April/May 1995, Pages 15, 108-110
From the Hebrew Press
Settling the West Bank and Israeli Domestic Politics
By Israel Shahak
The inescapable fact of Israeli domestic politics is that Palestinian
demands, no matter how minimal, can command no Israeli majority,
let alone an Israeli-Jewish majority. I don't speak here of Palestinian
self-determination, or the right to their own state, which is now
opposed by at least 103 Knesset members and supported by only 5,
whereas 12 Meretz MKs say different things at different times, avoiding
any public commitment in favor of this right.
What I have in mind are such immediately urgent rights as the rights
of the Palestinians in the territories (and for that matter within
Israel) not to be officially discriminated against, or have their
land taken away from them for the exclusive benefit of Jews, or
the right to protection of their property from the daily acts of
vandalism committed by the settlers. Only a small minority of Israeli
Jews consistently support such rights, and this minority is by no
means coextensive with the "peace camp," which usually
tends to ignore such matters. Instead, this minority for the most
part comes from the politically powerless center of the Israeli
political spectrum.
The opposition of a great Israeli majority to Palestinian demands
clashes with Palestinian hopes to win some rights through the Oslo
process. Since any government wants to stay in power and be re-elected,
the Oslo style "peace process" can only be carried out
by means of deceiving both the Israeli Jews and Palestinians, the
latter with the help of Yasser Arafat. This deception now is wearing
thin.
Although the Israeli masses still are being deluded by official
reassurances that the Oslo-style "peace process" is continuing,
in January 1995 the elitist daily Ha'aretz started disclosing that
the heads of the Labor Party (and therefore the heads of state)
already were admitting that the Oslo "peace process" is
dead.
In the Jan. 13 Ha'aretz, Orit Galili admits that the majority of
active Labor Party branch members oppose it firmly. When former
"Peace Now" leader Tzali Reshef joined the Labor Party's
ranks, he encountered, according to Galili, the relentless hostility
of its members when "he attacked the increasing construction
of housing units in the territories and proposed to dismantle at
least a few settlements."
Interestingly, Labor Party Secretary-General Nissim Zvili admitted
that "in order to reach a logical solution in the West Bank,
it would be necessary to remove 60,000 out of the 130,000 Jewish
settlers from there, except that nobody in the party has the courage
to say this," because it could only contribute to a major electoral
defeat.
According to Galili's sources, Rabin and Peres hold similar views.
"One of the best guarded secrets in the Labor Party is that
Yitzhak Rabin is already contrite about his support for the Oslo
Agreement," Galili writes. "This makes some party seniors
sad and disappointed. The first to feel it recently was the foreign
minister, Shimon Peres. He recently told his friends how the entire
government already was dissociating itself from the agreement and
accordingly doing nothing to advance it."
"Rabin is already contrite about his support
for the Oslo Agreement."
Galili adds that Rabin has never supported the Oslo Agreement wholeheartedly.
Since he also "has emotional problems in talking to the Palestinians,
he granted Peres the requisite, even if always limited, powers to
negotiate the implementation of the agreement." Lately, however,
"whenever Peres submits to Rabin any practical proposal devised
to forward negotiations about granting more powers in the West Bank
to the autonomy authorities, Rabin vetoes the idea. As a consequence,
the talks with the PLO not only have not progressed, but since the
conflict over the hill confiscated from Al-Khader village they have
regressed."
All Laborites interviewed by Galili admit that their party's standing
in the eyes of the Israeli public is very bad and that in all the
polls Rabin's ratings are considerably lower than Netanyahu's. According
to Galili, most Labor leaders are convinced that the only salvation
is to find somebody from the outside with personal prestige high
enough to remedy the party's plight. The two names mentioned in
this context are the present secretary-general of the Histadrut,
Haim Ramon, expelled from the party last April, who nevertheless
told Galili that he would be quite willing to come back; and the
ex-chief of staff, Ehud Barak.
