Western Irresolution Freezes Kosovo and Bosnia Crises at Edge of Resumed Warfare

By Peter Lippman

Bosnia in late winter is covered in snow, which makes for beautiful scenery but slippery travel. The political scene is similar. Long-frozen problems are about to become unstuck, but the thaw could have dangerous results.

The case of Brcko is representative of the larger problem in Bosnia, which remains divided between a “Serbian Republic” and the Muslim-Croat Federation. Brcko is a strategically important city in northern Bosnia, located on the corridor that connects the two lobes of the Republika Srpska (RS).

The decision as to whether Brcko was to belong to the RS or the Bosnian Federation was postponed at the time of the signing of the Dayton agreement in late 1995, and has been postponed twice since then. Brcko is also of vital importance to the Federation, as it provides access to the Sava River, an important commercial transportation outlet.

Brcko was two-thirds Bosniak (Muslim) and Croat before the war. During the war it was the location of one of the worst concentration camps run by Serb extremists; 3,000 people died there. The rest of the non-Serb population was expelled, their houses and apartments taken over by local Serbs, as well as by thousands of Serbs displaced from central Bosnia and Sarajevo.

The Dayton agreement called for freedom of movement, freedom of return, and the right to regain one’s property. Indeed, there will be no real peace in Bosnia until these things take place.

But to date, a total of one Muslim has returned to the city core of Brcko. The outskirts of the city are divided, administered by Croat and Muslim governments. With the help of the international community, several thousand non-Serbs have returned to their homes in these areas.

Arbitration hearings were held in mid-February, for the third year in a row, to decide the fate of Brcko. The highest-level politicians of both entities testified as to how much they had done for return, and why the strategically situated city should belong to their entity.

There are still 860,000 displaced persons in Bosnia, and hundreds of thousands of refugees in western Europe, who are under pressure to go home. But of half a million who have returned since Dayton, only one-tenth of that number have returned to places where they would now be in the ethnic minority. The proper word for this is relocation, not return. The politicians of Bosnia have done more to obstruct return than to facilitate it.

Brcko as a district would strengthen the unitary character of Bosnia.

Besides awarding Brcko to one entity or another, a third option has been suggested: that of making Brcko a “district.” Brcko as a district would be in neither entity; it would be run by the joint institutions of the Bosnian government. The nationalist politicians oppose this because it would strengthen the unitary character of Bosnia.

Today, Bosnia is more a loose and reluctant association than a unified state. This suits the nationalists, who stay in place by maintaining control over their ethnically-homogenized constituencies. If and when the voter base in a given area becomes multi-ethnic, the nationalists lose power.

The Brcko arbitration decision was scheduled to take place in March. If it had been postponed as it was twice before, this would work in favor of continued Serb nationalist control of the city. The longer displaced persons are denied the chance to return to their homes, the more they become discouraged and start looking for other options. In 1998, 18,000 Bosnians went to the United States alone.

The top politicians in both entities threatened resignation if Brcko was given to the other side. The only thing that would prevent a war in that case would be the presence of NATO troops. On the other hand, the creation of a Brcko district will contribute to the reunification of Bosnia.

Other storms continue to swirl around Bosnia. Most obvious is the ongoing conflict in Kosovo. An agreement last October between negotiator Richard Holbrooke and Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic failed to stop Serb atrocities against the Albanian majority population. After a short pause, Serbian troops resumed shelling villages, and death squad activities increased. Since October, an additional 50,000 Albanian Kosovars have been made homeless.

Concerned about the potential for broader destabilization in the Balkans, the international community compelled the Serbs and Kosovars to meet and negotiate in February and again in March in Rambouillet, France. But the agreement they hoped to impose on the two sides was doomed. There was no possibility that the Serbian government would invite NATO troops into its country, and an agreement without the promise of independence was unthinkable for the Albanians.

An Unlearned Lesson

Lord David Owen, one of the chief negotiators for the international community during the Bosnian war, came up with a suggestion: Serbia should allow partition of Kosovo, and in return for this receive part of the territory of the Republika Srpska. Lord Owen was one of those who originally suggested cantonization for Bosnia. As such he has some responsibility for the disastrous situation there today. Apparently he has not learned his lesson.

