wrmea.com

April/May 1997, pgs. 70-72

MIDDLE EAST HISTORY—IT HAPPENED IN APRIL

International Community Forces U.S. to Recognize the PLO And Palestinians

By Donald Neff

It was nine years ago, on April 26, 1988, when the 15-member International Court of Justice at The Hague ruled unanimously against the United States in its attempt to close the Palestine Liberation Organization observer mission at the United Nations.1 The ruling was yet another setback for Washington in its 20-year struggle with the world community over recognizing the national rights of the Palestinians. Before America finally lost this little-noted but titanic contest at the end of 1988, Secretary of State George P. Shultz and the United States would suffer not only defeat but one of the greatest embarrassments in U.S. diplomatic history.

The PLO had been around since 1964, but the struggle against it only began in earnest after Israel’s 1967 war. It was then that Israel more than doubled the territory under its control by launching surprise attacks that ended with the capture of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights.2 Israel’s occupation of these additional Arab lands elicited the anxious attention of the U.N. General Assembly, where the membership included many nations once under the yoke of colonialism. Starting in 1968, the assembly began passing a series of resolutions that by 1974 had recognized an array of the “inalienable rights” of the Palestinians and effectively established the legal and moral framework for Palestinian nationalism.

During the six-year period, General Assembly resolutions officially recognized the Palestinians as a distinct people “entitled to equal rights and self-determination;”3 confirmed the “legality of the peoples’ struggle for self-determination and liberation… by all available means consistent with the Charter of the United Nations;”4 and concluded that a “just and lasting peace” could not be achieved unless the Palestinians received their inalienable rights and enjoyed self-determination.5

Finally, in 1974, the General Assembly took the historic step of inviting PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat to address it on the political struggle and human suffering caused by Israel’s occupation. At the same time it awarded observer status to the PLO, meaning the Palestinians at last had official standing in the international community.6

All these actions were ardently opposed by Israel, and it effectively exerted its influence in the U.S. media to help paint the General Assembly as a hotbed of anti-Semitism. Under adverse news coverage and a pro-Israel political climate, American support for the U.N. dropped off even further—it had never been popular among the far-right—and Americans generally kept their backs turned to the plight of the Palestinians.

Widespread Indifference

This widespread indifference to a cruel and illegal occupation was abetted by an astounding growth of Israel’s influence in Washington from the mid-1960s onwards. The increased influence was not only in the Congress, accurately described by critics as “Israeli-occupied territory,” but in the White House as well.7 The days of Dwight Eisenhower’s coolness toward the Jewish state had been replaced by the Johnson administration. Lyndon Johnson was not only personally a strong supporter of Israel but he was surrounded by Israel’s sympathizers keen to do all they could to help the Jewish state. His successor, Richard Nixon, was less so. But one of his principal advisers was Henry Kissinger, one of Israel’s greatest friends. By the time of America’s supreme embarrassment in 1988, one of the most pro-Israel presidents ever, Ronald Reagan, was in the White House. His secretary of state was George Shultz, who seemed indefatigable in finding new services to render Israel.

Israel’s increased influence in Washington was a major reason why the United States was at odds with most of the world community over the issue of the PLO and Palestinian rights. Washington voted against all of the General Assembly resolutions conferring those rights. This thoroughly pro-Israel stand found the United States over the years frequently alone with Israel while all the rest of the world voted another way.

Despite the U.N.’s formidable opposition, Israel had a trump card, which it deftly played during negotiations on the 1975 Sinai II disengagement accords. As a condition for its partial withdrawal from Egyptian territory, Israel demanded that the United States not recognize or deal with the PLO until it met a number of conditions, including the renunciation of terrorism. Kissinger foolishly agreed, thereby limiting the ability of American diplomats to influence one side of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Congress sealed into law this Israeli demand by passing a statute in 1985 that essentially repeated Kissinger’s commitment:

