U.S. Press Speculation and Clinton Statement Threaten Saudi F-16 Buy

by Shawn L. Twing

Press speculation and public statements made by President Bill Clinton during Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s February visit to the United States postponed and may have undermined a potential $30 billion sale to Saudi Arabia of F-16 fighters and related weapons, training and hardware by Bethesda, MD-based defense giant Lockheed Martin.

News of the impending sale first appeared in the Jan. 30 Washington Times. At that time it was widely believed that Saudi Defense Minister Prince Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, brother of King Fahd, planned to sign agreements with Lockheed Martin during his February visit to the United States. But then public speculation as to Saudi Arabia’s motives for the purchase, and potentially damaging statements made by President Clinton during a Feb. 13 press conference with Prime Minister Netanyahu, are believed to have contributed to a Saudi decision to postpone the planned purchase until at least the end of the year.

In the Washington Times article, staff writers Bill Gertz and Warren Strobel wrote that some U.S. government officials “view the F-16 deal as a payoff to President Clinton and an effort to patch over the problems growing out of the Khobar Towers investigation.” Also mentioned in the article were complaints a week earlier by FBI Director Louis Freeh and U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno of alleged lack of cooperation by Saudi investigators into the truck bombing that killed 19 Americans in Saudi Arabia last year.

Although the authors of the Times article also discussed more likely explanations for the purchase, particularly the financial windfall provided to Saudi Arabia by relatively high, stable world oil prices, the notion that it was politically-motivated was picked up in the American press. This speculation ignored the two to three years of negotiations between Saudi Arabia and Lockheed Martin concerning the F-16 purchase that preceded Prince Sultan’s Washington visit. However, as is customary, the Saudis had not discussed the sale publicly until after it was raised in the Washington Times.

Another setback for the sale came during a Feb. 13 press conference when a reporter asked President Clinton for his reaction to the reported Saudi request. He responded by saying that the United States and Saudi Arabia “have had a long and very important defense relationship which persists to this day.” Then the president added that “any decision I make about [the F-16 sale] has to be made in a way that is consistent with our first commitment, which is to do nothing that will undermine the qualitative edge of Israeli security forces in the Middle East.”

“Our first commitment is to the qualitative edge of Israeli security forces.”

There was no official Saudi reaction at all to the president’s remarks, but they clearly did not advance Lockheed Martin’s prospects. Ten days after the Clinton press conference, Saudi Ambassador to the United States Prince Bandar bin Sultan, son of the defense minister, told reporters in his Washington, DC office that “no final decision has been made” on the sale. The Saudi ambassador said that Prince Sultan’s delegation to the United States would not discuss the issue with President Clinton because Saudi Arabia was not “ready institutionally” to acquire the aircraft.

Casting further doubt on the sale, another unnamed Saudi official told the Wall Street Journal that the Kingdom’s economy was improving because of higher oil prices but “we don’t want to mess that up now with a big airplane purchase.”

Meanwhile, responding to initial reports of the impending sale, Israeli officials and their lobbyists in Washington made clear what they expect in return for not trying to prevent the F-16 sale. The Detroit Jewish News wrote in February that “pro-Israel forces are expected to use the current unpopularity of the Saudi regime to wrest military concessions for Israel as part of the deal.” Those concessions, initially described in the Tel Aviv daily Ma’ariv, include Lockheed Martin’s next-generation fighter aircraft, the F-22, and the Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW), a precision-guided bomb capable of striking targets from safe distances with extreme accuracy.

The decision by Israel and its myriad lobbying organizations in the United States to put their own offer on the table immediately is as much a sign of Israeli weakness as strength on this topic. Israel has twice opposed major arms sales to Saudi Arabia. The first time was the sale of Airborne Warning and Control Aircraft (AWACS) by Seattle, WA-based Boeing, and the second was F-15 air superiority fighters made by McDonnell-Douglas. Neither time was the pro-Israel lobby able to defeat the sales.

Economic and Strategic Explanations

There are both economic and strategic explanations as to why Israel’s lobby was unable to defeat either arms sale, and why it likely will be unable to defeat the F-16 sale to Saudi Arabia should it try.

One reason is economics. A $30 billion arms sale would employ thousands of Americans, particularly in Fort Worth, TX where the F-16 is built. The associated subcontracts for avionics, weapons systems, training, software development and countless other components of the sale would reverberate throughout the American economy. In addition, keeping the F-16 production line open and active eventually will reduce the per-unit cost to the Pentagon of the F-22, which current estimates suggest will cost the United States more than $73 billion to deploy. As one congressional staffer told the Detroit Jewish Week, “passing a resolution of disapproval will be difficult, if not impossible, because of the economic impact” of the sale.

The F-16’s role in U.S. strategic policy in the Gulf region is less obvious but equally important. Components of the Clinton administration’s “dual containment” policy aimed at restraining Iran and Iraq require a substantial arms buildup among the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries—Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. Given its geographic size and population, Saudi Arabia is particularly crucial to this task. The goal in the short term is for the GCC countries to have the ability to hold off an Iranian or Iraqi attack long enough for U.S. forces to arrive in substantial numbers in the area. Vital to this plan is access to high technology weapons systems like the F-16.

Undermining these plans is America’s antiquated policy of maintaining “Israel’s qualitative military edge” over its potential Arab adversaries. This doctrine, established during the Cold War prior to the Oslo I and II accords, has tied the hands of American military planners who deal with the Middle East and South Asia. On one hand, the Pentagon wants GCC countries to arm and train themselves sufficiently to meet the Iranian and Iraqi threats. On the other hand, however, Israel’s interests must always be given first priority. These contradictory goals continue to plague those who are responsible for protecting American national security interests in the Middle East.

The Saudis probably will buy the F-16s, but perhaps not very soon. Unlike many other U.S. allies, the Saudis prefer not to discuss security policy or major military or civilian purchases publicly, particularly before agreements have been signed. The European aerospace firm Airbus Industries learned that lesson the hard way when it lost a $5 billion contract mainly because jubilant French officials talked about the deal before any agreements had been signed.

It is doubtful that the same fate will befall Lockheed Martin’s F-16. Saudi interest in the aircraft stems largely from its battle-proven record. Aside from countless thousands of air-to-ground missions, the F-16 has a 69-0 record in air-to-air combat and simply is the best aircraft in its class. Saudi defense officials know this and eventually, after the Washington rumor mill stops looking for other motives where none are needed, Saudi Arabia probably will finalize an agreement with Lockheed Martin. That agreement might already have been signed had the Clinton administration kept its priorities straight.