April/May 1997 pgs. 13-14
Affairs of State
Clinton's Strangely Homogenous Middle East Peace
Team
by Eugene Bird
A remarkable puff piece on the Clinton administration's Middle
East peace team of Dennis Ross, Aaron David Miller and Martin Indyk
was published in The Washington Post of Feb. 24. Written
by Post staff writer Laura Blumenfeld, it sought to turn
the awkward facts that all three diplomats are Jewish, that two
have had close ties with the American Israel Public Affairs Committee
or its spin-off think tank, the Washington Institute for Near East
Policy, and that all three have lived privately in Israel into some
sort of remarkable coincidence rather than an awkwardness that troubles
most Americans who learn about it and that vindicates Middle Eastern
America-haters.
It's not the first time Blumenfeld has embarrassed the State Department,
which sent her to work in the American Embassy in Amman as a summer
intern a few years ago. She returned charging publicly that sometimes
pithy off-the-record criticisms of Israel by seasoned U.S. diplomats
proved that they were "anti-Semites." It would be interesting
to hear her characterize similar comments by State Department and
White House officials currently involved with Israel, now that all
of them are Jewish. But apparently none were careless enough to
make off-the-record remarks, other than U.S. Ambassador to Israel
Indyk's prediction to Blumenfeld that "no good would come"
of her lengthy published gloat over the Jewishness of all of the
Clinton foreign policymakers.
In fact it was fascinating to find that the current team members
think they are doing a better job than the "Arabists"
of yore by basing all current efforts on building the confidence
level in Israel, rather than on finding a solution based on international
law that all sides can accept. Land-for-peace no longer seems to
be in the vocabulary of America's "honest brokers."
Blumenfeld concludes her article on America's official Jewish peacemakers
with a remarkably candid summary: "But all three arrived at
the same conclusion. A settlement will be achieved not by squeezing
Israel as Arabists advocated, nor by coddling Israel as the Zionist
lobby might like, but by cajoling the Jewish state to take `baby
steps' just like the psychologist in the movie `What About Bob?'
Or to make `incrementalist' approaches, a term Ross prefers, a technique
he observed at UCLA, watching the tiny daily plot advances on `General
Hospital.'"
Foreign policy by soap opera? It is interesting to speculate about
how far Carter would have succeeded in "cajoling" Menachem
Begin to make peace with Egypt at Camp David.
Carter himself was the ultimate key to making that first lasting
peace. He was tough enough to see that both sides had to respect
his power or there would never be a peace along the Suez Canal.
Both at Camp David and in later shuttle negotiations, he got personally
involved and he did not leave to the Arabists or to his Jewish advisers
(who never were in charge of the sensitive Middle East peace process)
the details of brokering the Egyptian-Israeli peace. Begin had to
give up the entire Sinai and move out the settlers. Egypt had to
reciprocate for the full Israeli withdrawal with a full peace.
But Carter already had a record of firmness with Begin: He had
once threatened to cut off aid to Israel if the Israeli prime minister
did not get his tanks and guns back across the Israeli side of the
border with Lebanon within one afternoon. This successful action
by President Carter was very different from the "incrementalist"
approach of the Clinton team, or the equally unique solo Middle
East performance of America's first Jewish secretary of state, Henry
Kissinger.
Henry Kissinger once told us in 1971 that the Rogers plan of 1970
(which looked remarkably like the Camp David Agreement of 10 years
later) had no chance of being implemented because "there was
no support for it in the White House." As national security
adviser, of course, Kissinger was the White House at that
point. Nixon wasn't making decisions anywhere unless Henry supported
them.
Kissinger also claimed that he had left Nixon administration Middle
East policy up to Secretary Rogers "because of my [Jewish-German]
background." Of course Kissinger himself was manipulating everything
in the background, and Rogers did not survive long into the second
term. When Kissinger then moved to the State Department to succeed
Rogers he insisted on taking the NSC hat with him, which left him
in sole charge of every U.S. initiative in the Middle East.