Election by Deceit
Deputy Foreign Minister Yossi Beilin, who is rightly perceived
as Labor's greatest dove, thinks that "Labor might win in the
1996 elections by reaching a solution with Syria and Lebanon and
advancing a permanent solution with the Palestinians." At the
same time he proposes that "Ehud Barak should join the Labor
Party without wasting a single day." However, Barak's notions
of a "permament solution with the Palestinians" are a
sheer impossibility, and his views concerning the solution with
Syria and Lebanon would not be easy to reach. In general, the sole
aim of all important Labor Party leaders seems to be to win elections
by deceiving the voters about peace.
Senior Labor leaders are not alone in expressing their opposition
to the Oslo Agreement. Prestigious Israeli military commentator
Ze'ev Schiff wrote in Ha'aretz on Jan. 20, two days before the Beit
Lid terror attack in which 20 Israelis were killed, that "although
the word 'veto' was not used" in talks Israeli senior army
officers had with Rabin and the government, "what they said
could be construed as a warning that under certain conditions the
Israeli army might refuse to accept responsibility for security
of Israelis who travel to the West Bank and its settlements."
Schiff comments that "some may see it as an instance of the
army's pressure on the political system, or even a case of the army's
indirect veto in a matter of military competence. But the Israeli
army's view is: 'It is our duty to point out military implications
of a decision. If that decision is the government's, we will be
bound by it, even if we perceive it as very difficult to execute.'"
Such an overt attempt by the army to determine policy has not occurred
in Israel since May 1967, when for the sake of preparing a military
attack on Egypt, army generals led by the current President Ezer
Weizman and seconded by Matti Peled practically forced Levi Eshkol
to terminate diplomatic attempts to solve the crisis.
According to Schiff, the army's pressure on Rabin "has already
yielded results. Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres are currently trying
hard to convince Arafat that the redeployment of the Israeli army
in the West Bank needs to be postponed. The real reason for postponement
is the need to complete construction of the bypassing roads and
other fortifications which is what the Israeli army demands."
In other words, Schiff admits that Rabin and Peres routinely deceive
Arafat.
Schiff adds that "the realists among the most senior commanders
of the Israeli army wonder whether even under the present circumstances
the army can guarantee security of Jewish settlements and of all
Israelis traveling in the West Bank without fail. The army claims
that it would not have the requisite manpower, even if it sent all
its soldiers to police the West Bank."
Shortage of manpower in the largest army in Israel's history stems
from the absurdly exaggerated demands of the settlers for protection
by soldiers under all imaginable circumstances. Rabin gives in to
such demands for political reasons. Schiff mentions one such instance.
"A platoon of soldiers is now assigned every day to escort
a single small girl from one settlement to another where she insists
on taking recorder lessons." The army says that under present
circumstances it hardly succeeds in meeting all such demands, but
"if the number of terrorist assaults grows, larger numbers
of reservists would have to be called up."
In fact, the Israeli army can cope with the settlers' demands because
in the recent period assaults on the settlers have been rare. The
casualties they sustained have been much lower than casualties inflicted
on Israelis in Israel. But as a result of Rabin's contrivance, a
high proportion of religious settlers hold fictitious government
jobs. Accordingly, they have plenty of time and can instantly react
to each assault on them with violent demonstrations in front of
Rabin's residence or government offices in Jerusalem. The inhabitants
of Tel Aviv, by comparison, need to work. Accordingly, they cannot
spare much time to demonstrate even after many of them are killed
in a terror assault. The burden the army complains so much about
therefore results from Rabin's policies.
Political vs. Military Decisions
Schiff says that the Israeli army is going to tell the government
that "as long as Palestinian terror goes on, in matters of
strictly military competence, the army may be unable or hardly able
to meet what is being demanded of it." As usual, the army will
also exploit this opportunity to complain that it does not receive
all the money it asks for. Schiff's own conclusion is that "Israel
needs political rather than military decisions. The prime minister
and his government should take full responsibility for their decisions.