“No officer or employee of the United States Government and no agent or other individual acting on behalf of the United States Government shall negotiate with the Palestine Liberation Organization or any representatives thereof (except in emergency or humanitarian situations) unless and until the Palestine Liberation Organization recognizes Israel’s right to exist, accepts United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and renounces the use of terrorism.”8

But the international community was not to be denied its championing of the rights of the Palestinians. The next year, in 1986, the General Assembly on Dec. 4 condemned Israel’s continuing occupation and urged all members to cut off all aid to Israel in order to force it to abide by the U.N. Charter.9 That resolution was just one of 24 passed against Israel that year by the assembly.10 At about the same time, on Dec. 8, the Security Council “strongly deplored” the recent killings of two Palestinian students by Israeli soldiers. The vote was 14-0 with the United States abstaining.11

In 1987 Secretary of State Shultz summarily ordered the PLO information office in Washington closed on Sept. 15. Shultz issued the order despite the fact that there were no allegations of illegal activities. In fact, the office had legally operated in Washington since 1978 as a duly registered foreign agent. Its director, Hassan Abdel Rahman, was a naturalized American citizen from Ramallah. Thus Shultz’s order closing the information-dispersing office without cause was a prima facie case of denying an American freedom of speech.

In order to get around this constitutional problem, the State Department unilaterally declared the office a “foreign mission,” and claimed that the secretary of state was exercising his authority to order it closed under the Foreign Missions Act. The reason for the closure, said a spokesman for Shultz, was to “demonstrate U.S. concern over terrorism committed and supported by organizations and individuals affiliated with the PLO.”

In fact, Shultz had taken his action when anti-PLO bills were pending in both the Senate and the House and it had become clear that Israel’s supporters in Congress were going to pass legislation outlawing the PLO.12

Less than three months later, the Palestinian intifada erupted in the occupied territories, causing untold suffering. Israel’s brutal efforts to suppress the stone-throwing Palestinians brought renewed condemnation from the world community, and even an occasional critical word from the United States. Mostly, however, Washington continued its role as Israel’s protector in the U.N.

Shultz finally overreached himself in 1988 by taking a series of actions that brought great embarrassment to himself and his country. The debacle began when he tried to get the PLO’s mission kicked out of the U.N. The General Assembly snapped back on March 2, 1988, by declaring that the U.S. effort to close the observer mission was a breach of America’s treaty obligations to the United Nations. It ordered that the issue be arbitrated under provisions of the treaty. The vote was an embarrassing 143 to 1 (Israel), with the United States abstaining. In a separate resolution, the General Assembly voted that the International Court of Justice should give an advisory opinion on whether the United States was obliged to enter into arbitration. The vote was 143 with America and Israel abstaining,

The next day the assembly voted 148 to 2 (Israel and United States) condemning America’s moves and urging it to honor the 1947 Headquarters Treaty. The treaty said that the United States must provide free access to the U.N. headquarters in New York to anyone invited there by the General Assembly.13

The matter went to the U.S. federal court as well as the World Court. On June 29, Judge Edmund L. Palmieri of the Federal District Court in Manhattan followed the World Court’s lead and ruled against the Shultz effort, saying it was a violation of the Headquarters Agreement.14 The Reagan administration did not appeal the issue.15

The struggle between the United States and the world community intensified in late 1988 when Secretary of State Shultz once again intervened to combat the PLO. On Nov. 26 he personally denied a visa to PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat to enter the United States for an appearance before the U.N. General Assembly. Shultz said the action was justified because Arafat had “associations with terrorism” and therefore was a security threat to America. Arafat had been invited by the General Assembly to address the issue of Palestine in early December.16

Shultz’s action was not only a violation of the Headquarters Agreement but was widely seen as a petty response to the U.N. support of the PLO. Former CIA analyst Kathleen Christison wrote: “His decision, taken on his own without prior presidential approval, to deny Yasser Arafat a visa…is a striking example of a policy adopted out of personal pique.”17 Nonetheless, 68 senators (33 Democrats, 35 Republicans) signed a letter to him applauding his efforts.18

