April/May 1997 pgs. 29, 85
Special Report
Israel Seeks U.S. Permission to Launch Rockets
From NASA Facility in Virginia
by Shawn L. Twing
The Clinton administration currently is considering
a request by the Israeli-government-owned defense conglomerate Israel
Aircraft Industries (IAI) to launch its Shavit II rocket
from a NASA flight center in Wallops Island, VA. The Shavit II,
or Next, is a four-stage rocket designed to launch lightweight
satellites into low Earth orbit. IAIs request is the most
recent in more than three years of attempts by the Israeli company
to gain access to the U.S. commercial and military launch markets.
If approved, the door will be open for Israel to compete in what
industry experts predict will be an extremely lucrative market in
the near future, potentially to the detriment of U.S. companies
in the satellite-launching business, and possibly in violation of
U.S. commitments to prevent missile proliferation.
In Israels Interest
For Israel, it is imperative that the Clinton administration
agree to IAIs request for several reasons. First, and most
importantly, Israel hopes to recoup the billions of dollars it has
invested in its space and missile industries. The Shavit series
of launchers and the successful 1993 launch of Israels Ofeq-3
spy satellite have consumed substantial sums of money which IAI
hopes to regain by selling the Shavit II on the international market.
This will be virtually impossible, however, if IAI doesnt
find a launch facility outside Israel. According to John Pike, director
of the space policy project at the Washington, DC-based Federation
of American Scientists, Israel verges on being a space-locked
country.
The reasons, Pike explained, have to do with the physics
of space launch. Rockets must travel in the neighborhood of 18,000
miles per hour to leave the Earths atmosphere. Given the speed
and direction at which the Earth rotates, launching due east adds
approximately 1,000 miles per hour (at the equator) to a rockets
velocity. For political reasons, however, Israel is forced to launch
due west, which means it loses nearly 1,000 miles per hour. This
translates into a 10 to 20 percent loss in payload-carrying capabilities,
according to Pike. If Israel wants to be a player in the launch
market, they have to find another place to launch, he said.
IAI has another very specific reason for wanting access
to a U.S. launch facility. Earlier this year, IAI and Pasadena,
CA-based Core Software Technology formed a company called West Indian
Space Limited, a 50-50 joint venture incorporated in the Cayman
Islands. West Indian Space hopes to launch Israeli-built satellites
on Israeli-produced launchers as part of a plan to make commercial
satellite imagery available via the Internet in an easily accessible
and user-friendly format designed by Core Software Technology. If
successful, West Indian Space could quickly gain the upper hand
in what some estimates suggest will be a $6 billion commercial satellite
imagery market.
The first of the companies 10 planned satellites
will be launched into orbit on a Russian rocket, but Core Software
chief executive officer Steve Wilson told the Washington Report
that we would like to use the Shavit down the road.
He said that neither of the partners in the joint venture want their
satellites in orbits available through launching from Israel. Further,
it would significantly reduce costs if IAI is able to launch its
satellites from the United States on its own delivery vehicles.
Causes for Concern
There are two primary concerns for Clinton administration
officials considering the IAI request: proliferation and U.S. commercial
interests. On the proliferation side, the United States is a party
to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), a 25-member international
suppliers cartel established in 1987 to slow the spread of nuclear-capable
missile delivery systems. Allowing Israel, which has never signed
the MTCR, to launch the Shavit II from the United States appears
to violate the spirit, if not the letter, of U.S. commitments under
that agreement.
The goal of the MTCR is to restrict the proliferation
of missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles and related technology. Included
in its definition of missiles are space launch vehicles. There is,
however, a loophole for space launch systems, but it does not affect
this particular case. According to the MTCR guidelines, the regime
is not designed to impede national space programs or international
cooperation in such programs as long as such programs could not
contribute to delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction
(emphasis added). Israels Shavit is one such system.
The convertibility of commercial launch vehicles into
nuclear-capable ballistic missiles varies with individual missiles,
but the Shavit could be converted easily into that role. According
to the most recent publication of Janes Sentinel, a
country-by-country assessment of economic and military capabilities,
the Shavit could be modified for military purposes and converted
into a powerful ballistic missile with a range of 4,500 kilometers
and 1,100 kilograms. MTCR guidelines use a baseline of a 500-kilogram
payload and range of 300 kilometers, which the Shavit clearly and
dramatically exceeds.
