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April 1996, pgs. 80-81 Special Country Section on Iran
Is Iran's Military Buildup Purely Defensive or Potentially Destabilizing?
by Shawn L. TwingOn Jan. 6 a patrol boat from the Iranian navy successfully test-fired a Chinese-made C802 anti-ship cruise missile near the entrance to the Strait of Hormuz south of Bandar Abbas, hitting a target barge 10 miles away from the missile's launch site. The acquisition of the C802s has been heralded by some as a turning point in Iran's ability to threaten the regional interests of the United States and of the Arab states of the Gulf, especially oil-laden tankers carrying an estimated 20 to 30 percent of the world's oil supply through the narrow waterway on a daily basis. The acquisition and successful deployment of the anti-ship missiles is one part of Iran's campaign to revitalize its military following its devastating eight-year war with Iraq from 1980 to 1988. These rearmament efforts have raised significant speculation about Iran's intentions in the region. Are its rearmament plans born of legitimate national security and self-defense needs, or does Iran seek to become the dominant power in the Gulf? An in-depth look at Iran's capabilities and limitations provides some possible answers.
Warning SignsDuring the last four years Iran has sounded alarm bells in Washington and in the capitals of Gulf Arab states with its military purchases and deployments, and the increased number and scope of its military maneuvers. In 1992 Iran took delivery of the first of three Russian-made Kilo-class diesel-electric attack submarines, making it the first country in the Gulf to possess underwater warfare capabilities. In 1994 and 1995, while the world's attention was focused on U.S. forces pouring into the Gulf in response to Iraqi Republican Guard forces moving dangerously close to the Kuwaiti border, Iranian troops took full control over Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs, three islands whose ownership is claimed jointly by Iran and the United Arab Emirates. Iran quickly tightened its hold on the strategically important islands by stationing thousands of soldiers from its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) there and deploying U.S.-made Hawk anti-aircraft missile batteries, artillery and Silkworm anti-ship missiles. Iran also has taken delivery of several important weapons systems, including 30 MiG-29 "Fulcrum" multi-role fighter aircraft, 12 Su-24 "Fencer"ground attack aircraft, 300 T-72 main battle tanks, 5 Hegu-class fast attack patrol boats and several SA-5 surface-to-air missiles. Although the United States has pressured its allies not to sell arms to Iran, Russia, which provided an estimated 64 percent of Iran's military hardware from 1991-95, reluctantly agreed to U.S. requests only on condition that Tehran first will receive all equipment Moscow had previously agreed to. Russia has yet to provide a list of that equipment. The number and scope of Iran's military maneuvers also have contributed to fears about its military intentions and capabilities. Since 1992 Iran has conducted over 130 military exercises with its ground, air, naval and IRGC forces, and has concentrated on integrating the roles of its various military components, including the Kilo submarines. The maneuvers have included the rapid deployment of amphibious and covert forces, simulated attacks against oil rigs, submarine warfare, anti-aircraft and anti-ship missile deployment, electronic warfare, chemical weapons defense and the kinds of ship interdictions that would accompany closing the Strait of Hormuz. U.S. Vice Admiral Douglas Katz, former commander of the Mideast Force/U.S. Naval Forces of the U.S. Central Command, told Jane's Military & Training Monitor that "Every exercise the Iranians have conducted for the last two years has been offensive in nature." More ominous, however, have been Iran's efforts to procure missile delivery systems, particularly from China and North Korea. The C802 anti-ship cruise missile, for example, comes in three variants, one launched from a missile boat at sea, another launched from fixed missile sites on land, and another launched from mobile land-based launchers. Iran has acquired both the sea-launched and fixed-site variants, either of which is relatively easy for the U.S. military to seek out and destroy. If Iran acquired mobile missile launchers, however, that would complicate matters. Successful deployment by Iran of mobile missile launchers would require a substantial effort by U.S. forces to find them, reminiscent of the "great Scud hunt" that occurred in Iraq during Operation Desert Storm. Without the ability to destroy the missile launchers, the United States Navy is denied its first and most effective tier of defense against attack by anti-ship missiles. Possibly the most troubling scenario for the United States and its allies in the region is Iran's attempted acquisition of medium- and long-range ballistic missiles. Currently Iran possesses several short-range missiles and has deployed a variant of the Scud-C missile made famous during the Gulf War. While these certainly are dangerous, the limited range and poor accuracy of the Scuds limits their abilities as offensive weapons. To overcome this problem Iran has ordered (but not yet received) North Korea's No-Dong I medium-range ballistic missile. The No Dong I has an estimated range of 1,000 kilometers, which possibly could be extended to 1,500 kilometers with design modifications. The payload capacity of the No Dong I allows it to carry chemical, biological and possibly even nuclear warheads, a potential development which makes Israel particularly uncomfortable.