Nevertheless, it would be something exceptionally rare in Israel's
history if a government, especially one with a [Knesset] majority
as slim as this government has, dared to force the Israeli army
to follow a decision running against the latter's firm preference."
In my view the army has realized for some time that Rabin would
not dare to do it. This is one of the reasons why, in Galili's words,
"Rabin is contrite about his support for the Oslo Agreement."
According to Aluf Ben (Ha'aretz, Jan. 24), "senior officers
of the Security System [i.e., army, Shabak and Mossad] attending
a special government session convened to discuss the Beit-Lid terrorist
assault accused the Palestinian Authority of doing hardly anything
against either Hamas or the Islamic Jihad." The new chief of
staff, Amnon Shahak, said that "the Palestinian Authority is
not honoring its obligations. The Gaza Strip and Jericho turned
out to be sanctuaries for terrorists."
Shabak's head, who also blamed the Palestinian Authority, used
the occasion to propose expulsion of the entire families of the
suicide bombers as a deterrent measure. But it seems that Shabak's
chief relies even more on aggravated torture, hypocritically called
in Israel "moderate physical pressure." Tova Tzimuki reports
in Yediot Ahronot of Jan. 24 that a ministerial committee for Shabak
affairs, headed by Rabin (with Yossi Sarid of Meretz as a member)
permitted "unlimited use of drastic methods" against "extremist
suspects," in addition to "some which cannot even be described."
Those which can be described include "total blindfolding, extreme
humiliations, total isolation, unlimited use of sacks [covering
the upper part of the body], protracted sleep deprivation, protracted
standing position, protracted denial of access to toilets, long-term
denial of the right to see a lawyer, etc." In his capacity
as the health minister, Efraim Sneh said in a speech to high school
students: "We permitted Shabak to do what it wanted" (Davar,
Jan. 24).
The firmest supporter of these and even more brutal measures is
"the architect of Oslo" and recipient of a Nobel Prize
for Peace, Shimon Peres, who alone among Israeli decision-makers
still has remained Arafat's patron. Nahum Barnea and Shimon Shifer
(Yediot Ahronot, Jan. 27), who report the responses of senior Israeli
ministers to the Beit-Lid terror assault, write that Peres firmly
supported Shabak's chief on the use of torture and the expulsion
of the entire families of the suicide bombers.
Peres also turns out to favor "assaults on Muslim clergymen"
and the "forceful entry and closure of mosques." Moreover,
he proposes that "Israel deal with Iran and Syria at once,"
because "we should never tolerate a mini-Iran right next to
us." Peres, described by the Hebrew press as the best friend
of Nabil Shaath, reiterated his unconditional opposition to dismantling
even a single settlement, and his support for the bypassing roads
"and for all other needed security means in the West Bank."
He anticipates that the Palestinian Authority will accept such measures
if only the negotiations are not formally terminated and if some
money continues to flow to its coffers.
Lawless Settlers
Widespread lawlessness does not only exist under the autonomy.
The settlers, particularly the religious ones, also operate as a
Lebanese-style militia, and the Israeli government has encouraged
their lawlessness for years on end. On Jan. 1, Ha'aretz correspondents
Uri Nir and Nadav Shraggai reported: "On the morning of Dec.
30 Jewish settlers from the Jordan Valley demolished the foundations
of a gas station owned by Jonas Hantuli, the head of the council
of Silt A-Dahar village located in the West Bank, near Jenin. The
demolition took place in daytime and lasted several hours. That
gas station was located near the settlement of Mehola...Alice Shazar,
the spokeswoman of Civil Administration in Judea and Samaria, said
that Hantuli had indeed obtained all the permits required to operate
his station...For long years Hantuli has been on the best of terms
with the Israeli authorities. Five months ago he received from the
Civil Administration the permit to build a gas station. Two weeks
ago he began to prepare the ground at the site...