Israel has argued repeatedly that the Shavit rocket
is not related to Israels military missile systems. But IAI
also produces the Jericho I and Jericho II missiles, which are the
foundation of Israels nuclear deterrent. It is impossible,
officials say, to buy the Shavit without supporting the development
of and/or underwriting investment in the Jericho I and II. And,
as FAS president John Pike put it, the Shavit certainly looks
a lot like the Jericho II.
Another potential loophole is Israels adherent
status under the MTCR. Although its not a full-fledged member,
Israel and several other countries have announced unilaterally that
they adhere to the MTCRs guidelines, which created a new,
informal sub-class under the MTCR. Adherents are exempted from the
legal ramifications associated with violating the regimes
provisions, but are not conferred the benefits of MTCR membership.
In addition to Israel's adherent status, others believe
there are unreported bilateral agreements between the United States
and Israel. Carnegie Endowment scholar and respected authority on
nonproliferation Leonard Specter told the Washington Report that
Israel and the U.S. may have signed a secret agreement
giving Israel privileged status in its missile technology
relationship with the United States. That agreement was alluded
to by President Clinton on March 15, 1993 when he announced that
the United States and Israel have begun a dialogue intended
to raise our relationship to a new level of strategic partnership.
The presidents remarks came during a visit by then-Israeli
Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. It was later reported in Israels
Hebrew newspapers that Clinton promised Rabin that Israel could
compete in Americas commercial space launch market. Preparing
the groundwork for that promise, the Clinton administration announced
in 1993 that it would allow for the importation of Israeli-built
space launch vehicle components into the United States, a move that
met with severe criticism from nonproliferation experts and U.S.
industry officials.
The focus of U.S. nonproliferation concerns was articulated
two years ago when IAI teamed up with American defense contractor
TRW, Inc. and tried to gain permission to launch satellites for
the U.S. Air Force. A member of the presidents National Security
Council pointed out the contradiction inherent in the United States
buying space launch vehicles from a warm assembly line
that also produces nuclear-capable ballistic missiles, especially
from a non-member of the Missile Technology Control Regime. That
argument was crucial to denying IAIs 1993 request, and it
remains valid.
U.S. Commercial Interests
U.S. industry representatives also are concerned that
allowing Israel access to launch sites in the United States would
help IAI compete unfairly with U.S. companies. IAI, they say, can
charge less per launch than American companies partly because the
Israeli company does not pay U.S. taxes (some of which are used
to build and maintain Americas national space launch infrastructure,
including NASAs flight center in Wallops Island).
Not only does IAI not have to pay American taxes,
Israel in general and Israel Aircraft Industries in particular have
been recipients of enormous sums of American tax revenue. Since
1948, Israel has received in excess of $80 billion (unadjusted for
inflation) in foreign aid from the United States. Further, since
the first time Israel asked for and received a one time only
provision in 1977 to use $107 million in U.S. foreign military aid
in-country for its Merkava main battle tank, the U.S. has given
Israel $4.882 billion in taxpayer grants to buy products from its
own defense companies (a provision not given to any other recipient
of U.S. foreign aid). IAI, Israels largest defense company,
has been the principle beneficiary of this American largess.
Prognosis
It is difficult to predict the Clinton administrations
decision on IAIs pending request. As with other aspects of
U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East, deciding whether or not
to allow IAI access to U.S. launch facilities probably will focus
more on unrelated topics, like Israels role in the peace process,
rather than on the dangers or merits of the individual request.
Depending on the political mood in Washington, the United States
may try to reward Israelmaybe for a surprise decision
not to build a Jewish settlement in Har Homaor conversely,
may try to reprimand Israel if Prime Minister Netanyahu
continues his defiance and intransigence on the U.S.-brokered peace
process.
Linking these largely unrelated topics could be dangerous
to U.S. strategic and economic interests. Allowing Israel access
to Wallops Island could, at the very least, erode the perception
of the United States as an honest broker in Arab-Israeli negotiations.
It is impossible for the Clinton administration to encourage arms
control and nonproliferation in the Middle East among the Arab countries
and Iran, while simultaneously supporting Israels missile
programs by allowing IAI space launches in the United States. The
two simply are not reconcilable.
It also is important to consider the economic interests
of American companies in the space launch industry. More launches
mean more revenue for American companies and more jobs for American
workers. Allowing foreign launches, especially less expensive U.S.-taxpayer-subsidized
foreign launches, will erode Americas competitive edge is
this rapidly developing market. |