Around the time that Owen’s suggestion was publicized, I was visiting a displaced Bosniak from Modrica (in the RS), an activist working to make return happen for his people. He told me, “Owen is my personal enemy, just like Karadzic. How dare he suggest that they give away my home to Milosevic?”

The first Rambouillet session ended in a stalemate. The international diplomats put on a brave face and wriggled out of their promise to bomb Serbia by saying, “A historic accomplishment has been made by bringing the two sides together.” Meanwhile, a massive buildup of Serbian troops is taking place on the borders with Kosovo, and spring is just around the corner.

The international community made a correctable mistake in October by signing a deal with Milosevic without requiring him to remove all his troops from Kosovo. It will now make a long-term mistake, as it did in Bosnia, if it arranges an agreement that does not ultimately allow self-determination for the Kosovars.

The West is understandably concerned with stability in Europe, and this is the basis for its Balkan policy. Unfortunately, Western diplomats need to learn that stability without justice is no stability at all. This is just as true in Bosnia as it is in Palestine.

Rather than applying band-aid palliatives, the real solution for the region would be to create democracy in Serbia and Croatia. For as long as these minor hegemonists are maneuvering for power at the expense of their neighbors, there will continue to be one atrocity after another.

The phrase “credible threat of military pressure” rolls off the lips of James Rubin, spokesman for Madeleine Albright, as if this threat were not already as devalued as the Yugoslav dinar. There is no threat in sight, and Milosevic knows this.

Given the present timorous approach of the international community, it is most likely that Milosevic will ultimately paint himself into a corner, and be removed by his own people. The Yugoslav trade union recently announced that six million people, or 65 per cent of the Yugoslav population, was living in poverty.

There are various recipes for a final breakdown of the Serbian expansionist machine. Besides Kosovo, there is also trouble in Montenegro. The government of the smaller member of the Yugoslav federation has been putting up resistance to Milosevic.

After Montenegrin President Milo Djukanovic refused to recognize Milosevic’s installation of his ally, Momir Bulatovic, as Yugoslav prime minister, the Serbian government implemented a trade blockade on Montenegro. Tension between the two republics is increasing; if hostilities break out, the third Yugoslavia would probably cease to exist.

The attempt by Milosevic and Croatian President Franjo Tudjman to divide Bosnia by war now continues by other means. The remnants of Bosnian Serb and Croat separatist leadership still make regular visits, respectively, to Belgrade and Zagreb. In spite of resistance from the international community, the urge to divide and annex Bosnia dies hard. Tudjman still makes regular declarations about the lack of an historical basis for the existence of Bosnia, and about the historical role of Croatia as Europe’s last defense against Islam.

One Bosnian politician who often visits Belgrade is Nikola Poplasen, a “Chetnik Duke” and the new president of the Republika Srpska. He is carrying on the Serb extremist tradition of obstruction of all legitimate political activity in Bosnia.

The present manifestation of this obstruction is to nominate a prime minister for the RS who will not receive the approval of the RS Parliament. Poplasen has now nominated his third doomed candidate in five months. The result of this is a governmental deadlock, and possibly a constitutional crisis.

For the hard-liners, any crisis will do. Poplasen’s latest nominee is Speaker of the RS Parliament Petar Djokic. Djokic lives in Brcko, in the house of an expelled Bosniak. He was embarrassed at the recent arbitration hearings when he was compelled to admit this. When he was asked to confirm that the mayor of Brcko, Borko Reljic, also lives in a Bosniak’s house, he replied, “Everyone knows that.”

The circle of obstruction, interference, meddling, destabilization, and general injustice comes back to Brcko. Displaced Croats and Bosniaks sit miserably in collective centers, without work, while the Bosnian politicians and international diplomats decide their fate at a leisurely pace. Something has to change. Something will give. The ice will thaw, but the outcome is unpredictable.

Peter Lippman is a human rights activist from Seattle currently working in Bosnia as a translator and free-lance journalist.