LimitationsIran's apparent military ambitions face substantial obstacles including constrained defense budgets, the toll of the Iran-Iraq war on Iran's military capabilities, the condition of much of its military equipment, as well as barriers preventing it from purchasing new armaments on the international market. Iran's economic problems have prevented it from allocating large sums of money for its armed forces. Estimates of Iran's military spending vary, but a reasonable assessment suggests that Iran, with a population of 64 million, spent approximately $1 billion per year in 1990 and 1991, and $4 billion per year since then. For comparison, Israel, with a population of approximately 5 million, spends more than $9 billion annually for its defense. In short, with a population nearly 13 times larger than that of Israel, Iran spends less than half as much for defense. Iran's ability to increase its defense budget is in serious doubt. U.S. trade sanctions have exacerbated spiraling inflation which, coupled with low international prices for oil, has forced the Iranian government to allocate relatively modest amounts of economic resources for defense. Another barrier blocking Iran's military expansion is the volume of its military hardware lost during its eight-year war with Iraq. U.S. analysts estimate that Iraq destroyed or captured 40 to 60 percent of Iran's military assets in both personnel and equipment,losses which Iran has not yet replaced. Also, a significant amount of Iran's military hardware that remains is left over from the reign of the Shah, when the United States and several of its allies sold Iran massive amounts of military equipment. Since this equipment is long past its recommended service life, its effectiveness is extremely limited, especially since the U.S. embargo prevents Iran from buying upgraded technology and replacement spare parts. To circumvent the embargo, Iran has cannibalized its U.S. weapons and has attempted to purchase parts on the international black market. Iran also has shifted away from Western armaments and is attempting to rebuild its conventional military machine with hardware from the countries of the former Soviet Union. Even these measures are proving difficult. When the United States learned that Poland had agreed to sell Iran 100 T-72 main battle tanks in 1995, the U.S. exercised considerable diplomatic pressure and gained a promise from Poland that the tanks would be Poland's last arms sale to Iran. Other suppliers have done the same. Iran finds it difficult, but not impossible, to procure military hardware on the international market except from China and North Korea. Although both continue to sell arms to Iran, their equipment is decidedly inferior to Western or Russian counterparts.
ConclusionsAssessing Iran's military intentions is difficult, but it is possible to draw several broad conclusions. First, Iran does not possess the ability to challenge the United States in or around the Gulf. At present the U.S. has 20 warships operating in the strategically vital region, including a carrier group and a Navy-Marine amphibious assault unit. In a demonstration of America's commitment to the region, the Navy sent the nuclear-powered attack submarine U.S.S. Topeka into the Gulf shortly after Iran's first Kilo submarine arrived in November 1992. Should Iran ever decide to confront American forces directly, it surely will pay a terrible price. This does not mean that Iran can't harass U.S. naval vessels or those of its allies, or seriously threaten unprotected commercial ships, especially oil tankers entering and exiting the narrow Strait of Hormuz. Iran's submarines work very well as mine layers and Iran has significant numbers of naval mines at its disposal. These mines could wreak havoc on military and commercial traffic in the region and conceivably could deny the United States unhindered mobility in the Gulf. There also is an element of self-defense that permeates Iran's defense planning. Having seen the devastation unleashed on Iraq by Coalition forces, Iran is well aware of the results of a confrontation with the United States and its allies. Equally important is Iran's concern about Israel's intentions. After Iran took over Abu Musa and the two Tunbs, Iran's Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati defended Iran's actions as a reaction to Israel's public statement in January 1995 that it might launch a pre-emptive attack on Iran's alleged nuclear weapons complex in Bushere. Velayati argued that the possibility, coupled with the precedent of Israel's 1981 aerial attack on Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor, represented a tangible threat to Iran's national security that necessitated the military buildup on the three islands, as well as on Sirri island farther north in the Gulf. Iran seems intent on complicating America's military plans in the region. The Iranian leadership knows that it cannot challenge the United States in a direct confrontation, but it can raise the stakes of U.S. actions by making access to the Gulf more dangerous and more difficult, and by adding more militarily significant factors for U.S. defense planners to worry about. The C802 cruise missiles are perfect examples of Iran achieving this goal. While not overly significant militarily, the C802 can, according to Scott McMahon, a national security analyst at the Virginia-based Pacific-Sierra Research Corporation, add an important "enhancement over [Iran's] current anti-ship capabilities." He added, however, that the threat "shouldn't be overestimated." There also is a worst-case scenario that could seriously threaten U.S. national security interests in and around the Arabian/Persian Gulf: Iran's successful development of nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them over long ranges. Iran's acquisition of North Korea's No Dong I missile could make this worst-case scenario a reality. If this missile were launched from Iran it would be able to reach, among other places, Riyadh, Amman and Tel Aviv, a development Israel would find intolerable. A No Dong I with a chemical, biological, or nuclear warhead, therefore could nullify security guarantees the U.S. military has made to its regional allies. Such a development could force the U.S. into a choice between permitting pre-emptive action or trying to convince its Middle East allies that mutually assured destruction is deterrent enough. In the absence of pre-emptive action against them, possession of such missiles would give Iran considerable military leverage in the region and among its neighbors, especially among those that do not possess weapons of equal deterrent value. Few outside the Iranian leadership find comfort in this scenario. SIDEBAR
Iran's Military At A Glance Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces: Ayatollah Ali Khamanei |