A Palestinian Islamist

Peace Process Depends Upon Israeli Withdrawal to 1967 Lines

By Ahmed Yousef

Given the breakdown in the peace process, both in the occupied territories and the Palestinian diaspora, other options must be made available for those who oppose the Declaration of Principles and the Palestinian National Authority to serve the Palestinian community.

Unfortunately, the peace process and its slow demise have created more rifts within the Palestinian community than ever before. This is true because some want it to work at all costs, while those against it view current events as proof that their worries have substance. Having said this, if the situation continues to worsen, Palestinians within the territories and abroad will unite, at least in principle, in opposition to the peace process as we know it. The options were numerous before the DOP was signed, and most still exist. The whole concept was both secretive and a "rush job," so it was inevitable that it would begin to unravel sooner than later.

Opposition is not purely an Islamic issue, as some have tried to imply. Socialists, nationalists, and Islamists view the deal as a complete sell-out. The man in the street took longer than those involved in politics to see it as an obstacle to real peace, but that became clear when he realized that it was bringing no real improvement in the economy, infrastructure, or quality of life.

Those in opposition vary in their alternatives. Although it is not evident in the newscasts, it is the socialists and nationalists who are the most opposed to the deal. Many feel that only a full-scale conflict will rid them of Israeli occupation. The Communists are divided. Those for the deal support it silently, and those against it are equally submissive, yet they have no real alternative.

The Islamists, on the other hand, have put forth proposals that may not appeal to either the Israelis or some of their allies, though many points make much sense. As the situation stands, the Islamists have offered a truce rather than a deal per se. In addition, they are willing to end their attacks on Israelis as long as the soldiers and settlers withdraw to pre-1967 lines and they, the Palestinians, control their own resources in rebuilding the towns and restoring the infrastructure.

A major issue is whether the opposition can break away from the PNA and provide an alternative not merely in theory but in fact. Opponents cannot realistically put forward proposals that would be rejected not only by the Israelis but by the PNA, which does not put its supreme authority to the test or permit it even to be questioned. Opponents therefore probably will participate in local elections at the municipality and university levels. This will not work, though, if the purse-strings continue to be pulled by the PNA.

Another issue is whether the Palestinians can expect support from foreign nations. The issue of money-control is the main reason for donor reluctance to release promised funds for the occupied territories. And, if there is no money, there can be no stability. If the situation remains volatile, the peace process will self-destruct, as it has been in the process of doing so far. If the mostly Western donors want to salvage the process, even partially, they will have to pump funds into the territories. Their reluctance to do so is understandable, since the PNA wants to monopolize the distribution of funds.

As far as political support is concerned, the Western nations, America in particular, should impress upon Israel the need to offer substantive concessions to the Palestinians. Few countries have actively discouraged Israel from building new settlements or completing old ones. Such intransigence in policy can only serve as a death sentence for the remaining months left before the peace process is declared irrevocably dead.

A critical issue is whether the intifada can regain its former strength. It cannot if its progress is measured in months or even in terms of a few years. Uprisings are not new to the occupied territories, but they occur in cyclical patterns of several decades. History teaches, however, that each time such a rebellion occurs, it increases in duration and intensity. During the British occupation, several riots occurred yearly. They climaxed in the mid-1930s with a three-year uprising, led for the first time by Islamically-aware scholars.

The most recent uprising, the intifada, was in full swing from December 1987 until mid-1992, and its aftermath is still relatively powerful. The next uprising will occur within the next 10 years, particularly if the situation worsens. If events in the territories show signs of improvement, it may take up to 20 years. However, the territories, particularly Gaza, have a relatively astronomical birth rate, and these children are growing up in a situation where they learn that aggression and assertiveness are the only things that will keep them alive. Therefore there can be no doubt that another intifada is around the corner, and it will make the most recent one look sedate by comparison.

The key to the future is the role of the Islamic movement. This movement is multi-faceted and the roles it will play cannot be defined in advance. Each facet or component entity is unique in its methodology. The only similarity among the diverse trends within the overall movement is in their ultimate aims, and by ultimate we mean a result that could occur in 8 years or 800.

The Islamic Jihad attracts the more uncompromising elements of Islamism, although they have in their cadres highly intelligent and capable people. The Muslim Brotherhood continues its role as a primarily social group, working at building social consciousness and a makeshift infrastructure until a more centrally organized one can be put in place. Hamas operates more on a political level, with military support. A significant part of its agenda is similar to the Brotherhood's. Yet it also encourages political activism among its supporters.

Other than its religious make-up, Hamas also differs from the nationalists in that it is less willing to concede territory to the Israelis. So, while Hamas in particular will be hurt in the short-run due to Israeli and PNA pressure, it will likely rebound eventually due to its emphasis on sociopolitical activism. Keep in mind that its military wing is decentralized and may progress or regress at rates different from Hamas' main contingent.

Those Israelis who genuinely want peace through justice as the only realistic means to enhance and guarantee their own security cannot ignore Hamas simply by excluding it from Palestinian elections, any more than Rabin could exclude from the Israeli political process those Israelis who oppose the Oslo accord. As Alon Ben-Meir, a professor of international relations at New York University, recommended in a position paper summarized in the Christian Science Monitor of Oct. 21, 1994, "Cracking down on Hamas won't, by itself, solve the problem. Many thousands of Hamas members have legitimate grievances. They have been ignored by the PLO. They are not participating in any of the newly developing social and economic institutions; thousands of their comrades are still languishing in Israeli jails. Their growing political power and numbers warrant more deliberate attention. Hamas' leaders should know that relinquishing violence would open the door to their political participation. Under the same conditions Israel could release, in stages, many of Hamas's prisoners—in particular Hamas's founder, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, who beseeched Waxman's captors not to kill him. Such a unilateral step by Israel could change the whole complexity of the emerging Israeli-Hamas conflict. This is not an appeasement, but a realistic assessment of changing conditions and the need to articulate a new strategy—one no less daring than the opening of a dialogue with the PLO more than two years ago."

Ahmed Yousef is the editor of the Middle East Affairs Journal in Springfield, VA.