"The Civil Administration spokeswoman said that on Dec. 29
the Mehola settlers asked for a meeting with the head of the [Civil]
Administration, Colonel Gadi Zohar. The purpose was to protest the
construction of the station. She says that an appointment was made
for the beginning of the next week. Without waiting for the meeting,
the settlers demolished the foundations of the station the next
day...The Mehola settlers argue that the permit for the station
was not discussed with them, and that the presence of Palestinians
in their vicinity lowers considerably the quality of their life."
Let me comment that the phrase "for long years Hantuli has
been on the best of terms with the Israeli authorities" can
only mean that he has been a collaborator and he got his permit
as a reward for his collaboration.
Yet, interestingly, as of Jan. 30 nothing had been done by the
police or any other Israeli law enforcement agency to investigate
the affair. Clearly, the Israeli authorities do not intend to depart
from a sacred principle of theirs and prosecute Jewish settlers
for nothing more than damaging Palestinian property. Rabin and Peres,
normally far from being reticent, preferred saying nothing about
the subject. And so did Arafat, even though Hantuli is now his supporter.
Wrote Uzi Benziman in the Jan. 1 Ha'aretz, "For the time being
Israel has agreed to grant the Palestinians only a limited autonomy.
The idea of an autonomy was invented by Menachem Begin and is now
accepted by an overwhelming majority of the Right. Certainly, the
Left is not against it either: it even expects a more comprehensive
arrangement developing on its foundations. However, the settlers
cannot stomach the idea of the autonomy even in its most circumscribed
version. What can autonomy mean if a Palestinian cannot build a
gas station near an Israeli settlement? Israeli authorities in charge
of keeping law and order in the territories in fact tolerate the
hooliganism of the Jordan Rift settlers."
Concluding, Benziman wrote: "Like so many among us, Rabin
is addicted to the opium of the occupation; 27 years of rule over
the Palestinians have generated attitudes and behavior patterns
which can take into account nothing apart from what is narrow-mindedly
perceived as an Israeli interest. All needs and all points of view
of others are totally ignored. Such thinking is unimaginative enough
to lead to claiming ownership of the occupied territories (according
to the Right-wing version) or their considerable part (according
to the concept of territorial compromise professed by the Labor
movement). This thinking constantly finds its manifestations in
the attitude of the Israelis toward the Palestinians, in the manner
the Civil Administration deals with the applications of the West
Bankers, in the sophistry which Israel uses in the negotiations
with the PLO and in the style of the personal contacts between Israeli
and Palestinian politicians."
More to Israeli Racism
Yet there is more to Israeli racism whose two most important characteristics
Benziman fails to mention. The first is that settlers are never
punished for breaking the law, except (and rarely) when they wound
or kill people by shooting. The second is that Israeli security
forces never open fire at the settlers. The Rabin government did
not even contemplate any changes on these two counts in the first
weeks after Oslo. Yet only by recognizing these two points can we
understand how come the settlers can be so cocksure that they may
act with total impunity.
The settler militia is by no means confined to the territories.
It has a large following within Israel and is on the best of terms
with the Israeli army and Shabak. This can be best seen from the
report of Nadav Shraggai in Ha'aretz of Dec. 16, who spoke to the
present militia commander Nissan Slomiansky. Slomiansky is a rabbi
who serves as chairman of the local council of the settlement of
Elkana in the West Bank and who "was the first secretary-general
of Gush Emunim. He heads the operations division of the Judea and
Samaria Council and drafts various plans and memoranda for that
council's directorate. Only a few of these plans have been implemented
to date, because Slomiansky is an ardent devotee of the deterrence
school. In his view, in most cases there is no need to put a plan
into practice as long as the government cooperates with the settlers.
It is sufficient if the plans are known.