However, international opposition to the United States was overwhelming. Vatican Radio said the decision was like “throwing cold water on the PLO.”19 Clovis Maksoud, Arab League ambassador to the United Nations, said: “It is not for the U.S. to decide who speaks for the Palestinians on a particular issue.”20 PLO spokesman Bassam Abu Sharif wrote an article explaining the evolution of the Palestinians’ struggle and urged: “…give peace a visa.”21

On Nov. 29, the General Assembly expressed its revulsion at Shultz’s stand. It voted 121 to 2 (United States and Israel voting against) to urge the United States to reverse its denial of the visa. But Shultz said: “I think it was the right decision. I stick by it.” He said the reason for his decision was his concern with terrorism. “I am afraid that it’s too easy for people to forget what an important problem that is and what a threat it is to civilized society.”22

The General Assembly had other ideas about what constituted a threat to civilized society. It responded with a 152-2-1 vote (U.S. and Israel against, Britain abstaining) “deploring” America’s refusal to reconsider. The General Assembly then took a stunning action. It made the unprecedented decision on Dec. 2 to move its regular session to Geneva so Arafat’s message could be heard. It was the first time in the U.N.’s history that the General Assembly moved its session outside of New York. The vote was 154-2-1. with the U.S. and Israel against and Britain abstaining.23

Soon more than 150 diplomats representing the governments of the world and hundreds of their aides packed their bags and traveled en masse to Switzerland. It was perhaps the most extraordinary event in the history of the United Nations. Certainly it was the sharpest defiance of the United States ever witnessed in the world body.

The embarrassment for Shultz and the United States did not stop there. On Dec. 13, Arafat appeared before the General Assembly in Geneva and made a dramatic gesture toward peace. He said in an 80-minute speech that “I come to you in the name of my people, offering my hand so that we can make true peace, peace based on justice.” He condemned terrorism “in all its forms” and sought a settlement among “Palestine, Israel and other neighbors, within the framework of the international conference for peace in the Middle East on the basis of Resolutions 242 and 338….”24

Despite Arafat’s public compliance with the demands put forth by Washington to earn its recognition, the State Department made the astonishing assertion that he had failed to accomplish that. Spokesman Charles E. Redman said America’s conditions—rejection of terror, acceptance of Resolutions 242 and 338 and recognition of Israel—“must be addressed clearly, squarely, without ambiguity. That didn’t happen and, as a consequence, the speech did not meet our conditions.”25

At a press conference the next day, Arafat unambiguously declared: “…it was clear that we mean…the right of all parties concerned in the Middle East conflict to exist in peace and security, and, as I have mentioned, including the state of Palestine, Israel and other neighbors, according to the Resolutions 242 and 338. As for terrorism, I renounced it yesterday in no uncertain terms, and yet, I repeat for the record…that we totally and absolutely renounce all forms of terrorism, including individual, group and state terrorism.”26

Such plain language and clear professions of peace could not be ignored. Arafat, backed by the international community, had finally forced Washington’s hand. The official response came a few hours later when President Reagan officially announced that as a result of Arafat’s pledge, “I have authorized the State Department to enter into a substantive dialogue with PLO representatives.”27

That same evening, a defeated Shultz called a press conference in the State Department and tried to keep up a proud front. He noted the conciliatory nature of Arafat’s remarks and said: “As a result, the United States is prepared for a substantive dialogue with PLO representatives. I am designating our ambassador in Tunisia as the only authorized channel for that dialogue….Nothing here may be taken to imply an acceptance or recognition by the United States of an independent Palestinian state. The position of the U.S. is that the status of the West Bank and Gaza cannot be determined by unilateral acts of either side, but only through a process of negotiations. The United States does not recognize the declaration of an independent Palestinian state. It is also important to emphasize that the United States commitment to the security of Israel remains unflinching.”28

Despite his words, Shultz proved to the end to be Israel’s willing servant.29 At U.S. insistence, the talks in Tunisia were narrowly focused and the PLO’s access to U.S. officials was restricted to Robert H. Pelletreau Jr., the U.S. ambassador in Tunis, not exactly the highest level of U.S. policymakers. Yet even these strict proscriptions did not satisfy Israel.

