Saudi Bashing

By Dennis J. Wamsted

On May 6 the Senate voted by the lopsided margin of 73 to 22 to disapprove the Reagan Administration's planned sale of $354 million of advanced U.S. military hardware to Saudi Arabia. The next day the House voted by the equally overwhelming margin of 356 to 62 to reject the sale. Although these votes were widely anticipated, the size of the majorities opposing the sale caught many by surprise. Indeed, that so many legislators voted against what is widely considered to be a militarily "insignificant" proposal that is not being actively opposed by either the Israeli government or the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) indicated the extent to which the Reagan Administration's ability to conduct an effective, independent foreign policy—particularly with regard to the Middle East—has declined. More ominously, the votes and the debate leading up to them highlighted clearly the prevailing double standard—one for Israel and another for the region's Arab countries—in Congress' perception of the Middle East.

One of the few Senators to understand fully the overarching importance of the sale for U.S. relations with the moderate Arabs was Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Richard Lugar (R-IN). In defending the Administration's proposal, Lugar stated that Saudi Arabia had supported U.S. policy goals in the Middle East by:

Acting as an emissary for the U.S. in Lebanon
Working to settle the Iran-Iraq war
Supporting the anti-Communist rebels in Afghanistan.

Lugar also noted that there were a number of other important and valid reasons for approving the sale. In particular, the Senator chastised his colleagues for ignoring the proposal's beneficial impact on the U.S. economy and trade deficit, and reminded them that the U.S. had forgone approximately $20 billion in foreign trade last fall by refusing to sell additional F-15 jet fighters to the Saudis. (This decision prompted the Kingdom to purchase Great Britain's advanced Tornado fighter aircraft.) Lugar said these anti-trade votes would "...cost the United States hundreds of thousands of man-year jobs throughout our economy." Lugar also alluded to the Congressional double standard vis-a-vis the Middle East, saying: "If we were discussing almost any otherissue, .... Senators would rise on the floor and talk about the need for U.S. exports . . . It's amazing that the subject of jobs disappears from this entire argument today." Lugar concluded his statement by urging the Senate to give more weight to the Administration's assertion that the sale is "vital to U.S. foreign policy."

The Triumph of Politics

Not surprisingly, a great many Senators were much more concerned with rhetoric and the exigencies of domestic politics. The sale's leading Senate opponent, Alan Cranston (D-CA), argued: "Now is not the time to send more weapons to an uncertain friend in the Middle East, a friend that has aligned itself with the terrorists of Tripoli." Senator Alan Dixon (D-IL) echoed Cranston's argument, stating that the Saudis "have repeatedly acted against the interests of the United States in their support of Libya." Senator Frank Lautenberg (D-NJ) averred that the sale "would more likely exacerbate terrorism than lessen it."

A key concern for many Congressmen was the inclusion of 800 shoulder-fired Stinger missiles in the overall package. Representative Mel Levine (D-CA), leader of the House opposition, urged that these weapons be kept away from "a part of the world where terrorism is the game of the day." Senator Howard Metzenbaum (D-OH) asserted that the Stingers "pose a real and present threat to American citizens," and that because "many Saudis are sympathetic to the PLO" it was virtually inevitable that a "crazed, Qadhafi-guided terrorist" would eventually acquire one or two of the missiles to use against Western targets.

Lost in the rhetoric was the fact that since mid-1984 the Saudis have had a second issue brought up repeatedly in both the House and Senate was Saudi Arabia's alleged reluctance to support U.S. peace initiatives in the Middle East. Senator John Kerry (D-MA) charged that "The Saudis failed to support President Reagan's own peace proposal of 1982 and even went so far as to discourage King Hussein of Jordan from entering into negotiations." The truth, of course, is that Arab League members who met in Fez, Morocco, in late 1982, unanimously endorsed Saudi-drafted principles for a peaceful settlement based upon the land-for-peace formula embodied in U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, and stated specifically that their Saudi-drafted "Fez Plan" was compatible with the Reagan Plan.

It was Israel, under the leadership of then-Prime Minister Menachem Begin, that categorically rejected the entire U.S. proposal within hours of the time it was announced by President Reagan, but this has not dampened the Congress' enthusiasm for providing weapons and aid to Israel.

Presidential Veto Expected

Similarly, the sale's opponents—noting the assurances given by the Reagan Administration in 1981 that delivery of the AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) planes to Saudi Arabia would depend on significant progress being made toward regional peace with "substantial assistance" from the Kingdom—complained that the U.S. should not sell any additional arms to Saudi Arabia because there has been no "significant" progress toward a resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Lost in the anti-Saudi, anti-Arab rhetoric were Israeli actions during the same period, including:

The December 1981 Israeli "annexation" of Syria's Golan Heights
The June 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon
The Israeli air strike against Tunis in the fall of 1985.

Immediately after Congress acted, the White House issued a statement criticizing the disapproval and reaffirming that ". . . it is the President's intention to veto this resolution and to work actively with members of both houses of Congress to sustain that veto." Administration officials, however, were openly concerned about garnering the 34 votes in the Senate needed to sustain the veto. One official, said "I think we'll be able to, but it's going to be very tight."

Regardless, most analysts believe the damage to U.S. credibility has already occurred. They cite virtually complete American identification with Israel at the same time the Administration seems unable to guarantee the legitimate defense needs of moderate Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Senator Daniel Evans (R-WA) articulated it clearly when he said: "If we deny this sale we will inevitably watch actions which will be adverse to the United States interests in the Middle East . . ."

Dennis J. Wamsted, of Washington, D.C., has lived and studied in the Middle East and writes frequently on it.