American Engineer Under Investigation For Passing Secrets to Israel

by Shawn L. Twing

Pentagon and FBI officials announced in February that a civilian employee of the U.S. Army’s Tank Armor Automotive Command (TACOM) in Warren, MI is under investigation for allegedly passing classified information to Israel. David Tenenbaum, a 39-year-old Jewish mechanical engineer from Southfield, MI, apparently admitted to U.S. investigators during a routine security clearance polygraph exam that he had “inadvertently” passed classified information to Israel for the past 10 years.

According to FBI affidavits, Tenenbaum provided technical data about the U.S. Army’s Bradley infantry fighting vehicle (IFV), ceramic and reactive tank armor, Patriot missile countermeasures, and other information on U.S. military research and development to every Israeli liaison officer working at TACOM during the past decade, as well as to Dr. Reuven Granot, scientific deputy director in Israel’s Ministry of Defense.

Almost immediately after U.S. officials announced an investigation into the matter, there was widespread speculation in Israel and in the United States that it might touch off another “Pollard affair,” referring to the arrest and imprisonment in 1985-86 of U.S. naval counter-intelligence analyst Jonathan Pollard, a civilian employee who was arrested by the FBI after he sought refuge in the Israeli Embassy in Washington, DC.

Unlike the aftermath of Pollard’s arrest, however, which U.S. Jewish leaders feared would trigger public suspicions of Jewish U.S. government officials, there have been few press reports about the Tenenbaum investigation since the story first appeared in The Washington Post.

The lack of reporting created fertile ground for speculation. Available evidence to date, however, suggests a fundamental difference in the information given to Israel by the two men. Pollard provided his handlers, who operated from the Israeli Embassy in Washington, DC, with an estimated 800,000 highly classified documents. These apparently included U.S. satellite imagery, intelligence codes and code-breaking techniques, the identities of U.S. intelligence officers working abroad, and other highly sensitive and potentially damaging information pertaining to U.S. security activities all over the world.

There have been few press reports about the Tenenbaum investigation

Although Tenenbaum allegedly gave away technical data on U.S. weapons systems and armor, its usefulness to Israel was more for commercial than military advantage. The Bradley IFV, for example, is a light armored vehicle developed for the U.S. Army. One Israeli company, Elbit, offers several upgrades for the Bradley, as does Elbit’s wholly-owned American subsidiary Elbit Fort Worth (EFW) Inc., which employs approximately 100 people in Texas. It is possible that information given by Tenenbaum indirectly helped Elbit develop products for the Bradley IFV, which were then sold to the United States or other countries.

Israeli companies also are well known for their involvement in ceramic and reactive armor designs for tanks and other armored vehicles. Reactive armor, for example, is an advanced defense product consisting of a series of explosives attached to the outside of armored vehicles that explode upon impact from anti-tank weapons. The exploding armor redirects the kinetic and explosive energy from the weapon away from the tank’s underlying steel frame, which adds significantly to the chances for crew survival. Access to information about ceramic and reactive armor, test data, and other research and development available from work done at TACOM could have given Israel an edge over American companies in bidding both for U.S. and foreign military work. For example, in 1996, the Pentagon paid to an undisclosed Israeli company $14 million to upgrade American armored vehicles with Israeli-produced reactive armor.

This case highlights Israel’s ability to collect intelligence in the United States, which is a continuing concern to American officials. A 1996 U.S. General Accounting Office report entitled “Defense Industrial Security: Weaknesses in U.S. Security Arrangements With Foreign-Owned Defense Contractors,” stated that Israel “conducts the most aggressive espionage operation against the United States of any U.S. ally.” (See the April 1996 Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, page 14 for details of the GAO report and its specific findings.)

The GAO report’s findings show a pattern of Israeli espionage aimed particularly at advanced U.S. military hardware. The information obtained is passed on to Israeli military officials and industry representatives for use by Israel’s myriad defense companies.

A Pattern of Abuses

Without access to confidential U.S. and Israeli information, it is impossible to determine whether information provided to Israeli liaison officers at TACOM later was used by Israeli defense companies. Meanwhile, however, circumstantial evidence strongly suggests this is the case. Numerous publicly available reports, including the GAO report cited above, show a pattern of abuses of Israel’s privileged strategic relationship with Washington. The “Tenenbaum affair” may or may not end up as another entry in a long list of Israeli clandestine activities in or against the United States which have come to the attention of U.S. counter-intelligence investigators over the years.