April/May 1995, Pages 17-18, 81

The Questions That No Senators Dared to Ask: Confidential Questions Prepared for Martin Indyk Hearing Are Revealing

By Eugene Bird

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held its confirmation hearing for the new U.S. ambassador to Israel, Dr. Martin Indyk, on Feb. 2. Committee Chairman Jesse Helms (R-NC), who already had made it clear that he would not oppose the nomination of the former lobbyist for Israel, was conspicuously absent from the hearing. The three senators present, all closely identified with Israel, subsequently recommended confirmation, an action carried out by a Senate voice vote on March 3.

There were many questions the senators might have asked a nominee who, still as an Australian citizen, had been a media adviser to an Israeli prime minister; a senior policy analyst with the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), Israel's principal Washington, DC lobby; the founding executive director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, a think tank funded by AIPAC directors; and whose U.S. naturalization had to be accelerated to enable him to become the Clinton White House senior director for Near East and South Asian Affairs. None of this was touched upon in the hearings.

In fact, only Sen. Claiborne Pell (D-RI) raised a really serious question concerning Israeli settlements and their devastating impact on the peace process. Appearing late, the former head of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee asked for Indyk's views on settlements. Indyk said they were a problem that complicates the negotiations with a "negative impact on the Palestinians and in the Arab world as well."

Noting that 4,000 new apartments had just been authorized by a new Rabin-appointed committee, Indyk said it was his "understanding that they will be in existing settlements" and that the Israeli prime minister had made clear to Yasser Arafat that there would be no new settlements, and that no new Arab lands would be taken except for roads needed for redeployment.

When Pell asked about the rate of privatization and whether or not U.S. aid should be focused more on that problem in the Israeli economy, Indyk retreated and explained that first of all the key factor was that Israel must know that "politically and strategically" it could really rely on the United States to continue aid. Second, Indyk said, in a truly frank exchange, that "the problem with your suggestion is that our aid is now structured in a way in which we basically hand over the money in a check at the beginning of each year...To try to redirect that money in any way would be a little complicated."

Interestingly, Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff members had prepared an unusually long 10-page briefing memorandum for the hearings covering all aspects of the U.S.-Israel relationship. The Washington Report obtained a copy of this memorandum, prepared "for committee use only," and made up largely of "background and suggested questions." Unfortunately, very few of the "suggested questions" were asked. Following are verbatim excerpts from the Foreign Relations Committee memorandum dated Jan. 30, 1994.

Background

The United States and Israel have forged a special relationship since the foundation of the Jewish state in 1948. It is a multidimensional relationship, based on strategic, economic, political and cultural ties. Israel is, both currently and cumulatively, the number one beneficiary of U.S. foreign assistance.

Although some have alleged that the strategic underpinnings for the U.S. special relationship with Israel have evaporated with the end of the Cold War, the vast majority of the U.S. political establishment, including the Clinton administration and the 104th Congress, continue to be supportive of the relationship.

Questions

1) Some commentators have suggested that in the post-Cold War world with the end of the superpower rivalry, the Arab-Israeli conflict no longer has much direct impact on American national interests. They suggest that the United States now has fewer reasons for a strategic partnership with Israel and can afford to disengage from the special relationship. In the post-Cold War world, what are the underpinnings of a continued special relationship with Israel? Does the administration plan to reassess its policies toward Israel and the Arab-Israeli conflict in light of the changed international scene?

2) The United States has played a key mediating role in the regional peace process, but today Israel and Jordan, as well as Israel and the PLO, deal with each other directly. Is it time for the United States to withdraw and to let the parties proceed and pursue their own interests as they see fit? Would a reduced U.S. role affect Syrian willingness to remain involved in the peace process?

Foreign Aid Background

As a recipient of more than $3 billion in foreign aid annually, Israel is the number one recipient of U.S. foreign aid. For FY1994, the United States provided $1.2 billion in Economic Support Fund (ESF) grants, $1.8 billion in Foreign Military Sales grants, and other grants for refugee settlement, cooperative development for Israel's own foreign aid program, and regional development.

Since 1984, under the "Cranston Amendment," it has been the policy of the United States to provide Israel with economic assistance not less than the amount of Israel's annual debt service payment to the United States; $1 billion of the $1.2 in ESF is for debt service. About half of Israel's external debt is owed to the United States. Israel also receives $200 million in equipment for its military stockpile and $75 million in excess defense articles. President Clinton has promised to maintain the current aid level and to provide other forms of assistance to Israel to minimize the costs of peace. These include super computers, continued support for development of the Arrow anti-missile system, and surplus military equipment.

Many friends of Israel, both in the U.S. Congress and in the pro-Israel community in the United States, as well as Israeli government officials have suggested that in an era of a shrinking foreign assistance budget, current aid levels to Israel cannot continue indefinitely.

Questions

1) Although in the past, Israeli officials expressed a desire to wean their country from dependence on U.S. aid, of late they have voiced concerns about possible aid cuts. Is Israel taking any steps to lessen its dependence on external resources, especially those from the United States? Should current aid levels be sustained indefinitely? Alternatively, would you advise Israel to adopt incremental measures now to diminish its vulnerability to possible cuts later?

2) Some have suggested a reconfiguration of aid to Israel whereby Israel's debt to the United States would be forgiven and Economic Support Funds would no longer be provided. What is the administration's reaction to this suggestion? What is Israel's view?

3) Israel currently receives assistance without economic conditions. Has Israel continued the pace of economic reforms in the recent past? Should assistance to Israel be conditioned on market reform and privatization?

