Washington Report, May 16, 1983, Page 3

The Soviet Dimension

Along with the Israeli invasion and occupation of Lebanon has come a parallel development: the re-emergence of the Soviet Union as a major actor in the Arab-Israeli arena for the first time in many years.

The assumption by the Soviets of this new role since the Israeli invasion took place last June is hardly, of course, a coincidence. It stems directly from the humiliation Israeli forces inflicted on the Soviets by destroying Soviet planes, tanks and air defense equipment during the early days of the war, and has gained impetus and encouragement from the growing feeling of many Arab leaders that the U.S. has shown itself powerless either to end the occupation or to secure a broader Middle East peace. Much of this pessimism remains despite the announcement of a Lebanese-Israeli agreement on withdrawal.

What gives the Soviets their clout right now is the fact that they have not only made up Syria's equipment losses from the war, but have upgraded Syria's military potential to the point where Israel, for the first time ever, may think more than twice before using its favorite option of a "preemptive" strike in the event of a confrontation.

The principal deterrent is Syria's new air defense system, which is now based on SA-5s, one of the largest anti-aircraft missiles ever built and the principal weapon used to defend Soviet cities against attack. Batteries of these missiles have been installed at two sites in Syria, one of them about 25 miles east of Damascus and the other just outside of Homs, in the center of the country. They have a range of 150 miles, which would allow them to knock down aircraft over Israel itself. The deterrent value of the missiles is enhanced by the fact that they are operated by Soviet technicians—thus substantially raising the stakes involved in any planned attack by Israel.

The Soviets are said by Western military analysts to have replaced all 85 of the Syrian fighter planes, mainly MIG-23s, which were shot down last year by the Israeli air force. They have also delivered quantities of new T-72 tanks, Katyusha rocket launchers, SA-6 and SA-9 anti-aircraft missiles, self-propelled 122-millimeter and 155-milimeter howitzers, armored personnel carriers and trucks, among other equipment. There are now an estimated 4,500 to 5,000 Soviet technicians in Syria, including the 500 to 600 who man the SA-5 batteries, and Soviet advisors are reported to be attached to Syrian units from the brigade level down to battalion level.

A Soviet official told a Western newspaper reporter in Moscow recently that the upgrading of the Syrian armed forces was "of primarily political importance" as a show of commitment to Syria in the wake of the Lebanon war. But the buildup of Syria is only the most prominent among a number of new Soviet initiatives in the Middle East that have taken place under the leadership of Yuri Andropov and have led to closer relations with a number of Arab countries. Among those countries:

• Iraq. The Soviets have resumed shipments of military equipment to Iraq after the failure of a policy aimed at maintaining friendships on both sides of the war that Iraq and Iran have been carrying on for more than two and a half years. According to Iraq's Deputy Prime Minister Taha Yasin Ramadan, the most recent shipments are being provided to Iraq on credit.
  
  
• Egypt. The two countries have come a long way since the late President Sadat expelled the Soviet ambassador, six diplomats and more than 1,000 technicians in 1981. Egypt's Foreign Minister says that he expects Egypt and the Soviet Union to exchange ambassadors before the end of this year, and has expressed the hope that the normalization of relations will allow Egypt to obtain spare parts for its weaponry, much of which is still of Soviet make. Soviet Deputy Premier Nikolai Baibakov has made two stopovers in Cairo, and last month Egypt and the Soviet Union signed a draft agreement for a scientific and cultural cooperation agreement. Trade between the two countries rose by more than $100 million in the past year.
  
  
• Saudi Arabia. The Soviets hint repeatedly that they would like to establish diplomatic relations with the Saudis, and have not succeeded yet. However, they are getting closer. Late last year, Prince Saud bin Faisal, Saudi Arabia's foreign minister, travelled to Moscow as part of an Arab League delegation, and thereby made the first known visit by a senior Saudi official since Saudi diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union lapsed in the late 1930s. During his meeting with the delegation, Mr. Andropov made a strong bid for better Soviet-Arab relations, and Prince Saud also met separately with the Soviet foreign minister. Just two months ago, Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia told a Kuwaiti newspaper that Saudi Arabia should consider establishing diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union "at a suitable time" because, he added, ''the Soviet Union is a superpower."

The newly assertive stance of the Soviets, coming as it does at a time when Arabs tend to perceive the U.S. more than ever as incapable of reining in an aggressive Israel, has revived discussion in the area of the advisability of involving the Soviet Union in Middle East peacemaking.

For example, a Lebanese cabinet minister who is normally friendly to the United States says: "We are rapidly reaching the point where this area must be stabilized—must be cast in concrete—by joint U.S.-Soviet guarantees." Another U.S. friend in the region who is known to believe that a Soviet role is necessary is Jordan's King Hussein, and he has expressed this view repeatedly to visitors in recent weeks.

In the 1960s and early 1970s U.S. officials dealing with the Middle East used to accept it as a "given" that there could be no permanent peace settlement in the area unless the Soviets were brought into it. The idea behind the theory was that the Soviets had legitimate interests in the area which had to be protected, and that leaving the Soviets on the outside of any settlement would be destabilizing, rather than the opposite. But in 1974, after a brief fling at trying to reach a settlement of the latest Arab-Israeli war through a "Geneva Conference" at which the U.S. and the Soviet Union were co-hosts, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger decided it was in the U.S. global strategic interest to work out a deal on its own, freezing the Soviets out. For a short while during the Carter Administration the Soviets and Americans worked together again, issuing a joint communiquè in October, 1977, which discussed the future of the Palestinians. But a month afterwards, Sadat made his unexpected trip to Jerusalem, and the U.S. once again abandoned its policy of working with the Soviets in favor of giving full support to the Sadat initiative, which climaxed with the signing of agreements at Camp David by the U.S., Egypt and Israel.

One major Arab-Israeli war later, with a possible new one in the offing, many Arabs believe the outlook could not be worse if the Soviets were brought into negotiations again—and would probably turn out to be better.