We Shouldn't Expect it of Shamir

By Sol Schindler

Rather than approach everything from a moral imperative—should the US force Israel to do this, should Yitzhak Shamir be forced to do that—why not view the events unfolding in the Middle East with as much dispassion as we can muster and see what actions might best lead to peace, a peace from which everyone would profit, and one for which most people devoutly wish.

If elections of the sort the Israeli government has suggested are held in the occupied territories, those people elected will for the most part be either members of the PLO or have close ties to it. When Israeli government officials talk to these elected representatives there will be de facto Israeli-PLO negotiations, regardless of what one calls them. Why, then, all the fuss?

The problem for many is that if elections and negotiations are allowed to proceed as contemplated, the large administrative cadre of the PLO—the apparatchiks—will be excluded, at least initially, and the power of governing and the power of leading will slip into the hands of the residents of the territories.

If the intifadah is indeed the current ideological mainspring of the PLO, then it is logical that the ideological vanguard be also the negotiating vanguard.

From one point of view this is not such a bad thing to happen. The residents are used to the Israelis, have dealt with them on a daily basis, have taken advantage of the Israeli legal system when possible, and after 20 years experience are probably best equipped to deal with Israel. Since they are also the ones who suffer the most from the continuation of both the occupation and the intifadah, they would be the most pragmatic in their approach, and be the ones most likely able to come to an agreement. They are the ones through whom peace might be reached most easily.

All the above brings to mind a question originally posed by an Arab periodical: Does Yasser Arafat lead the intifadah or does the intifadah lead Yasser Arafat? Is Arafat really like the politician who, seeing a mob storming down the street, rushes out ahead of it and cries, "Follow me!"?

Certainly since the intifadah became significant, Yasser Arafat has become more pragmatic in his approach and has moderated both his position and his speech. Would the pre-intifadah Arafat have suggested a peace treaty with Israel? Or an end to terrorism?

If the intifadah is indeed the current ideological mainspring of the PLO, then it is logical that the ideological vanguard be also the negotiating vanguard. Either by design or coincidence, Shamir's course of action may be the most productive. As long as hard-liners like Mohammed Abu Abbas, head of the Palestine Liberation Front and still a member of the PLO Executive Committee, say things like the establishment of a Palestinian state "would not prevent the continuation of the struggle until the liberation of all Palestine is achieved," it would be the height of naivete to expect more from Israel at this point.

If there is a chance for negotiations, that chance should be seized. If there is an opportunity to limit the oppressive effects of both the intifadah and the occupation, that opportunity should be taken. The people of the territories merit at least a semblance of normal life, and a return to that relative prosperity to which their natural industry had taken them.

Sol Schindler is a retired Foreign Service officer who writes and lectures on international affairs.