Jerusalem Background

In June 1967, Israel annexed East Jerusalem, which had previously been held by Jordan. Israel maintains that Jerusalem will remain its eternal, undivided capital. The United States condemned the annexation and never moved its embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Most recently, in March 1994, however, the United States abstained from a section of a U.N. General Assembly Resolution that referred to Jerusalem as "occupied territory." This purportedly was because the question of Jerusalem is to be addressed in final status negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians and the United States did not want to prejudge the outcome of those negotiations.

Politics Background

Since July 1992, Prime Minister Rabin has headed a narrow coalition government of his own Labor Party and the left-wing Meretz party. With the withdrawal of the Shas (Sephardic Torah Party) from the governing coalition, Rabin has been forced to rely upon non-Jewish Members of Parliament to create a majority for his peace and security policies. Arab-Israeli Members of Parliament tacitly support the coalition and vote with it on peace-related issues. Rabin has courted other small parties to widen his coalition and to garner additional support for a possibly hard-to-sell peace with Syria or the Palestinians. Meanwhile, in addition to Foreign Minister Peres, several cabinet members have attempted to position themselves as successors to Rabin as has former Health Minister and head of the Histadrut labor federation Haim Ramon.

In the next scheduled election, in June 1996, the prime minister will be elected directly for the first time. As of now, polls project Likud leader Benjamin Netanyahu to win by a comfortable margin. At least two of Netanyahu's rivals within Likud, Ariel Sharon and David Levy, boycott central committee meetings and Levy has hinted at forming a new party. Jerusalem mayor Ehud Olmert also is considered a possible future Likud leader.

While welcoming peace with Jordan, Likud opposes interim arrangements with the Palestinians and possible withdrawal from the Golan Heights. It is ideologically opposed to the concept of " land for peace."

Questions

1) How vulnerable is the Rabin government to opponents' attacks on the peace process? Does Rabin have the requisite support of the public to continue the peace process?

2) Is the Labor party united behind the Rabin peace effort? What impact will Israeli President Ezer Weizmann's recent statement questioning the continuation of the peace process have in Israel?

3) Should Labor lose the next election, do you believe a successor government would stand by the terms of the Declaration of Principles and continue with the peace process?

Nuclear Background

While Israel neither confirms nor denies its pursuit of a nuclear weapons program, Israeli officials repeatedly have stated that Israel will not be the first country to "introduce" nuclear weapons into the Middle East. It is widely believed, however, that Israel began a nuclear weapons program in the mid-1960s, and may now have advanced to the point of having as many as 200 nuclear weapons. There is little public information about the program, although in 1986, an employee of Israel's Dimona Reactor program, Mordechai Vanunu, delivered photographs of the plant to the London Sunday Times. He was subsequently spirited back to Israel, tried, and imprisoned for treason.

Israel has repeatedly refused to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Successive governments have stated that the entire region must be denuclearized, and that before it is willing to abandon any nuclear option, all nations with a potential to reach Israel with a weapon (including Pakistan) must move toward bilateral disarmament agreements with Israel.

Egypt recently stated that it would not support the indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which is up for renewal in April of this year, until Israel agrees to sign the NPT. Egypt's position has placed it at loggerheads with the United States, which maintains that such issues should be discussed in the framework of the peace process.

Questions

1) What is the official position of the United States government on an Israeli nuclear weapons program? Does the United States believe Israel should sign the NPT?

2) What other states in the Middle East have explored or are currently involved in nuclear weapons programs or research? Would those nations be likely to target Israel?

3) Should Israel and the other nations of the Middle East become signatories to the NPT, would that protect Israel from assault by a nuclear weapon?

4) Has the United States ever sanctioned Israel for any nuclear related violation?

Loan Guarantees Background

The United States has provided Israel with loan guarantees to ease the costs of absorbing Jews from the former Soviet Union and Ethiopia. In September 1994, President Clinton reduced the $2 billion in loan guarantees scheduled for FY1995 by $311.8 million, equal to the amount that the U.S. estimated Israel had spent on new settlements in the occupied territories. However, the President offset $95 million of the $311.8 million cut by factoring in Israel's estimated costs in implementing its agreement with the Palestinians.

Israel has not requested use of the loan guarantees to aid in moving Israeli settlers from occupied territories in the Golan Heights, Gaza Strip or West Bank, although congressional sources have raised this possibility.

Critics have alleged that Israel is not using the loan guarantees for the purposes outlined, and is merely exercising its right to borrow under the guarantees to avoid needed economic reforms.

Questions

1) Does the administration anticipate an Israeli request to use the loan guarantees to aid in moving settlers from occupied territories? Will the administration request legislative authority to respond to such a request?

2) How much has Israel borrowed under the loan guarantee program, and to what purpose have the funds been used?

All in all, there were 36 questions suggested to the senators. In addition to the few actually asked of Indyk directly, committee members posed others to the Department of State in connection with the hearings. Most of the answers, transmitted to the various senators, remain closely held. Some are available, however, and sources claim that the department prepared innocuous answers on such issues as the Golan Heights, deployment of American troops, foreign aid, and other sensitive issues.

Most of the unasked questions will remain hanging in the air surrounding Ambassador Indyk's mission to Israel. They will probably be the very ones he will write about, long afterward, in his recollections of the first British-born, Australian-naturalized, American-naturalized Jewish-American ambassador to the Jewish state for which he had worked so long and so hard—and so openly—before his appointment to the Clinton administration.

Eugene Bird, a retired career foreign service officer, is president of the Council for the National Interest in Washington, DC.