U.S.-Egypt: Crumbling Alliance?

As Egypt continues to renew its friendships in the Arab world, and moves to normalize relations with the Soviet Union, the U.S. Administration has to ponder this big question:

Will Egypt, now that it has reclaimed the Sinai peninsula from Israel, inevitably drift away from its four-year-old political, economic and military partnership with the U.S.?

Although it's too early for a definite answer, it’s a good bet that the partnership, which was spawned after President Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in 1977, will face some severe, possibly crippling, strains during the months ahead.

The seed of the coming trouble lies in the continued absence of a U.S. policy to replace Camp David, which for all practical purposes seems to have run its course.

U.S. official policy is to go ahead with talks on "full autonomy" for the West Bank Palestinians on the assumption that the talks will succeed in reaching a formula on which both Egyptians and Israelis can agree—although hardly any Middle East specialists believe there is a ghost of a chance that this will happen (see The Washington Report of May 3, 1982).

Differing Motivations

Nor do the Egyptians and Israelis believe this either, in the opinion of observers. The Israelis are willing to resume the talks because they know they're planning to hold onto the West Bank whatever happens—and would like to keep the U.S. treading the Camp David path rather than thinking up new peace formulas which might require Israel to make substantial concessions. The Egyptians, on the other hand, have agreed to the talks because they had to commit themselves to do this in order to assure Israeli withdrawal from Sinai.

Some analysts think the scenario for a souring of U.S.-Egypt relations—in the event that the talks don't collapse even earlier as a result of the dispute on whether Jerusalem should be one of the sites for the discussions —will go something like this:

At some point during the resumed talks, Egypt will have to face a moment of truth: it will have to decide whether or not to put its signature to a "transitional" autonomy plan which will almost certainly not allow the Palestinians any authority over their security, land or water rights, and will not permit them to have legislative powers. Nor is it probable that the plan will contain any restrictions on Israel's drive to establish settlements on the West Bank. If President Hosni Mubarak signs such a document, however, he will lose the good will of those Arab leaders who held President Sadat responsible for "selling out" the Palestinians, but who have been giving Mubarak the benefit of the doubt in their assessment of the way he has been handling the policies which he inherited. To lose the goodwill of these Arab leaders would set back Egyptian plans which were recently described by the Egyptian Foreign Minister this way: "Egypt absolutely has not relinquished its role in the Arab countries, nor its pan-Arab goals." Egypt would also lose the opportunity to receive loans, grants and capital investment from the Arab oil-producing countries. After weighing these factors, and taking into account his own belief in Palestinian self-determination, Mubarak will not sign the autonomy document.

According to the same scenario, the U.S. will then face its own day of reckoning, when the talks founder as a result of the unbridgeable gap between the Egyptian and Israeli positions. The Administration will have two choices: either to allow Israel to go ahead, by default, with its unilaterally-imposed plans for running the West Bank—which may include outright annexation or to use its leverage to push Israel into agreeing to a formula that would be fair and acceptable to the Palestinians. There is no contemporary or historical basis for assuming that the U.S. would put the degree of pressure on Israel that would be required to achieve this result.

Huge Stakes

The final foundering of the autonomy talks will mean the burial of Camp David, and open up a whole new chapter in the Middle East. It will also bring a myriad of anxieties for U.S. policymakers. Among these will be concern for the future of the relationship with Egypt, which the U.S. has made the Arab cornerstone of its policyon the Arab-Israeli issue.

The investment in this cornerstone has been enormous, and is continuing. The U.S. is providing economic aid at a rate of more than $1 billion a year, to cover purchases of everything from population control experts to nuclear reactors. Egypt is the second largest, next to Israel, recipient of military aid, with $1.3 billion in military sales financing scheduled for the 1983 fiscal year. In the past three years, it has received over $2 billion in U.S. military aid. It has used this credit to order some of the most modern and sophisticated equipment in the U.S. arsenal, including F-4 and F-16 fighter aircraft, M-60A3 tanks, improved Hawk air defense batteries, TOW anti-tank missiles and armored personnel carriers. Some of these purchases have been made under a special "cash flow" exception to the normal credit rules—an exception also made for Israel—whereby the two countries may put in orders even though authorizations have not yet been made to cover the future payments.

The aid has gone hand in hand with a burgeoning military cooperation between the U.S. and Egypt. A joint committee for such cooperation has been established. In both 1980 and 1981 large-scale combined military maneuvers, involving thousands of U.S. troops —"Operation Bright Star"—were held on Egyptian soil. Informal arrangements have also been made for possible use of Egyptian bases by the U.S. in a crisis. The U.S. is providing financial assistance for the improvement of one of these bases, Ras Banas, on the Red Sea.

Symbolic of the growing partnership has been the increasing numbers of American citizens present in Egypt. The embassy in Cairo is now one of the largest U.S. embassies in the world. The thousands of Americans in Egypt include hundreds of U.S. military men, who help administer and provide technical assistance for the U.S. military aid program. As more hardware arrives, these numbers will grow even larger.

Ever since Mubarak took office last October, there have been indications that he has been trying to lessen his dependence on the U.S. In January, Egypt bought 20 Mirage 2000s from France for $1 billion. Earlier there had been a purchase of 30 French-West German Alpha jets for $250 million. If Mubarak can once again get access to Saudi, Kuwaiti and UAE surplus funds, he may be able to make a lot more of such purchases. Mubarak has also raised some pulse-beats in Washington by referring frequently to Egypt's foreign policy as being one of "non-alignment"—a term which has not been heard very much in Cairo since the days of President Gamal Abdul Nasser. At the same time, he has brought in Soviet technicians to help run three Soviet-built installations —the Aswan Dam, a big steel plant and an aluminum plant and has agreed to a Soviet request to expand its embassy staff in Cairo.

None of these developments are likely to cause Washington any real alarm as long as it continues to engage in wishful thinking over the Camp David autonomy talks. When the talks fail, however, leaving Israel free to consolidate its hold over the West Bank, Egypt is likely to do some re-thinking. Among the questions it will be asking itself is this: Is the "American card," which was first played by Sadat and then picked up by Mubarak, still of real value? Or will close identification with the U.S. be more of a burden for Egypt than a benefit?

How Egypt answers the question will depend onwhat kind of a policy the present Administration comes up with to replace the policy it inherited from President Carter.