Clinton's current all-Jewish team has an equally effective approach
to remaining in charge. Members simply rotate the key NSC and State
Department seats among themselves.
A real end to the occupation is all that the Palestinians, the
Syrians and the Lebanese want. Will the Clinton team realize this
before it is too late? Or will some judicious threats from America's
Arab trading partners and from the European Union achieve a peace
that the present U.S. team finds elusive? Maybe they should listen
to some different soaps.
Yasser Arafat Does Washington
Yasser Arafat's own diplomats and the Clinton administration laid
out a remarkable schedule designed to elevate Palestinian-U.S. relations
to the state-to-state level. Palestinian Authority President Arafat
spent two hours with the president, had a working lunch with Madeleine
Albright and was given a "co-chair" with the secretary of
state of a new working group between the United States and the PA
designed to meet and iron out both economic and political problems
two or three times a year.
Arafat was hosted at three dinners in Washington with the Palestinian,
Arab and Muslim communities and with Jewish- and Christian-American
business figures. He also visited the United Nations to make his
first call on the new secretary-general.
Perhaps as important as anything else was Arafat's visit to Houston,
his first outside the New York-Washington corridor. He spoke at
Rice University's newly inaugurated James A. Baker Center, and also
met with former President George Bush.
He also made a stop in Georgia to meet with former President Jimmy
Carter, who said at their press conference that settlements are
illegal. Period.
When Arafat visited congressional leaders, the fanatically anti-Arab
chairman of the House International Relations Committee, Ben Gilman,
was conveniently absent. Gilman thus avoided questions on why he
is holding up the American-promised payment of $10 million in USAID
funds for Arafat's Palestinian Authority.
Palestinian and Arab League sources remarked on the importance
of Arafat's meeting with Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-MS),
which apparently went very well. The entire visit was, of course,
shadowed by the Netanyahu government's announcement that it was
building 6,500 houses for Jews only at Har Homa, thus further derailing
Middle East peace efforts. The announcement on Har Homa (Jabel Abu
Ghneim) was expected, but it confronted Clinton and his peace team
with the Jerusalem question they have been trying to push off until
the last possible moment in the longest peace process in history.
Perhaps because of the contentious Har Homa issue, there seemed
to be a greater willingness by both White House and State Department
spokespersons to venture into slightly stronger wording, expressing
the opinion that the U.S. wanted both the Palestinian airport and
the port in Gaza to be opened because it wanted more trade with
Palestine. And on the investment climate in the Palestinian areas,
the Department of State spokesman said that until the "regulations"
preventing access to the Palestinian areas were changed, one could
not expect investments to flow.
The Arafat visit changed little of substance. There was no ringing
U.S. declaration affirming land for peace, and no inkling of what
the Department might do on Jerusalem, although it did regret the
closure of the Palestinian offices there.
The excruciating peace process now is almost two years behind
the firm schedule set down in the first and second Oslo agreements.
Defining the limits of Israel and of the Palestinian state is proving
to be the costliest peacemaking effort in history. It is costing
the U.S. about $25 million daily.
How so? Well, there is the $16 million a day in grants and loan
guarantees given to Israel (aside from tax-deductible donations,
many of them highly questionable). Then there is the $6 million
a day to Egypt, about $200,000 a day to the 2.5 million Palestinians
on the West Bank and Gaza, another $100,000 a day to other refugees
from the Arab-Israel wars and $300,000 a day to Jordan, and then
the costs to the U.S. of maintaining certain military efforts in
Israel itself as well as others in the Eastern Mediterranean that
hopefully will disappear when peace finally is comprehensive.
The U.S. has paid out more than $100 billion just in the 18 years
since Camp David. And that is not counting the hidden costs of special
deployment of forces, nor the Gulf war, which certainly can be partly
blamed on the unsettled Arab-Israel dispute.
But of course the Arab-Israel dispute has never been considered
as just another line item in the federal budget. It seems there
will always be American money to maintain Israeli occupation of
Arab territories. |