A Glossary of Contemporary Politics In the Islamic Republic of Iran

by Mike Mansoor (pseudonym)

In seeking to understand parliamentary and presidential politics in Iran, several peculiarities of the Iranian political arena must be kept in mind:

There are no formal political parties in Iran. Without organized party membership, therefore, there is no party platform, or political allegiance to a party leader. This relatively loose political system means that individuals do not adhere to agreed-upon party positions. Instead, individual politicians' positions may span the political spectrum. It is therefore difficult to label and define political groups.
There exist several, often conflicting, centers of power. Among them are powerful individuals such as Iran's president, Hashemi Rafsanjani; Iran's supreme guide, Ayatollah Khamenei; and various heads of ministries. Additional centers of power include foundations (bonyads), which are autonomous financial and political institutions, and leaders of different military organizations, such as the army, the baseej, the hezbollah and the pasdaran. The number and independence of these groups make it difficult for any one individual or group to consolidate power sufficiently to pursue a separate political agenda.

In addition, conflict between competing centers of power easily leads to political sabotage. For example, leading members of Rafsanjani's government, such as Foreign Minister Velayati, have made an effort to gloss over the Rushdie death sentence pronounced by Ayatollah Khomeini in order to assuage European ire. However, simultaneously, the Foundation of the Dispossessed (Bonyad-e-Mostaz'afin) announced it was raising the price on Rushdie's head, thereby effectively sabotaging government overtures to Western public opinion.

As in most revolutionary regimes, revolutionary rhetoric plays a central role in Iranian politics. Indeed, the anti-Western social platform and populist economic goals of the revolution of 1979-80 continue to shape political discourse. The primacy of revolutionary objectives explains why an anti-U.S. stance has continued to dominate Iranian foreign policy.

Increasingly, however, elements in the Iranian polity are challenging the dominance of revolutionary rhetoric and seeking a rationalization of both domestic and international policy based on national interests. Political boundaries are challenged not only by pragmatists and technocrats within the government, but also by religious leaders who believe that the revolution, in its attempt to control the religious establishment and harness its power of legitimation, has overstepped itself and threatened the integrity of religious belief and practice.

Revolutionary rhetoric is wielded as a weapon of legitimation and, conversely, delegitimation of political policies. For example, diplomatic rapprochement with the United States often is decried as a threat to revolutionary goals. Such a denouncement clearly seeks to delegitimize rapprochement with the U.S. for the domestic audience. This, in turn, threatens Iranian political leaders who back rapprochement with domestic opposition.

As the repository of the ideals of the revolution, Iran's Council of Guardians has the power to veto government bills council members deem counter-revolutionary. Their authority extends over the entire political arena and they are the ultimate arbiters of who may run for office in an election. Often candidates approved on local and national levels are eliminated by the Council of Guardians.

Political terms from the U.S. political arena are misleading when applied to Iran. For example, "right," "left," "conservative" and "liberal" all have meanings in Iranian politics which are quite distinct from their meanings in the West. The following is a generalized description of the various political orientations in Iranian politics, and their respective attitudes toward the economy, social issues and foreign policy.

Radicals. Radicals seek to maintain the social and economic goals of the revolution. They believe in tight government control of the economy and major companies, and resist privatization and the gradual abandonment of government subsidies for petrol and basic foodstuffs. They promote social/ cultural and political censorship and are largely anti-Western and anti-U.S. in their foreign policy stance. Major groups in this category include the Majma-e Ruhaniyun-e Mobarez, the Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution led by Behzad Nabavi (not to be confused with the outlawed opposition group called the People's Mojahedin), and the Association for the Defense of the Values of the Islamic Revolution headed by Mohammad Mohammadi-Reyshahri.

Conservatives. Conservatives are less adamant than the radicals concerning economic statism and the defense of government subsidies. In terms of social policy, however, they are generally for social/cultural and political censorship. While they are anti-U.S., they are not as adamantly anti-foreign as the radicals. The major political grouping in this category is the Jame'eh-ye Ruhaniyat-e Mobarez. The principal conservative figure is Parliamentary Speaker Ali Akbar Nateq-Nuri. Others include former Deputy Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Larijani and head of the Tehran Chamber of Commerce Ali Naqi Khamoushi.

Moderates. Moderates are attempting to alter the status quo on all fronts. They promote free enterprise and privatization, and repeatedly have attempted to reduce or eliminate costly government subsidies. In social policy they believe in a relaxation of government-imposed social/cultural controls and are willing to tolerate political participation of liberal opposition groups. In foreign policy, moderates have attempted a rapprochement with the West.