After Two Disastrous Decisions, Revolutionary Iran Again at a Crossroads

by Amir Hossein Ganjbakhsh

Iran has just entered the 18th year of its Islamic revolution, which ended 25 years of monarchical dictatorship with the enthusiastic support of the overwhelming majority of the Iranians. That historic revolution was expected to usher in a new era of progress where diverse political forces would, not in mortal combat but in peaceful competition, lead Iran toward political, economic and cultural development. However, the dominant leaders of the Islamic revolution, who had set out to challenge the West and suppress human rights, not only blocked the emergence of this era but, by their incessant resort to political and cultural suppression, paved the way for the ascendance of radical and regressive forces in their midst.

Today, after the passage of 17 years of internecine violence and continuous violation of human rights and civil liberties, none of the hopes and aspirations of those who supported the revolution have been realized. Instead of enjoying political freedom, social justice and economic progress, Iranians are suffering from widespread political suppression and unprecedented economic hardships. Indeed, while the tide of democracy and freedom has swept aside dictatorial regimes across the globe, the leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran continue to disregard the will of the Iranian people and thwart the reconstruction of a modern and progressive state.

The exercise of exclusive authority by Iran's supreme jurist (velayat-e faqih) has practically supplanted all normal legal and judicial safeguards for civil freedoms and private enterprise in Iran. Quasi-governmental foundations and institutions, seemingly accountable to no one, have created a state within the state and, in the pursuit of their private goals, have sapped the country's financial and economic resources and dragged the government to the verge of economic bankruptcy.

Furthermore, the regime's aggressive and revolutionary stance in its foreign relations has led to Iran's political and economic isolation in the international community. While many of the developing countries of the Third World have managed to attain sustained economic and industrial growth, enter the modern world of science and technology and become influential members of an expanding international market, Iran has remained on the periphery of this market as a mere importer of consumer goods and an exporter of petroleum products. Thus, given the current trend, Iran, whose population has exploded from 30 to 64 million within 15 years, soon will join the ranks of those poverty-stricken nations of the world whose contribution to the world economy is little more than cheap labor and raw materials.

The end of the Cold War and of Soviet-American competition for world hegemony has laid the foundation for peaceful coexistence and economic cooperation among all members of the international community. Iran can, therefore, no longer rely on the old political rivalries between superpowers for the maintenance of its independence and territorial integrity.

In the emerging world, only through economic, social and political development at home and cooperation and coexistence abroad, can Iran hope to ensure its survival and independence. However, the objectives and conduct of Iran's foreign policy have prevented such cooperation, and the regime's continued support and encouragement of violent terrorist movements in a number of Muslim countries have in no small degree contributed to Iran's further isolation in the world and, more importantly, in the Middle East.

Thus, far from being a regional leader for the promotion of peace and progress, Iran has been rightly branded as a force for continued strife and destabilization in one of the most politically sensitive and economically vital areas of the world. While the political fallout of such counterproductive foreign policy has further weakened the regime, its disastrous economic consequences have exacerbated the economic problems of the Iranian people.

Today, it may well be assumed that the regime, bereft of the charismatic personality of Ayatollah Khomeini and unable to fulfill its promises, has lost its revolutionary legitimacy. No longer can the prospect of exporting the Islamic revolution, or the call to struggle against imperialism, motivate or mobilize the masses. Neither can the lingering zeal of Khomeini's dwindling number of followers ensure the survival of his successors.

President Hashemi Rafsanjani's efforts to gain a new measure of legitimacy by implementing privatization and economic adjustment programs all have ended in failure. It is clear that sustained economic growth cannot be attained without the active participation of the population as a whole. Only a modern and progressive state and an open and stable society can ensure such participation.

Furthermore, the Islamic republic of Iran still is seriously plagued by the existence of numerous and competing centers of political power which do not allow for the introduction and effective implementation of needed, and long overdue, economic and social programs. Indeed, continuation of the precarious equilibrium between these centers of power has further distorted and destabilized the process of political decision-making and reduced the government to a mere instrument for the introduction of short-term and stop-gap policies.

The deterioration of economic conditions and failure of the government's repeated attempts to stem the tide have led to differing reactions among various factions within the regime. The supporters of velayat-e faqih and the supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, have opted for further radicalization of the government's domestic and international stance. Those who side with the president of the Islamic republic, Hashemi Rafsanjani, while refusing to challenge the republic's undemocratic institutions and practices, persevere in their attempts to normalize Iran's relations with the United States as a way out. Finally, the religious intellectuals and technocrats have come to realize that the Islamic regime can not long survive by continuing the old policies and practices.

To save the country from economic bankruptcy and political disintegration, this latter group believes, the Islamic republic must renounce violence both in its domestic and international behavior. Ironically, the advocates of tolerance and moderation who have not yet emerged as a viable political force in the country have themselves been targets of violent attacks by those who see no need for change in the institutions or practices of the regime.

To be sure, the continuing and accelerating clash among the foregoing factions and groups has led to the creation of an atmosphere where voices in support of the process of democratic yet peaceful reforms may be heard. Those who espouse this process believe that violent and sudden political upheavals in society may lead to serious internal violence and potentially endanger Iran's territorial integrity.

They, therefore, believe that the most appropriate strategy for solving the current crisis in Iran is to compel the leaders of the Islamic republic to abide by the legitimate demands of the Iranian people. To this end, these democratic forces have insisted on the holding of free elections and freedom for the press and political parties. Meanwhile, a growing number of Iranian writers and artists have continued their campaign for the repeal of censorship and for the government's observance of and respect for provisions of the Universal Declarations of Human Rights and the Covenants on the Promotion of Political, Social and Economic Rights.

For the third time in Iran's post-revolutionary history, the leaders of the Islamic Republic are faced with a crucial choice. In the first instance, immediately after the revolution, they opted for exclusive and arbitrary use of power and thereby blocked the path toward the establishment of a peaceful and democratic society. In the second instance, in the aftermath of the liberation of Khoramshahr and the retreat of invading Iraqi forces in the early phases of the Iran-Iraq war, they opted for the continuation of the war, with catastrophic consequences.

Now, once again, they have to make another historic choice. One choice is to accelerate the process of liberalization, ensure freedom of the press and political parties and eventually pave the way for the transfer of political sovereignty to the Iranian people. This choice will ensure economic reconstruction at home and normalization of Iran's relations abroad.

Another choice is to continue to resist and reject legitimate popular demands and ignore the deepening social and economic crisis that has debilitated Iran for so long. This choice will precipitate a crisis which may well usher Iran into a new period of widespread violence and bloodshed.

Clearly the choice between liberalization and real democracy on the one hand or repression and renewed violence on the other rests with Iran's present leaders. The choice is theirs, and theirs alone.