New Mossad Chief Takes Charge in a New Era

By Michael C. Dunn

Israel's foreign intelligence agency, Mossad, has a new director and an old problem. Mossad's director assumed office after an unusual behind-the-scenes controversy over who should have the job. He takes up his post at a time when Israel's intelligence community appears to be offering Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir (himself a longtime Mossad operative) information on both the intifadah and the PLO that he would rather not hear.

As always, the new chief of Mossad is not publicly identified. His predecessor, Nahum Admoni, had never been named in the Israeli press during his six and one-half year tenure. Admoni had come into the top intelligence post unexpectedly in 1982 during Israel's invasion of Lebanon, when the man designated as the new chief, Gen. Yekutiel Adam, was killed during the invasion. Although Admoni was a 35-year veteran of Mossad, this fact in itself led to some criticism, since former Mossad directors, at least since the end of the legendary reign of Isser Harel, have usually come from outside the agency, generally as career military men. At the beginning of this year, Israeli press reports claimed that there was a dispute over how to replace Admoni and, indeed, his replacement seems to have been somewhat delayed.

Israeli Intelligence Community Under Scrutiny

Though the head of Mossad is directly in charge only of Israeli overseas intelligence, the Mossad chief also traditionally heads the Va'adat or Committee of the Heads of Services, much in the way the US director of Central Intelligence heads the intelligence community here.

The new Mossad chief takes office at a time when the whole Israeli intelligence community is under scrutiny following the leaking of certain conclusions of the annual National Intelligence Estimate which, according to the most conservative of various reports, at the very least indicated that the PLO should now be considered part of the moderate Arab camp and the only Palestinian force with which negotiations were possible. (Some reports have indicated that the estimate actually recommended that the Israeli government open talks with the PLO. Not only has this been denied, but it seems unlikely that the estimate would have made direct policy recommendations of this nature.) It was also reported that the estimate concluded that there would likely be no end to the intifadah except through negotiations. While, without the text of the estimate, one must of necessity deal in generalities, a few conclusions may be drawn about the Israeli intelligence community.

Although Prime Minister Shamir initially called the reports regarding the intifadah and the PLO "lies" he has subsequently indicated that what he meant was that the estimate did not openly recommend policy. Other reports have suggested that one intelligence service, said to be reporting to the prime minister's office, had disagreed with the conclusions of the estimate, which according to most reports generally reflected the view of military intelligence. Two main Israeli intelligence services report to the prime minister's office directly: Mossad and the domestic security service.

Israel's intelligence community, like that of the US, has been divided in the past. It is far from clear that it is really divided now. An estimate such as that which the Israeli press has reported would, in all probability, include material from the various agencies. Military intelligence, which seems to have been the driving force behind the final report, would assess the military situation in the occupied territories and also any guerrilla threat across Israel's borders, as well as potential military threats from other states. Shin Bet, which overlaps with military intelligence in security matters in the occupied territories, would provide direct assessments of the strength and toll of the infifadah. Mossad, which like the US CIA is theoretically restricted to overseas operations, would contribute its assessment of the PLO's internal politics, intentions, and likely future course. If the reported conclusion that the PLO must now be considered part of the moderate bloc was indeed contained in the estimate, this suggests that Mossad also is willing to take some chances in its recommendations. Other groups, such as the National Police and the Research Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, are also considered part of the intelligence community and would have input in any intelligence estimate.

The new Mossad chief takes office at a time when the whole Israeli intelligence community is under scrutiny following the leaking of certain conclusions of the annual National Intelligence Estimate which ... indicated that the PLO should now be considered part of the moderate Arab camp and the only Palestinian force with which negotiations were possible.

That the Military Intelligence Service (Aman) would take the lead in recognizing that there is no likely end to the intifadah without negotiations is in keeping with other indications of the thinking of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) General Staff. Chief of Staff Dan Shomron has made similar statements publicly and has been criticized for it by the political leadership. Central Command Commander Amran Mitzna, in overall military charge of the West Bank, has made similar remarks. The IDFs training and doctrine are designed for quick wars of movement, not for suppression of insurrection, and the IDF high command seems extremely uncomfortable with a counterinsurgency role. The impression that there can be no military solution to the intifadah seems to be spreading in the armed forces leadership.

One interesting irony is that the man most vehemently opposed to the conclusions of the reported intelligence estimate, and most critical of those who leaked it, is also the Israeli intelligence professional to have risen the highest in politics. Yitzhak Shamir, after his career with LEHI (the "Stern Gang") during the War of Independence, entered Mossad and spent much of the 1950s and 1960s as an intelligence officer, rising ultimately to be head of Mossad operations in all of Europe. One wonders how this former intelligence professional must feel when the intelligence community he once served offers up an estimate seemingly incompatible with his own politics.

Dr. Michael C. Dunn is Senior Analyst of the International Estimate, Inc, publisher of the biweekly newsletter The Estimate, and is adjunct lecturer at the Georgetown University Center for Contemporary Arab Studies.