Clash of Cultures: Iranian Moderates vs. Hard-liners; American Official vs. Academic Iran Specialists

By Henry Precht

Washington was recently the scene of two conferences on Iran. The first, on the U.S. Congress and Iran, featured ex-State Department and congressional staffers. No one giving a paper had spent extended time in the country.

The second session took stock of the 20th anniversary of the Iranian Revolution. It was populated by academics, mostly Iranian-Americans, who regularly return there. Not only do they know Persian, they speak academic jargon—even more impenetrable. Balancing each session was a principal speaker from the other side—an Iranian-American academic concluded for the staffers while a State Department officer opened for the academics.

The two diagnoses of Iran’s condition were cultures apart. Staffers were faithful to Washington’s perspective: accusatory, pessimistic, insistent that Iran move toward U.S. standards, little interested in the internal dynamics of Iranian politics. Iran, for all its bitter factionalism, was always discussed in the collective singular. “Iran did this, Iran supports that.” No nuances or distinctions. The superb cohesion and discipline that staffers attributed to Iranians are perhaps matched only by the Islamic regime’s propaganda about itself.

The academics focused on the outlook for President Mohammad Khatami, with whom they found little fault. Basically hopeful, most seemed convinced Iran’s march toward greater democracy was irresistible. Potholes, to be sure. Hard-line religious groups could never regain full power, although their strength should never be underestimated.

The chief challenge for Khatami, academics feared, was economic. Low oil prices constrained him from liberalizing the state-dominated economy and dealing with the urgent demands of his supporters, e.g., a million new jobs each year. Khatami also faces the power of foundations that have corruptly exploited assets they took from shah-era enterprises. Iran badly needs investment from expatriates or foreign firms: Neither is coming as long as the economy is unable to modernize and the political future remains in doubt. Academics also were troubled by weak management, especially by Khatami’s economic team.

The staffers virtually ignored Iran’s economic distress. Consequently, no one asked how a regime struggling to survive and heavily dependent on scarce resources for popular support could invest its limited income in building a military nuclear capability. Nor was there any inquiry into the threats Iran faces and how the nation should best respond to those dangers. Would it make sense to develop nuclear weapons when those facilities would be vulnerable—as Iraq was—to a pre-emptive Israeli or U.S. strike?

Washington staffers and academic specialists badly need to listen to each other.

Neither academics nor staffers discussed Iranian support for terrorism in any detail. A professor asserted the last Iranian assassination abroad was in 1992 (the killing of Kurdish dissidents in Berlin’s Mykonos restaurant).

Both sessions applauded the arrest of Iranian intelligence officers for murders of internal opponents. This was not sufficient, however, to ease Washington’s concerns, staffers complained.

They also saw no change in Iran’s opposition to the Arab-Israel peace process. Academics thought Khatami’s stated willingness to accept whatever the Palestinians would agree to put an end to that charge against the regime.

Academics questioned the future of rule by a religious jurist, suggesting that in clerical ranks and among opinion leaders there was a developing consensus to diminish the position’s unlimited powers. The role was designed for Khomeini; plainly the present Supreme Guide, Ali Khamenei, did not fill his slippers.

One expert argued that the next stage could see a shift in sovereign religious power to the seminaries, i.e., the religious establishment, away from the daily strife of politics. The idea of a completely secular future for Iran did not merit mention.

Hard- and soft-liners in Iran pay close attention to opinion polls, academics agreed. Because America was so popular with Iranians, Khatami’s TV message to the American public was aimed as much at the Iranians as the Americans. The staffers, on the other hand, said Americans continue bitterly to resent the hostage crisis. Neither group quoted poll figures.

A Test for the Administration

Both sides viewed the proposed huge Iranian purchase of American grain as a test for the Clinton administration. Staffers doubted Iran would buy after a sale was approved, but none of them suggested it be rejected. If approved, they insisted, U.S. goodwill must be reciprocated by a significant gesture from Tehran.

Academics agreed the sale would send a positive message to Tehran, but didn’t expect anything in return that might pose a political risk for Khatami. They argued for more U.S. gestures—easier visas and no ban on carpet sales.

The high point for the audience at the U.S. government officials’ session was the casual remark by former Assistant Secretary of State Richard Murphy that when Israel’s policy toward Iran changed, American policy would change the next day. Academics ignored the question. Perhaps because they so badly want a reconnected U.S. and Iran, the academics skirt the obstacles that block the way.

Plainly, a murderous ideological factionalism afflicts Iran and a great ideological chasm separates Tehran and Washington. More polite and less known is the split between Washington staffers and academic specialists. They badly need to listen to each other if the healing in the other two conflicts is to begin.

Henry Precht, a former career foreign service officer, was in charge of the State Department’s Iran Desk during the 1979 Revolution and subsequent hostage crisis.