israeli-Palestinian negotiations should be accepted, even I would be cautious about tampering with aid to Israel and Egypt. However, if it is not, as seems increasingly likely, why would we not reduce aid? If we do not, it will be taken as an indication that we are willing to subsidize permanently Israel's present military occupation. Clearly we are not. The money is needed elsewhere and Israel's political leadership needs to receive that message.

What will actually come to pass? There will be reductions in aid to our three strategic allies-Pakistan, Turkey and Greece—next year if not this. As for Israel, Senator Inouye is even now working on an increase of a half-billion dollars or more in aid. And Egypt will continue to expect its annual peace price of $2 billion or more until real peace comes to the Middle East with a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

So we're back to our first question. How do we raise money for Panama, Nicaragua, foreign narcotics control, etc. New taxes, anyone?

C. Patrick Quinlan, a retired career foreign service officer living in Edina, MN, is active in international education. He served in Lebanon, Yemen and Egypt and as consul general in Salzburg, Austria and US chief of mission in Oman.