U.S. Position on Protection of Palestinians Exasperates Allies

By Ian Williams

The Clinton administration responded to the Feb. 25 massacre by a Jewish settler of Muslim men and boys at prayer in the Al Ibrahimi mosque in Hebron with vociferous verbal condemnation. But the administration's diplomats quietly but stubbornly resisted action by the United Nations. They held up for more than two weeks a U.N. Security Council resolution on the issue by insisting it make no reference to East Jerusalem as part of the occupied territories, nor to a U.N. presence to monitor and protect the Palestinians.

Indeed, the position of the U.S., which can veto any resolution whose wording it doesn't approve, was reported to be stronger than that of the Israelis, perhaps reflecting the influence of the Likudniks in the Clinton administration. The Council met repeatedly over two weeks to resolve the U.S. veto threat.

Finally, a compromise was accepted calling for a temporary "internal or foreign presence in accordance with the Declaration of Principles of Sept. 13, 1993," with the agreement of the parties. The presence would in fact be purely symbolic.

On the matter of Jerusalem, there was no difference between Israel and Washington. While even the most pro-Israeli of previous administrations have accepted that the settlements are "illegal" and the territories, specifically including East Jerusalem, are "occupied," the Clinton administration line is that they are "disputed. " The Clinton administration would leave the "dispute" to be resolved between the PLO and Israel without reference to international law and the United Nations, although it is the U.N. that has, with American support, framed international law on this issue.

The final, opposing, versions of the resolution offered by the U.S. and by the other Security Council members differed in an equally symbolic way. The American draft did not mention Jerusalem, referring only to territories taken in June 1967. Of course, in reality, that includes East Jerusalem. Faced with the united opposition of every other country on the Security Council, the U.S. eventually was forced to accept that the resolution had to go ahead.

But the U.S. insisted the voting would be by paragraphs-enabling it to abstain on the section involving Jerusalem. Then, suddenly, the State Department did a 180-degree turn. It would veto the resolution unless the PLO returned to the talks. Even America's closest allies were thoroughly exasperated at what seemed to be a classic case of blaming the victim.

As PLO envoy to the United Nations Nasser Al-Kidwa pointed out, even if the resolution were passed, Palestinians would like to know how it was to be implemented to protect Palestinians in the territories. The resolution finally was passed March 18, with the U.S. abstaining on Jerusalem, but not vetoing the resolution.

An Absence of Pressure

Far from giving Rabin and Peres room for political maneuver, this absence o U.S. and U.N. pressure means that Israel's Labor government has no force majeure to counter the arguments of settlers and the Likudnik fringe. An Israeli prime minister whose election was won because the Israeli electorate could see the looming results of American displeasure with the Likud government's intransigence must surely see the internal bargaining strength that a firm U.S. hand would give him. Instead, the Clinton administration is trying to disassemble the whole apparatus of international law and U.N. decisions on the issue of Palestine. Aside from its immorality, it is inexpedient as well.

Israeli Ambassador Gad Yaacobi, while expressing his horror at the massacre, said that "All sides had crossed the point of no return on the way to a new era of peace, security and cooperation. There simply is no alternative. " However he did not explore how much longer the PLO negotiators could keep the rapidly waning confidence of the people in the territories confronted with a curfew on the victims, while the soulmates of the murderer strutted the streets, armed and unhindered by the Israel Defense Forces.

Nasser Al Kidwa helpfully did suggest a way forward. The settlers should be disarmed, the settlements dismantled and not merely limited. The settlers should, he suggested, be offered compensation by the government of Israel.

An Unobserved Precedent

Unobserved, and with little debate, the Security Council provided a precedent, although in this case the "settlers" were occupying their own land only to have it taken from underneath them. Following the Gulf war, a group of Iraqi citizens found themselves suddenly unwelcome strangers in their own homes.

The U.N.'s demarcation of the disputed Iraq-Kuwait border left 95 Iraqi farms and 206 Iraqi homes on the Kuwait side of the border. The U.N.'s position is that the border was, officially, always where the cartographers have now put it, so it could have been argued that since these people had been living (albeit unknown to themselves) in Kuwait all along, they should have some claim to citizenship. That is not what Kuwait or the Security Council wanted. Instead, by Resolution 899 a trust fund was established of 71.5 million Iraqi dinars to compensate the displaced citizens, and it was deemed for humanitarian purposes so the money was not affected by the trade embargo. It remains to be seen whether Baghdad will allow the victims to sell their patrimony in this way.

Bumbling on Bosnia

History moves much faster nowadays. All the U.N.'s well-meaning ineffectuality over Palestine over a period of almost half a century has been concentrated into two years of waffle in the Balkans. It is like Palestine on fast forward. Untouched by the deaths of 250,000 and the suffering of millions more, it took the public relations disaster of 68 citizens of Sarajevo being killed by one mortar shell near the TV cameras to produce the type of action that, if it had been taken two years before, would have averted genocide in the region.

And, to the last, Western governments have tried to be duplicitous in their own individualistic ways. Germany supports sanctions on Serbia for having troops in Croatia and Bosnia, but is opposed to action against Croatia for having troops and artillery in Bosnia. All the governments officially accept the legitimacy of the Bosnian government, but then undermine it wherever possible. For example, the French are attempting to put Sarajevo, the capital, under U.N. supervision. The British deplore the ethnic violence but privately have been working on the principle of partition since the first Serb shots were fired against the Muslims and Croats of Bosnia. UNPROFOR, the U.N. force, has been so partial to the Serbs that, without derogating from the bravery of the peacekeepers themselves, it is hopelessly compromised in the eyes of Bosnians. President Clinton thinks that what is happening is deplorable and suggests, correctly, that the Europeans are being unprincipled. Then, however, he refuses to do anything about it.

Equally, even though the General Assembly voted for lifting the arms embargo on Bosnia, with the U.S. voting for, the White House and the State Department have failed to use their influence on their alleged allies to persuade them to support this point of view. It does seem, belatedly, that the firmness of the new UNPROFOR commander and of NATO is already producing results, in that, as we go to print, Tuzla airport is on the verge of reopening, the bombardment of Sarajevo has been suspended, and fewer U.N. relief convoys are being blocked. For a few short weeks, genocide has been slowed down. It is minor triumph, but indicates what can happen when the West sounds as if it means what it says. An incurable optimist might almost hope for the same firmness on Middle East resolutions!

Ian Williams is a free-lance writer based at the United Nations.