Saudi Arabia in the 1980's: Foreign Policy, Security, And Oil

By William B. Quandt, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1981 190 pp. $8.95 (paperback)

Reviewed by John P. Richardson

William Quandt's Saudi Arabia in the 1980's is a good book on a number of counts. It is commendably concise (160 pages of text plus appendices and bibliography), written in lucid English, and nonpolemical in tone. Given the extremes to which commentators on the Saudi scene are prone, Quandt steers a sound course between the Scylla of Saudi-haters and the Charybdis of uncritical apologists. Perhaps most important, the book presents Saudi leadership as made up of human beings whose actions (and inactions) make good sense when looked at from their perspective.

Saudi Arabia in the 1980's represents, a new dimension in the scholarly writing of Quandt, whose earlier books dealt with Algeria, Palestinian nationalism, and American Middle East policy. Quandt's choice of topic is made clear in his observation that "few foreign policy matters deserve higher priority in Washington (other than proper management of the U.S.-Saudi relationship), for it is there that the future of U.S.-Saudi relations will largely be decided."

The book's three sections address the foreign policy setting and perceived threats, ways in which the Saudi system copes with threats, and the U.S.-Saudi connection. The concluding set of "guidelines for U.S. policy" merits the close attention of anyone likely to be involved in U.S.-Saudi relations in the current decade.

Political Balancing Act

In the introductory section Quandt describes how Saudi leadership regards its prospects as linked intimately with a host of events outside Saudi borders that could impinge on internal stability. Quandt sees Saudi political objectives in the Middle East as being dictated by a political balancing act that seeks hegemony in the Arabian Peninsula but an "equilibrium" elsewhere -making sure that no single Arab state or political force becomes dominant. Quandt points out that the Saudis have consistently placed security concerns ahead of ideology in day-to-day decisions.

Quandt identifies two major themes in Saudi foreign policy, the Palestine conflict and Islam. High-level Saudi support for resolution of the Palestine conflict reflects the conviction that Israel's destabilizing role in the region has encouraged radicalism in the Arab World and created opportunities for Soviet penetration. Saudi sensitivity to its self-proclaimed role as chief defender of Islam and to the location of Islam's two most revered sites within the kingdom results in special attention to issues of great importance to Muslims worldwide.

In the section on the Saudi political system Quandt points out that the kingdom has been undergoing a controlled internal revolution ever since its creation in the early decades of this century. Quandt describes the principal actors in Saudi decision-making as the senior princes, junior princes, the "technocrats", and the Ulama (religious authorities). Oil wealth has created undreamed-of opportunities but has also severely strained the fabric of the kingdom. Reconciliation of the tenets of puritanical, Wahabi Islam with the pressures created by Croesus-like oil wealth generates the tension reflected in every element of Saudi society.

The American Connection

The section dealing with the American connection is a useful "primer" on a complex topic. Quandt shows how Saudi confidence in the U.S. though still high, has slipped steadily since the 1950's. He identifies American policy on the Arab-Israeli conflict and the potential Israeli veto over arms transfers to the Saudis as corrosive elements in the relationship. He also describes basic cultural differences in diplomatic technique between the two countries that generate misunderstanding.

One of the main points Quandt makes in the book is that while the kingdom is more stable and flexible than often given credit for, there are limitations on the influence that Saudi Arabia can wield in a given situation. It is important that Americans attempting to understand Saudi Arabia maintain perspective on this point, particularly since popular images of Saudi financial power prevail, and it is incorrectly assumed that this wealth has a political/military correlative.

The author's own assessment of U.S.-Saudi relations in the decade ahead is sobering: "Neither the United States nor Saudi Arabia is particularly well prepared for the scope and complexity of their relationship in the 1980s. As a result mistakes will certainly be made, perhaps with grave consequences. While the pressures on Saudi Arabia are likely to grow, it is less certain that the means available to the Saudis to cope with these pressures will be adequate.

"The United States can make a difference in two respects: by its regional and global policies it can either aggravate or reduce the pressures; and by its direct relationship with Saudi Arabia it can either strengthen Saudi capabilities or add to domestic burdens. In brief, more than any other country, the United States, by its actions or inaction, will have a decisive influence over Saudi developments in the 1980s."

Mr. Richardson is President of the Center for U.S.-European Middle East Cooperation, based in Washington.