Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, April 1998, Pages 32, 101

Speaking Out

Cool Clinton Response to Khatami Initiative Shows Israel-Inspired Dual Containment Policy Not Yet Dead

By Paul Findley

Where Middle East policy is concerned, the United States suffers either from serious immaturity or, still worse, from foreign manipulation. It may be a combination of the two afflictions.

The most recent example: The U.S. administration, so far at least, has failed to grasp a dramatic diplomatic opportunity in the Gulf region.

It has made only a bland, noncommittal response to the remarkable, progressive commentary and specific proposal from Muhammad Khatami, president of Iran, during his recent televised interview with Christiane Amanpour, chief of CNN’s foreign news reporters.

Khatami suggested non-governmental exchanges between the United States and Iran as a first step toward a more normal relationship. He mentioned exchanges of journalists, scholars, and tourists as good starting points.

In other parts of his interview, Khatami explained, apologetically, the factors that led Iran to hold U.S. diplomats hostage for more than a year in 1979-81, and he expressed regret for the seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and the holding of hostages. He also made admiring reference to American fundamental principles, culture and heritage.

His comments were a sharp and welcome contrast to the “death to America” and “America the great Satan” themes that are still being shouted in parts of Iran. Khatami was clearly trying to break icy discord, extending the olive branch in a constructive, wholly non-belligerent manner.

The response of the U.S. State Department was embarrassing: “We listened with interest to President Khatami’s interview on CNN. We welcome the fact that he wants a dialogue with the American people and welcome his appreciation of the fundamental principles that form the foundation of our nation....Ultimately, real improvement in the relations between our two countries will depend not upon what the government of Iran says but what it does.”

This reads as a not-so-gentle brush-off, and inevitably it will be so interpreted by Khatami and his many powerful critics within Iran. In so many words, the U.S. government said we’re glad you recognize the greatness of our principles and glad you see the importance of getting along with us.

Note well the phrase “We welcome the fact that he wants a dialogue.” The State Department did not say, “We welcome a dialogue.”

How much better if Clinton’s administration had said, “Our entire society is rooted in the free, unfettered exchange of ideas and information, and we believe this is especially important in dealing with governments with which we have outstanding mutual grievances. Accordingly, we will cooperate enthusiastically in the exchanges you suggest.”

The response of the U.S. State Department was embarrassing.

That type of response would be a mature diplomatic response, one that arises from the recognition that the extension of communication is the way to secure a convenience and should not be considered just a compliment.

If President Clinton does not quickly come up with a generous, cooperative response he will leave a sorely embarrassed Khatami hanging, twisting in the wind—an easy target for the radical religious leadership within Iran that opposes any rapprochement with the United States and seems to have control over most foreign policy questions. The hard-liners in the Iranian government will have a field day and may well be able to discredit the new president, despite the 70 percent vote he received.

If Khatami does not receive something substantial from Washington in return for his bravery, Iran’s recent reform movements may be reversed and U.S.-Iranian relations could suffer a serious setback.

His latest initiative comes in the wake of the highly successful all-Islamic conference he recently sponsored in Iran’s capital city. Iran, mostly Shi’i Muslim, and the leaders of mostly Sunni Muslim states like Saudi Arabia, were brought together harmoniously, despite long-standing and often bloody differences between the two religious communities. The event, I believe, will go a long way in tempering this hostility, and is a tribute to the vision and wisdom of Khatami and Saudi leadership.

It is a pity that a matching level of vision and wisdom does not prevail in Washington.

In Lockstep with Israel

As usual, the U.S. government behaves in lockstep with Israeli objectives. Washington persists in the absurd dual containment policy, under which the isolation of both Iran and Iraq is sought. Most observers believe the policy is the creature of Washington-based Israeli political lobbies that see Baghdad and Tehran as twin danger points, against which America, might must be rallied on a sustained basis.

While major European states are pressing for an easing of sanctions against both Iran and Iraq, Washington, ever dutiful to Israeli demands, holds back.

In 1996, Congress enacted the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act that accuses Iran of supporting terrorism, undermining the peace process in the Middle East, interfering in the affairs of neighboring countries, and being a producer of weapons of mass destruction.

In Iranian eyes, U.S. behavior has not been exactly exemplary: helping Saddam Hussain in his long war against Iran, shooting down an Iranian airliner with 280 people—mostly Iranians—aboard, helping Israel continue its subjugation of Palestinians, and constantly criticizing the Tehran regime for its domestic policies.

Terrorism is often in the eye of the beholder, and so is battling for justice. Iran has no difficulty justifying its support of activities that seek to remove Israeli military forces from Lebanese and Syrian soil and help Palestinians battle against Israeli destruction of human rights and takeover of their land. To Iranians—and Arabs—these practices are responses to injustice and in no sense deserve the label of terrorism.

And, when weapons of mass destruction are up for discussion, Iran points to these well-established facts: Israel possesses at least 200 nuclear warheads—which the United States helped to bring into being—and the United States owns thousands of these awful instruments. To Iran, these facts reduce to a hollow ring American lamentations against the possibility—only the possibility—of Iran gaining control of its own weapons of mass destruction.

Dr. Wolf Fuhrig, a political scientist whose commentaries deserve wide attention, offered sound advice to President Clinton five weeks ago: “Sooner rather than later, the president and the secretary of state need to recognize that a more pragmatic approach toward Iran and its incoming president might be in the best interests of all concerned.”

Fuhrig finds that developments since that time give validity to his appraisal. He sees Khatami’s comments as a challenge to Iran’s present religious authorities and an implicit rejection of the warning of the late Ayatollah Khomeini that it was “unseemly” for Iran and America, “the lamb and the wolf,” to have contacts with each other.

He considers Khatami’s initiative “fraught with grave risks,’’ as most of the politically powerful Iranian clergy is hostile to normalizing relations. He finds “millions of Iranians, particularly the more educated men and women younger than 50, are obviously yearning for less theocracy, more personal freedoms and an opening to the rest of the world.”

Clinton would be wise to follow the lead of Arab leaders who have taken a step of rapprochement with Tehran. Beyond its positive impact on regional politics, it should garner good marks in tomorrow’s history books. In a sense, he could “do a Nixon.” President Richard Nixon secured his place in history by pulling down the wall between China and the United States. By embracing Khatami’s proposal, Clinton would enhance his own prestige and boost the influence of the courageous and beleaguered Iranian president.