"Slomiansky passed his first major test long ago. After the
Patriarchs' Cave massacre, Yitzhak Rabin considered evacuating the
neighborhood of Tel-Rumeida in Hebron...Today Slomiansky reveals
that as soon as the evacuation would have begun, 'someone would
have simultaneously started to evacuate the Arabs from Hebron. There
were specific and detailed plans for doing it at the time,' he said,
refusing to elaborate. Slomiansky says the tactic of counter-evacuation
of Arabs, 'regardless of how many,' could again acquire relevance
whenever the ministers contemplate 'shrinking' the settlements into
enclaves. 'In my terminology this amounts to an evacuation.' In
Hebron, Slomiansky and his comrades organized 15,000 people during
the Passover week. They worked hard behind the scenes, met with
ministers and Knesset members, warned and sounded alarms. The Jewish
residents of Hebron made their own contribution. Noam Arnon spoke
about booby-trapped gas tanks...In Kiryat Arba, said Slomiansky,
everybody knew where he was supposed to be in an hour of a real
emergency.
"'We have a hard core, numbering hundreds of people, who are
prepared to reach the site in minimum time. They are ready to do
things that an average Jew is not yet prepared to do...In order
to consolidate the hard core, I now meet every night with groups
and representatives of various organizations. If, heaven forbid,
Rabin again considers evacuation of Netzarim or any other Jewish
spot in order to accelerate the peace process or to please Arafat,
there are people who will quickly appear on that spot to resist.
This will just be the first batch, allowing us to gain time before
a crowd of our followers arrives...' As far as possible Slomiansky
tried to evade the subject of the envisaged nature of the planned
resistance. He limited himself to presenting the case of the Brakha
settlement, near Nablus, as a 'theoretical' model. 'There is only
one road linking it. I assume there are people ready to make that
road impassable, either by barricading it, or by demolishing it
by explosives. At the first stage we will just want to gain time.
But simultaneously we will bring to the site thousands of volunteers
who will foil the evacuation with their own bodies...There may also
be people who will simultaneously evacuate an Arab village. We will
also activate our city headquarters. We now have 90 city headquarters
all over Israel. They will block major highway intersections with
the effect of paralyzing the whole country. Whoever remains stuck
in his car thus unwillingly helps us to maintain the blockade. And
if they nevertheless succeed in evacuating [a settlement], we will
return to its site time and again.'"
This is not a unique story. There have been many others of roughly
a similar kind in the Hebrew press. They all show what was already
known to anyone who refused to delude himself: that no Israeli withdrawal,
even from one single settlement, is possible without a civil war
fought by some Israeli Jews against others.
In view of the facts discussed above, the much publicized issue
of the West Bank lands which continue to be confiscated now appears
to me as already rather secondary in importance. In the first place,
most of the West Bank lands (70 percent by my estimate, 73 percent
by that of Orient House) were confiscated before the Oslo Agreement.
The Oslo Agreement contained no provision for returning even the
still unused part of these lands (54 percent by my estimate) to
their rightful owners; nor did it challenge the rule that they could
be used only by the Jews. After the protests of Al-Khader villagers
against the robbery of their land for the sake of extending the
settlement of Efrat, a committee of ministers was set up, with the
supposed chief dove of Rabin's government, Shulamit Aloni, among
its members.
The committee arranged a "compromise" whereby the hill
in question, a small chunk of land robbed from Al-Khader and other
Palestinian villagers, will be turned into an army fortress, whereas
the extension of Efrat will be built on another hill. Thus the once-confiscated
land will never be returned. No wonder MK Hanan Porat, a rabid Gush
Emunim leader, hailed Aloni's consent to this "compromise"
as a major victory for the settlers.
The Al-Khader affair was followed by the Hebrew press investigations
of the Rabin government's conduct in the West Bank. It was not hard
to discover that Rabin had been systematically deceiving the public
about his settlement policies. In 1994 the Israeli government spent
70 percent more on settling the West Bank than in 1993. Under the
Labor government "Greater Jerusalem" is expanding much
faster than it ever did under Likud.
Israel Shahak, a Holocaust survivor and retired professor of
chemistry at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, is chairman of
the Israeli League of Human and Civil Rights. |