Shamir's Stalling, Not Bush-Baker Tactics, Toppled Israeli Coalition

(After a half century of Israeli deception, the best-informed Americans are likely to be the most misinformed about the Middle East. It's the result of continuous exposure to what anti-Zionist writer Alfred Lilienthal calls "mythinformation" in the US media.)

As President George Bush and Secretary of State James Baker methodically pressed Yitzhak Shamir to implement his own plan for elections in Israeli occupied territories to choose Palestinian interlocutors for peace talks, the Israeli prime minister cast around for a way out. By dismissing his Labor Coalition partner, Finance Minister Shimon Peres, an advocate of peace talks, he brought down the Israeli coalition government and halted the forced march toward peace.

Following Shamir's cues, his supporters in Israel and in the American pro-Israel establishment chose Bush, Baker, and White House Chief of Staff John Sununu to be the scapegoats. Appropriate myths, like spring flowers, blossomed suddenly in the halls of Congress and the pages of mainstream media. Here are the myths, and some facts they nipped in the bud.

Telling Remarks

The myth about Bush's Jerusalem statement, first telling:

"With a single remark last week, George Bush may have derailed the 10-month-old Middle East peace initiative ... and driven a substantial wedge between American Jewry and the Republican Party. Just as Shamir seemed on the verge of being pushed into a meeting with Palestinians—or having to accept the blame for failing to do so—Bush suddenly fueled Israeli fears that Jerusalem would be tossed on the negotiating table along with the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Foolishly, he warned Israel not to settle Soviet Jews in East Jerusalem." (Excerpted from editorial in Washington Jewish Week, March 15, 1990)

The myth about Bush, second telling:

"I am mystified and disappointed by President Bush's decision, at a time when the need for partnership and trust is most crucial, to provoke deep concern about American intentions. There is no reason for the United States to undermine [the peace process] through thoughtless insensitivity or conscious provocation." (Senate Majority Leader George J. Mitchell (D-ME), March 17, 1990).

The myth about Bush, third telling:

"Loose lips at the highest level of the Bush administration sank the government of Israel ... President Bush insists he meant to say East Jerusalem. But by doing so, he undermined Secretary Baker's peace plan and caused a crisis in Israel." (Senator Ted Kennedy, National Public Radio, March 23, 1990)

Appropriate myths, like spring flowers, blossomed suddenly in the halls of Congress.

Fact one about the Bush statement:

"The Bush remark, made at a news conference March 3 in Palm Springs, CA, was consistent with long-standing US policy on East Jerusalem, which was annexed by Israel after the 1967 war." (Excerpt from article by David Hoffman in The Washington Post, March 14, 1990).

Fact two about the Bush statement:

"Rare are the instances of crash landings before take-offs. Yitzhak Shamir accomplished this daunting feat when launching his so-called peace initiative on a runway mined by himself... The prime minister promoted the idea. hoping it might divert growing international pressure generated by the intifada and the diplomatic standstill...

"While Shamir banked on PLO rejection of his initiative, (Labor Coalition Defense Minister Yitzhak) Rabin sought active American support for its implementation. And, indeed, Washington endorsed and recommended it to Yasser Arafat in Tunis and President Hosni Mubarak in Cairo...

"Shamir decided to stall indefinitely. Having cornered himself, he fired his deputy and coalition partner, Shimon Peres, an act not surprising to those familiar with Shamir's modus operandi." (Excerpted from article by Gideon Rafael, former director-general of the Israeli foreign ministry and former Israeli ambassador to the United Nations, in Washington Jewish Week, April 5, 1990)

Tactical Maneuvers

The myth about Baker's tactics, first telling:

"I was taken aback generally at the time chosen by the US government, or the secretary of state, in putting before us an inflammatory idea like this." (Yitzhak Shamir, March 3, 1990)

The myth about Baker, second telling:

''Bush's statement comes on the heels of Secretary of State James Baker's testimony before Congress declaring that the administration will oppose housing assistance for Soviet Jewish refugees unless Israel produces 'assurances on creation of additional settlements or expansion of existing settlements'... Within little more than a week, Baker has called for an end to Israeli settlements, declared that Yasser Arafat has abandoned terrorism; endorsed 'shaving' aid to Israel. wished Israel's foreign minister were as 'forthcoming' in the search for peace as his Egyptian counterpart; suggested Israel is the one dragging its feet in the peace process: and expressed sympathy with Arab opposition to Soviet Jews going to the occupied territories. 'If I closed my eyes, I could swear Jimmy Carter was back in the White House making Middle East policy,' declared one Jewish Democrat. 'It was policies and attitudes like that that were the major reason why Jews so profoundly mistrusted and disliked Carter."' (Excerpted from article by Douglas Bloomfield in March 8 1990 Washington Jewish Week)

The myth about Baker, third telling:

"George Bush and James Baker are frozen in the diplomatic Ice Age. They focus on Israel's West Bank; they exploit division within Israel's polity and refuse humanitarian aid to refugees unless the Israeli government accepts their view of what's best for our ally's security. That's why we see Mr. Bush deliberately calling into question the integrity of Jerusalem as Israel's capital, ordering the Israelis not to let new refugees live there. That's why Mr. Baker—more underhanded than evenhanded—wants an Arab representative from Jerusalem, not from the West Bank, in the negotiations ... The Bush-Baker notion is to revisit the issue of an undivided Jerusalem, settled a generation ago, and put it on the negotiating table." (Excerpted from column by William Safire in The New York Times, March 9, 1990)

"If I closed my eyes, I could swear Jimmy Carter was back in the White House making Middle East policy."

The facts about Baker's tactics:

"We regard [settlements] as an obstacle to peace. As such, we draw a very clear distinction between absorption of Soviet Jews into Israel and their settlement in the territories. Because of our support for the absorption of Soviet Jews into Israel, the secretary felt that we could support ... the $400 million in housing loan guarantees that are not in our budget ... But only if we could get some assurances respecting settlement activity." (State Department spokeswoman Margaret Tutwiler, in March 2 news briefing)

More facts about Baker's tactics:

"The arrival of Baker, with a reputation for tough, pragmatic handling of problems... created unease among Israeli leaders. They were alarmed when he told Washington's pro-Israel lobby shortly after taking office that the Zionist state should abandon dreams of a Greater Israel that would include the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Israeli officials know the current point of friction, the issue of Jewish settlements among the 1.75 million Palestinians of the occupied territories, reflects the personal concern of President George Bush. But they have focused on the blunt-speaking handler of foreign affairs as a key source of the current deterioration in the US-Israeli relationship." (Excerpted from article by Jack Redden, Reuters News Service, March 4,1990)

The myth about Sununu's influence on the Middle East peace process:

"The architect of linkage is not the secretary of state but the White House chief of staff, John Sununu. When he first put forth the idea of linking settlements to refugee housing assistance, it seemed like a trial balloon that wasn't going anywhere. But soon Bush and Baker embraced it and declared it government policy ... Sununu, an Arab-American, has demonstrated his clout on a wide variety of issues... A man of demonstrated hostility towards Israel... he appears fully engaged, and, as the official closest to the president. he is in a position to wield great influence." (Excerpted from article by Douglas Bloomfield in March 8, Washington Jewish Week)

A Statement of Fact

The facts about the Middle East peace process:

"Peacemaking at a snail's pace is a euphemism for standstill. And the coy waiting for the 'ripening' is nothing but a subterfuge to evade facing the issue ... After more than four decades of emnity, five major wars and 28 months of uprising, the situation is overripe. It calls not for small but for bold steps—executed on the firm grasp of existing realities, acquired experience, past practice and the utilization of the available building blocks ...

''The acquired experience indicates that the settlement of the conflict, or any part of it, requires third-party participation within an international framework. Past practice, from the armistice talks on the island of Rhodes to the peace negotiations at Camp David, confirms this premise. And the peace-building blocks are in ample supply.

"They consist of procedural UN Resolution 338 stipulating direct negotiations under appropriate international auspices and the operative Resolution 242 calling for the conclusion of permanent peace on the basis of territorial compromise, the establishment of secure and recognized boundaries and the renunciation of the threat or use of force." (Excerpted from article in April 5 Washington Jewish Week by Gideon Rafael, former director-general of the Israeli Foreign Ministry and former Israeli ambassador to the United Nations.)