April/May 1995, Pages 11, 98
What's Next for the Middle East?5 Views
An American Middle East Specialist
End of Peace Process Now May Mean End of Israel Later
By Richard H. Curtiss
"The PLO...has no means to pressure the Israeli government.
Only the United States could do that and thus advance the hopes
of peace, but the Clinton administration sold American foreign policy
in the Middle East to the Israeli lobbylock, stock and barrel.
The United States has no Middle East policy. Israel does, and the
United States carries it out. This is a disgrace and will prove
a tragedy for Palestinians and Israelis alike."
Syndicated Columnist Charley Reese,
Orlando Sentinel, March 20, 1995.
Only President Bill Clinton or Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin
can save the current Oslo-agreement-based phase of the peace process.
Neither will.
Clinton has based his administration's entire Near East and South
Asian policy on the dictates of the Israeli government and its principal
U.S. lobby, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee. It was
the easy way. Leave the driving to them, and accept plaudits for
doing so from Israel's amen corner in the American mediaa
tail that by now wags the "mainstream press" dog.
To signal his capitulation early, Clinton installed former AIPAC
officer Martin Indyk, founder of the Washington Institute for Near
East Policy, a "think tank" spun off by AIPAC, as the
principal White House adviser for Near East and South Asian Affairs.
In the State Department he retained from the George Bush administration
Dennis Ross, a former fellow at the Washington Institute for Near
East Policy. Ross's title in the Bush State Department had been
"director of policy planning," which meant he carried
out the carefully crafted Middle East policies of Secretary of State
James Baker. Those led to the direct talks between Israelis and
Arabs that began in Madrid in 1991 and gave birth to the current
"peace process."
Under the Clinton administration, Ross's title changed and so did
his functions. Instead of being the principal Middle East aide to
a hands-on secretary of state, he became the "czar" of
U.S. policy in the Middle East. Over and over, as the "peace
process" died, Ross has sent Secretary of State Warren Christopher
on fool's errands to Jerusalem and Damascus, which Christopher visited
for the 11th time in two years in March. Whatever the intent, however,
Christopher's latest trip could not conceal the fact that Israel's
Rabin had changed course, and was using the fear of terrorism as
an excuse to stop taking steps to halt the settlements and turn
the Israeli-occupied West Bank over to the Palestinians and the
Golan Heights back to Syria.
Clinton's Middle East policy is one that will not be undone except
on a signal from Rabin. It's a signal that will not come because,
whatever his original motive in signing on the White House lawn
on Sept. 13, 1993 the Declaration of Principles negotiated in Oslo,
Rabin now has no intention of conceding the three minimal demands
of the Palestinians: real self-rule either in the form of a sovereign
state or in confederation with Jordan, a shared Jerusalem, and Israeli
withdrawal from all of the West Bank and Gaza, which together constitute
only 22 percent of Palestine.
It may be that Rabin calculated from the beginning that he did
not have the political strength to make any of these concessions
to the Palestinians or to withdraw Israeli forces from Golan. If
so, from the time it took power in June 1992, the Labor government's
entire "peace process" performance was a sham designed
only to keep American aid flowing. In fact Rabin's goal may have
been the same "Greater Israel" embraced by his Likud party
rivals, Menachem Begin and Yitzhak Shamir. In that case Rabin used
the "peace process" to buy time to complete the "annexation"
of East Jerusalem and Golan and the "creeping annexation"
of the West Bank through the building of settlements. Or it may
be that Rabin really did, for a time, fall under the spell of his
long-time rival within the Labor Party, Foreign Minister Shimon
Peres, who envisioned a real peace with Israel's Arab neighbors
and Israeli integration as a major economic player into the booming
petroleum-driven economy of the Middle East.
If Rabin ever envisioned genuine peace with the Arabs, however,
the time to begin implementing it would have been immediately after
the February 1994 massacre by Dr. Baruch Goldstein of 29 Palestinian
men and boys at prayer in the West Bank town of Hebron. There the
arrival of 400 ferociously militant Jewish "religious"
settlers has kept the town's 100,000 residents in a state of turmoil
for more than a decade. Had Rabin sent Israeli troops then to force
the return of Hebron's Gush Emunim settlers to the nearby Gush Emunim
settlement at Kiryat Arba, from which both they and Goldstein came,
most Israelis would have applauded the move.
No Curfew for Settlers
Instead Rabin put the entire Arab population of Hebron under a
lengthy curfew which faced them with severe hardships, some of which
continue to this day. Settlers, meanwhile, were free to roam the
shuttered streets, vandalizing automobiles, shooting out windows
and stealing or destroying the goods in Palestinian shops whenever
they were allowed to open.
When white-coveralled, unarmed international monitors were put
into the city for three months, instead of allowing them to restore
order Rabin restricted their activities to "recording"
human rights violations. When their three-month mandate expired,
instead of renewing it Rabin sent the international human rights
monitors packing. It was clear from that point on that the Israeli
prime minister had decided to ignore both the letter and spirit
of the Declaration of Principles.
