Jordanian Arms and the Middle East Balance

By Anthony H. Cordesman. Washington, D.C.: The Middle East Institute, 1983. 186 pp. $15.00 (paperback)

Reviewed by James H. Ahmann

In view of the emotion which has characterized the debate over U.S. arms sales to friendly Arab states, Tony Cordesman deserves a commendation for valor.

I would predict that his book will be attacked by Israel's supporters as being generally slanted towards justifying arms sales to Jordan. On the other hand, his effort to introduce a degree of objectivity by coverage of reasonable Israeli concerns, coupled with his uncomplimentary discussion of Arab weaknesses in military organization, training, and application of technology may cause some Arabs to be less than enthusiastic in their reception of his treatise. Likewise, his unkind words on American vacillation on prior arms sales to Jordan and his questionable accusations that the U.S. provided less than its best F-4's to Egypt and less than adequate M-60 tanks to Jordan will certainly tweak the sensibilities of the policy establishment in State and Defense.

Meritorious Service

Despite all of the above and despite a hard-to-read organizational structure, an analyst's typical abundance of tabular data and the occasional difficult-to-prove conclusion, Cordesman deserves an additional award for meritorious service—since he is correct in his conclusion that the U.S. should meet Jordan's expected requests for defensive weapons systems.

Simply stated, Cordesman makes a good overall case for the following:

The modernization of the Jordanian armed forces' fighter assets with F-16's and/or F-20's and the improvement in surface-to-air missiles with mobil I-Hawks and man-portable Stingers will not provide Jordan with an offensive capability which can really threaten Israel.
Provision of such arms will increase Jordan's ability to deter a potential Syrian aggression.
King Hussein's participation is critical to progress on President Reagan's Middle East peace proposal, and a U.S. demonstration of long term support by the arms sales is needed to encourage him to participate.
The concept of the U.S. providing arms to both sides in the Arab-Israeli confrontation is anathema to some and confusing to many. However, this seemingly paradoxical policy does make sense if it is considered in the context of the following:
Peace between Israel and Arab states is a major goal of U.S. policy.
The Soviets have demonstrated that they can and will overtly support Arab states who turn to them for such support.
There are other threats to friendly Arab states—such as from Iran and from the Soviet Union.
In the final analysis, a Mideast composed of an Israel supported by the U.S., and the Arab states supported by the Soviet Union, represents an extreme danger for Israel's survival, as well as for the self determination of weaker Arab states. It also carries the risk of a calamitous East-West confrontation.

Cordesman's major argument in regard to the U.S. "remaining friends with both sides" is that such a situation creates not cause for despair but immense opportunities for both furthering the cause of peace and improving the U.S.'s capacity to protect its national interests in the area. This point is worth thoughtful consideration by the legislative branch of our government as it considers Jordan's expected requests for additional defensive arms. For that matter, it is also worthy of thoughtful consideration by the Israeli government. It is difficult to envision how a reasonable Israel could consider its safety to be enhanced, in the short or long term, by an increased number of Arab states supported militarily by a generous and hostile Soviet Union.

Sovereign Respectability

Cordesman also effectively makes the argument that accommodating the expected Jordanian arms requests will not create any major military imbalance in the area. On the contrary, it will only bring a small country, whose arms expenditures have been miniscule compared to those of its neighbors, up to a point of sovereign respectability. Such respectability will allow King Hussein to have increased confidence in the internal stability of Jordan, will provide assurance that the U.S. can be counted on as a long term friend and will give Jordan's armed forces some confidence that they can deter a Syria massively armed by the Soviet Union.

The quest for Middle East peace is so critical that it must not be damaged by a U.S. refusal to provide a relatively small amount of defensive arms to a relatively small but critical country, now significantly underarmed, whose policies, by and large, have been as closely aligned with those of the U.S. as any Arab state's policies can be. I would hope that this book, with its wealth of data and, more important, its common sense conclusions, is read and carefully considered by all who are involved in the historically critical search for peace in an area too long dominated by cruel, unproductive, and unnecessary conflict.

James H. Ahmann, Lt. Gen. (Retired) of the U.S. Air Force, is a former director of the Defense Security Assistance Agency.