Rival Government Factions Emerge Clearly as Iran's Post Khomeini Power Struggle Begins

By Bahram Alavi

A severe internal political crisis has struck the Islamic Republic of Iran. Only six weeks after the celebrations which marked the 10th anniversary of the establishment of the Islamic regime, Ayatollah Khomeini has ordered his designated successor, Ayatollah Montazeri, to resign. Montazeri's forced removal was followed by the resignation of several top-ranking officials.

They included Deputy Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Larijani, who was in charge of American and European affairs, and Iranian UN ambassador Mohammad JaWar Mahallati. Both played key roles in peace negotiations with Iraq. Both are also close friends and proteges of Montazeri, and enjoyed close contacts with the West.

In a letter written by Khomeini to Montazeri, the 87 year-old leader ordered his former student to "clean up his house and to stop the comings and goings of dishonest people, who pretend to be in line with the Islamic republic but are actually opposed to it. " It was a clear reference to Montazeri's close relationship with a number of political figures opposed to Khomeini's theocracy, including Mahdi Bazargan, Iran's first prime minister after the 1979 revolution. Removal of Montazeri and his allies should come as no surprise to those who have been following recent political events in Iran. The resignations result from an intensified and explosive power struggle among warring factions within the Iranian political structure.

The removal of Montazeri is a clear indication that the post-Khomeini era has begun, and the showdown between rival factions within the Khomeini regime has reached a decisive stage. The intensity of the factional conflict is such that even the Salman Rushdie affair, which was used to divert the attention of the Iranian people from severe internal problems, failed to delay the forced removal of Montazeri.

Montazeri's resignation is a dear sign of things to come. The imminent overthrow of the Islamic regime? Not yet, but perhaps the beginning of a complete disintegration of centralized political authority inside Iran.

In the past year and a half, two factions, the first led by Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, speaker of the Parliament, and the second, led by ultra-dogmatic religious leaders such as the state prosecutor, Mussavi Khoeiniha, have been gaining the upper hand at the expense of the other factions and religious leaders, particularly Montazeri and his supporters, who have consistently opposed their attempts to monopolize power.

Rafsanjani is the man responsible for establishing the secret contact with Israel and the Reagan administration that led to the Iran-contra scandal. Since the cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq war, he has called for improvement in the Islamic regime's relationship with the West and a more centralized presidential system.

Rafsanjani's call for closer diplomatic and economic relationships with the West stems from his desire to portray himself as the leader of a "Westward looking," "pragmatic," and "moderate" faction. He hopes that the moderate image will ensure the support of Western European countries and the United States for his own faction. On the other hand, his demand for creation of a centralized presidential system is linked to his desire to become the next president of Iran. Indeed, since February he has repeatedly stated that he will be "the main candidate for presidency in the next election:' to be held next summer.

The ultra-religious faction, on the other hand, has gained momentum of its own since Khomeini supported its call for the execution of Salman Rushdie, author of The Satanic Verses. This faction, which opposes both Rafsanjani and Montazeri, calls for further curtailing Iranian links with the West and establishing close ties with the Soviet Union.

Both Rafsanjani and the ultra-religious faction are vehemently opposed by a coalition of religious leaders and political factions which includes Montazeri and his associates., This coalition favors a political system based on participation of all major political and religious institutions and an improvement in the area of human rights (i.e. political prisoners, tortures, and mass executions). As representatives of this coalition, Montazeri and his supporters argue that only by offering some basic social liberties can the government prevent its imminent collapse.

The major problem facing Montazeri and his associates is that they do not enjoy the support of Khomeini and his close advisors. The decline of Montazeri's power began when his associates leaked news of the secret arms deal with the Reagan administration to a pro-Iranian Lebanese newspaper. The revelation of secret deals with the US and Israel not only embarrassed Rafsanjani, who had organized the negotiations, but also Khomeini, who had personally approved them.

Since the leak that set off such embarrassing international repercussions for Iran (and the Reagan administration), Rafsanjani's faction has carried out a systematic campaign to discredit Montazeri and his supporters. The execution of at least 15 religious figures connected to Montazeri dearly demonstrates that Montazeri's faction continues to be under harsh attack, and also helps explain why Montazeri has personally and publicly criticized the policy of executing political prisoners.

Rafsanjani, "the moderate," with support from the ultra-right faction, has countered Montazeri's criticism by asserting that any relaxation in the government's current reign of terror will send the wrong signal to the people and that anti-Khomeini opposition forces "will use the opportunity to bring down the regime."

Nevertheless, it is too soon to write off Montazeri. He has many supporters among the factions which oppose both Rafsanjani and the ultra-religious faction. As the struggle for Khomeini's successor continues, however, an increasing number of prominent leaders in the Iranian government can expect to share Montazeri's fate.

Bahram Alavi is the pseudonym of an Iranian-born political scientist teaching at a US university. It is against Washington Report on Middle East Affairs policy to publish articles or letters without the correct name of the author. However, for this article and three others by the author covering factions and currents inside and outside the Khomeini government, the editors have made an exception to the policy in order to protect the author's relatives in Iran. These articles will be available as an American Educational Trust White Paper later this year.