Some 28 percent of the West Bank has been confiscated for settlements
or for annexation to "Greater Jerusalem." The pace of
settlement building is greater now than under the Likud governments.
Settlement expansion has the clear goal of cutting off Jerusalem
from the West Bank, and isolating Palestinian population centers
from each other. Bypass roads eventually will enable Israelis living
on the West Bank to avoid coming into contact with Palestinians
at all.
Israeli construction and agricultural industries, always in need
of cheap labor, will be supplied by laborers imported from developing
countries ranging from Romania to Thailand, 70,000 of whom already
are in Israel. West Bank towns increasingly will become Palestinian
"Bantustans." They will exist only as markets for Israeli
goods and at the sufferance of Israeli authorities until their demoralized
inhabitants drift away, to more prosperous Arab states or to join
relatives in North and South America.
This Israeli scenario would leave Yasser Arafat as governor of
900,000 rootless refugees crammed into one of the most heavily populated
areas of the world living under Israeli regulations which
bar Gaza from direct access to the outside world except through
Israeli-controlled borders. The Gazans might even remain subject
to the present ruinous Israeli restrictions that make it impossible
for their fellow Arabs, or even well-meaning Americans and Europeans,
to provide them with the investments or markets that would help
them become self-supporting.
Whatever Rabin's original intentions, clearly his policy now is
to ensure that "autonomy" for Gaza, Jericho and any other
West Bank towns the Palestinian National Authority accepts, fails
so that Palestinians can be labeled "incapable of self-government."
As for Yasser Arafat, there is little he can do to maintain his
place in history other than to continue to go through the motions
of negotiating while making no further compromises on sovereignty,
territory or Jerusalem.
Arafat's Dilemma
Arafat's present dilemma began with his seeming embrace of Iraqi
President Saddam Hussain's occupation of Kuwait. In aligning himself
with the inevitable loser in the war that split the Arab world,
Arafat alienated the PLO from Saudi Arabia and the other GCC countries
whose resources had sustained it through a generation of tenacious
resistance to Israel. Arafat also jeopardized the large and extremely
prosperous Palestinian communities that had grown up in every Arab
state of the Gulf except Oman.
Arafat's second major error, it now appears, was signing in desperation
an agreement that relied solely on Israeli good will or U.S. pressure
on Israel. As Palestinian lawyer Mona Kishmawi charged in a March
seminar in Washington, DC, a team of Israeli lawyers checked every
word of the Declaration of Principles, but not a single Palestinian
lawyer was assigned to read it before it was signed.
In apparently losing his desperate gamble for a sovereign state
for the two million Palestinians of Gaza, the West Bank and East
Jerusalem, Arafat also will be accused of having weakened the claims
of more than two million others in the Palestinian diaspora for
repatriation or compensation for homes and lands lost in 1948. (The
1967 refugees are supposed to be repatriated, but the Israelis now
seem to be reneging on this, too.) It's a charge he'll have to live
with, while making sure he makes no more concessions that might
further undermine Palestinian claims.
The formal death of the Declaration of Principles probably will
be certified by Israel's next prime minister from the Likud party,
which rejected any agreement with the Palestinians from the beginning.
Likud seems very likely to return to power by 1996, despite poisonous
personal rivalries among its leaders.
Resuming its rush toward a "Greater Israel," however,
will not be an unmitigated victory for Israel. True, it will be
free of the demographic burden of some 900,000 Palestinians in Gaza
who, together with Palestinians in the West Bank, Jerusalem, and
Israel itself, almost match the Jewish population of Israel and
the territories under its control. Now, instead of Muslim and Christian
Palestinians becoming a clear majority by the year 2000, that may
not happen until a few years later.
The Palestinians double in number every 17 years. By contrast,
Israel's Jewish population of between 3-1/2 and 4 million seems
to remain virtually static. Even that is thanks only to a continuing
trickle of immigrants from areas of the former Soviet Union, offsetting
the continuing trickle of Israeli emigrants to the United States.
In the absence of the goodwill that would have been generated by
sincere and generous Israeli implementation of the DOP, the chances
of politically and economically integrating Israel's tiny Jewish
population into the sea of perhaps 200 million Arabs and well over
one billion Muslims lapping at its borders will die with the DOP.
What will remain is the cold peace with Egypt and the new peace
with Jordan. The latter is getting colder by the day. Tour buses
taking Israelis to Petra already are being stoned. That's only the
beginning if there is to be no peace with the Palestinians.
Both the Egyptian and Jordanian peace agreements are totally dependent
upon generous U.S. economic aid extending into the indefinite future,
as is the economically unviable Jewish state itself in an era when
American economic forecasts are increasingly cloudy.
This is Israel's reward for "winning" the peace game
under the zero-sum rules it has imposed on the other players. In
all but the very short run, it seems no more attractive than the
"penalty" the Palestinians and their beleaguered leader
now must pay for losing.
Richard H. Curtiss is the executive editor of the Washington
Report. |