Under persistent heavy pressure from Israel and its U.S. friends, especially those in Congress such as Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina,30 the White House finally succumbed and broke off this modest dialogue. The Bush administration announced on May 30, 1990, it was suspending the talks because the PLO refused to apologize for a terrorist attack against Israel in which no Israelis were killed and even though the PLO probably had nothing to do with it. 31

Thus by mid-1990, the United States was right back again ignoring the PLO as it had for two decades. It was only after Israel itself accepted in the 1993 Oslo accords the fact that the PLO could no longer be ignored that the White House finally recognized the PLO as a full partner in the peace process.32

All told, it was a shameful chapter in U.S. history, largely perpetuated by three secretaries of state, Kissinger, Alexander Haig and Shultz, and three presidents, Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon (unintentionally) and Ronald Reagan. If the United States had had the courage of its convictions and had honored its international commitments, many lives would have been saved and America’s claim to being an “honest broker” would ring truer. Instead, it was a period of cynical subservience to a foreign country for domestic political gain that no American can be proud of. Yet, under Bill Clinton, this myopic policy of subservience to Israel continues today.

The optimistic note in this doleful tale is that the international community remains committed to seeing justice for the Palestinians. There is, after all, the demonstrable fact that even the United States at its most arrogant can eventually be made to bow somewhat to world opinion and the ideals of the U.N. Charter. Who knows, if the international community keeps up its pressure, the United States might some day actually become an even-handed mediator in the Middle East.

RECOMMENDED READING

Epp, Frank, H., Whose Land is Palestine?, Grand Rapids, Michigan, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1974.

Kimche, David, The Last Option: After Nasser, Arafat, and Saddam Hussein, New York, Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1991.

Neff, Donald, Fallen Pillars: U.S. Policy towards Palestine and Israel since 1945, Washington, DC, Institute for Palestine Studies, 1995.

Nyrop, Richard F., (ed.), Israel: a Country Study (2nd ed.), Washington, DC, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979.

Simpson, Michael, United Nations Resolutions on Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: 1982-1986, Washington, DC, Institute for Palestine Studies, 1988.

U.S. Senate and U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Relations and Committee on Foreign Affairs, Legislation on Foreign Relations Through 1986 (vol. 1), Washington, DC, U.S. Government Printing Office, March 1987.

