April/May 1994, Page 8

Seven Views: Reassessing Declaration of Principles of Peace in Light of the Hebron Massacre

Arafat Is in Trouble, But So Is Israel

By Robert Hazo

Yasser Arafat is in deep trouble. The aftermath of the massacre in Hebron could weaken his position or improve it considerably, depending on how he handles it. Prime Minister Rabin has made gestures, but Arafat has demanded more: specifically that the settlements problem be placed at the top of the agenda. It is not yet clear whether Rabin will go further or whether Arafat will refuse to negotiate further until his demands are met. Both may be playing for time until Palestinian anger cools.

Arafat's real difficulties are of his own making, and go much deeper. One is the widespread suspicion that he is on an ego trip, willing to make concessions just to become the first president of an entity called Palestine. A second suspicion is that he is unwilling to include the full spectrum of Palestinian political opinion in his plans.

The first draft of the charter for Palestine does not mention "one person, one vote. " Instead it suggests an autocratic system wherein political parties must receive presidential approval before they can function, and where the powers of the legislative branch will be considerably restricted.

A report to the contrary, however, indicates that Arafat has invited Hamas and others (presumably the secular left) to join with him in pressing his demands. This action would be in sharp contrast to his exclusion of political opponents from the original negotiating committee.

Arafat's most important problem is that he behaves as if he is dealing from a position of weakness.

On the Israeli side, since the massacre in Hebron Rabin has not done much other than disarming members of two ultra-fanatic Kahane groups. He publicly stated he was "ashamed" as an Israeli at what happened, and that he would consider some kind of international presence not an armed presence and not the U.N.) in the territories. At the same time, Rabin and just about every Israeli who deplored the act of Dr. Goldstein improperly compared the former, a fringe phenomenon, to major forces such as Hamas and Hezbollah.

Arafat's initial reaction, plus the breaking off of talks by the Syrians, Jordanians and Lebanese, has been a plus. By playing hardball he has put the Israelis in a comer. While neither side really wants the talks to fail, should they fail neither side wants to be seen as the cause of failure.

It remains to be seen whether or not Arafat will stay the course. Right now he has no choice but to play the brinksman. He may not get all, in all likelihood not even most, of what he asks for. But now and for some time to come he dare not be seen as accommodating.

He has no military or economic power. Although he has neither paid PLO operatives in months, nor organized his bureaucracy to govern and carry out an election, it still is not certain that he is financially bankrupt. He may be saving what money he has for the Palestinian police, a key element in the agreement, which he may see as his palace guard.

Although Arafat dares not abrogate the declaration of principles, there is sufficient ambiguity in the agreement so that he can toughen his stand considerably. And that may bring him more support from West Bank and Gaza Palestinians, the Palestinian diaspora, and from Israeli Arabs who, for one of the few times in memory, have not simply protested the Hebron massacre, but actually have engaged in violence against the Israeli police and army.

There is, of course, a limit to what the Israelis will give, but it is far from having been reached. Actually, Prime Minister Rabin's election campaign pledge in 1992 to grant Palestinians autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza was in response to the wish of a majority of Israelis to come to terms with their political environment. Most Israelis are weary of conflict and living under the threat of conflict. There is no reason to believe that such an Israeli majority is no longer in place.

Rabin almost certainly realizes that Israel can make a better deal with Arafat than with his likely hard-line successors, assuming that Arafat does not suffer the same fate as the late Egyptian President Anwar Sadat before the negotiations are completed.

The Israelis also know that many of their most skilled citizens and new immigrants have left, or are thinking of leaving because of what they believe will be an uncertain Israeli future. They also know that U.S. government belt-tightening very possibly will reduce or terminate foreign aid. Without peace, there will be no substantial investment by outsiders in Israel and no possibility of Israeli economic independence.

"Peace Now" still constitutes only a fraction of the Israeli population. But Israel is experiencing civil disobedience reminiscent of America's experience in Vietnam, as well as the post-traumatic stress and soldier suicides familiar to Americans during and after that war.

Further, the cost of maintaining a huge military force makes the Israelis the most taxed people on earth. For relief they need agreement with their most immediate neighbors, even as their government propagates the dogma that Islamic fundamentalism, as embodied in Iran, necessitates a continued U.S. presence in the area. Since the U.S. wants peace, the Israelis must give peace a very hard try to keep American support.

Most of Israel's assets are tangible and readily apparent, while those of the Palestinians are intangible. However, the conflict is no longer a military but a political one. And on the political battlefield the intangible weaknesses of Israel become Arab levers of power if Arabs learn when and how to use them. Should they do so, the declaration of principles signed by the PLO and Israel will in retrospect be seen as an historic turning point. It will have been made possible by the steadfast unwillingness of the Palestinians and their Arab allies to capitulate, despite more than half a century of enormous suffering.

Robert Hazo is chairman of the Middle East Policy Association.