FOOTNOTES

  1. Paul Lewis, New York Times, 4/27/88.
  2. The U.N. 1947 partition plan alloted Israel 5,900 square miles, but Israel had enlarged its frontiers to nearly 8,000 square miles by the end of the 1948-49 war. It captured 20,870 square miles in 1967; see Nyrop (ed.), Israel: a country study, p. xix. Also see Epp, Whose Land is Palestine? p. 185; Foundation for Middle East Peace, Report on Israeli Settlement in the Occupied Territories, Special Report, July 1991.
  3. #2672 (XXV).
  4. #2787 (XXVI).
  5. #3089 (XXVIII).
  6. Neff, Fallen Pillars, p. 114.
  7. Ibid., pp. 119-21.
  8. U.S. Senate and U.S. House of Representatives, Legislation on Foreign Relations Through 1986, pp. 359-60. The law’s official title is Codification of Policy Prohibiting Negotiations with the Palestine Liberation Organization.
  9. Resolution 41/162 A, B, C. The text is in Simpson, United Nations Resolutions on Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1982-1986, pp. 206-09.
  10. Jules Kagian, Middle East International, 9/1/87, p. 11.
  11. Resolution 592. The text is in Simpson, United Nations Resolutions on Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1982-1986, p. 231; see Frank Collins, “The Iron Fist:A Policy of Provocation,” Middle East International, 2/6/88.
  12. Elaine Sciolino, New York Times, 9/15/87. Texts of the various documents are in American-Arab Affairs, Number 22, Fall 1987, pp. 115-20. Also see Richard Curtiss, “USLeaders Protest Palestine Information Office Closure Order,”Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, Vol. VI, No. 7, November 1987. For the PLO’s side, see Hassan Abdel Rahman in The Washington Post Outlook Section, “Evicting the Palestinians,” 11/29/87; Rajai M. Abu-Khadra, “The Closure of the PLOOffices,”Journal of Palestine Studies, Spring 1988, pp. 51-62.
  13. Marvine Howe, New York Times, 3/3-4/88. Also see Rajai M. Abu-Khadra, “The Closure of the PLOOffices,” Journal of Palestine Studies, Spring 1988, pp. 51-62.
  14. Arnold H. Lubasch, New York Times, 6/30/88.
  15. Robert Pear, New York Times, 8/30/88.
  16. Don Oberdorfer, Washington Post, 11/27/88; the same edition carries the text of the State Department statement, as does the New York Times of the same date, and Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 89, No. 2143, February 1989.
  17. Kathleen Christison, “The Arab-Israeli Policy of George Shultz,”Journal of Palestine Studies, Winter 1989, p. 30.
  18. John M. Goshko, Washington Post, 12/2/88. Among the signers were VicePresident-elect Dan Quayle and Republican Minority Leader Bob Dole; Democratic Majority Leader George Mitchell declined.
  19. Karen DeYoung, Washington Post, 11/29/88. For a profile of Arafat and his mood at this time, see Marie Colvin, “The Ambiguous Yasser Arafat,” TheNew York Times Sunday Magazine, 12/18/88.
  20. Paul Lewis, New York Times, 11/29/88.
  21. Bassam Abu Sharif, “A Message from the PLO:Give Peace a Visa,”text in Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. XVIII, No. 3, Spring 1989.
  22. Robert Pear, New York Times, 11/30/88.
  23. Washington Post, 12/3/88.
  24. The text is in Journal of Palestine Studies, “Documents and Source Material,”Spring 1989, pp. 161-71; excerpts are in New York Times, 11/17/88.
  25. New York Times, 12/14/88; the text of Redman’s remarks is in the same edition. Also see Kimche, The Last Option, p. 298.
  26. Text of Arafat’s statement is in New York Times, 12/15/88, and “Documents and Source material,”Journal of Palestine Studies, Spring 1989, pp. 180-81. For an excellent profile of Arafat at this time, see T.D. Allman, “On the Road with Arafat,” Vanity Fair, February 1989, reprinted in Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, September 1989.
  27. The text is in “Documents and Source Material,” Journal of Palestine Studies, Spring 1989, pp. 184-85.
  28. The text is in New York Times, 12/15/88, and Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 89, No. 2143, February 1989. A small group of Jewish Americans including international lawyer Rita Hauser had met personally with Arafat and came away convinced of his sincerity. Despite wide criticism from leaders of organized Jewry, the Hauser group was an influential voice in the debate over recognition; Paula Span, Washington Post Style Section, 12/30/88. In addition, President-elect Bush and National Security Adviser Colin Powell pressured Shultz to accept Arafat’s pledge; Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, Washington Post, 12/16/88.
  29. Shultz went so far in his partisanship in 1987 as to inaugurate the George Shultz doctoral Fellowships at Tel Aviv University and personally contributed $10,000 to the program; see Glenn Frankel, Washington Post, 10/19/87. It is unlikely that any sitting secretary ever took such a biased action while trying to mediate in a divided region.
  30. James M. Dorsey, Washington Times, 7/21/89. Also see Journal of Palestine Studies, “Documents and Source Material,” Vol. XIX, No. 1, Autumn 1989, pp. 169-70.
  31. Thomas L. Friedman, New York Times, 6/21/90. Texts of official PLO statements on the issue are in Journal of Palestine Studies, “Documents and Source Material,”Autumn 1990, pp. 159-63, the text of President Bush’s comments is in the same journal, pp. 186-90.
  32. The Oslo texts are in New York Times and Washington Post, 9/10/93. For an analysis of them, see Burhan Dajani, “The September 1993 Israeli-PLODocuments:A Textural Analysis,”Journal of Palestine Studies , Spring 1994.