The Phenomenon of "Fundamentalism"

By Greg Noakes

Few political developments in the Middle East seem as ominous or as threatening to outsiders as the rise of "Islamic fundamentalism." Even fewer have been so misunderstood. The popular image in the West is of a monolithic movement spreading like wildfire across the region, heralding a return to medieval obscurantism by means of apocalyptic violence. To be certain, the movement has often shown its darker side of intolerance, fanaticism and xenophobia.

This is only part of the picture, however, and "fundamentalism" is neither monolithic nor necessarily violent. It sets as its goal not blind obedience to hidebound tradition, but rather the reintegration of noble religious principles into the political sphere, the renewal of a rich Islamic culture and society, and a return to the roots of Islam. There is, of course, a great deal of disagreement among Islamic activists as to the exact definition of these goals, as well as the means by which they should be attained, and one can only speak in rough generalizations. It is clear, though, that image and reality are often two separate entities when it comes to Western perceptions of "fundamentalism," largely as a result of sensationalist media coverage, a lack of information about the region, its people, and its history, and Western paranoia and misunderstanding when dealing with Islam.

The Question of Terminology

To begin with there is the thorny question of terminology. Many Muslims are uncomfortable with the term "fundamentalism" used in conjunction with Islam. Originally applied to a current of thought in Protestant Christianity that accepts and interprets Scripture literally, the term is often misapplied to Islam by outside commentators, as Muslim "fundamentalists" have interpreted the Qur'an in a variety of ways. Fundamentalist Christians believe that the Bible is the divinely inspired word of God. In this sense, however, all Muslims are "fundamentalists," as it is an article of faith that the Qur'an was revealed by God to Muhammad through the angel Jibril (Gabriel).

Other terms widely used to refer to " fundamentalist Islam" are also problematic. "Revivalist" or "resurgent" implies that Islam was somehow dead or moribund before, when in fact there have been repeated calls for reform from both liberal and conservative Muslim thinkers throughout the years. "Radical" Islam is also somewhat unsatisfactory: tactics used by some Islamic activists in the Mideast are indeed radical, but the basic ideology of these activists is very conservative, and even reactionary.

Islamic Activists like Tunisia's Rachid

Ghannouchi and the leaders of Algeria's Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) have preferred the terms "Islamism" and "Islamist" to refer to their movements and their followers. It should be stressed that "Islamism" is not the same as "Islam," and that "Islamist" is not a synonym for "Muslim. " Islamists are but a vocal minority among the Muslim community and, as one Algerian taxi driver noted, "I don't have to belong to an Islamist party in order to be a good Muslim. "

These relatively neutral terms do little by way of explaining Islamist ideology, however, in part because there are so many divergent groups with widely differing doctrines. In general, Islamists are trying to create an Islamic society based on a glorious and ideal model from the past. Some activists narrowly define that past as the lifetime of the Prophet, while most Sunni Islamists extend the model to include the first four "rightly guided" caliphs. Shi'i Islamists usually look to the examples of the Prophet, the fourth caliph 'Ali, and his line of descendants. There is a good deal of romanticization and idealization of this era involved in Islamist rhetoric, and it should be remembered that three of the first four caliphs were murdered and that the Muslim community was often split after the death of the Prophet.

This notion of using an ideal past as a guide for proper conduct is not limited to Islamists. The basis of Islamic law (shariah) is the Qur'an and the sunna, or practice, of the Prophet and his Companions. While different interpretations of these sources are allowed, innovation is condemned. God's Word is not subject to change or amendment by man, while the Prophet's words and actions are used to illuminate and illustrate the meaning of the Qur'an. Islamists, though, reject the codification of the shariah by medieval scholars as an unnecessary accretion which has led to stagnation.

Islamists also demand an end to Western style secular regimes and a return to an Islamic system of government. According to classical Islamic thought, the state apparatus exists to ensure the proper practice of the religion, and is itself governed by and constrained by the tenets of the faith. Yet the shariah does not mandate specific structures for an Islamic government. Muhammad's leadership of the community was based on his unique status as a prophet, while the first four caliphs were elected by consensus on the basis of their ties to the Prophet and their personal character and piety. With the rise of the Umayyad caliphate, power shifted to a hereditary system of succession, and a de facto split in temporal and religious power occurred.

Thus there is no set formula for the structure of an Islamic government, or for its relationship to the society at large. Islamists have different ideas on this point, including the "mullahcracy" of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the re-establishment of the caliphate, and democratization as a form of community consensus. Some radical Islamist groups demand strict adherence to the model of the early Muslim community, while others see this as a basis for reform and a guide for the integration of modern state structures in an Islamic context.

With respect to policy formulation, most Islamist groups have focused on social and cultural issues such as the wearing of the veil or hijab by women, the strict prohibition of alcohol, gambling and usury in Muslim countries, and the curtailment of Western consumerism and mass media. Less clear are the Islamists' positions on issues of national foreign policy (both inside and outside the Muslim world), the problems of agricultural and industrial development, and the dilemma of the Third World's unequal economic relationship with the West.

The Debate over "Modernity"

Islamism is in part a product of a longrunning debate among both Muslims and non-Muslims as to the compatibility of Islam and "modernity." Secularist reformers argue that Islam should be relegated to the sphere of personal spirituality, and that the appropriation of Western technology can only be successfully accomplished in the context of a Westernized society. Many Islamic reformers in the early part of this century believed that it was indeed possible to integrate modern technology into Muslim society, but set forth their arguments largely in terms of a problematic put forward by the West. Modern Islamists also believe that there is nothing incompatible between Islam and science, but argue for the self-sufficiency of Islamic thought, eschewing Western theoretical models and terminology in favor of their own.

Islamism also owes its existence to popular frustration produced by political conditions in the Islamic world. Many regimes in the region are viewed as repressive, corrupt and isolated from the needs and desires of their populations. A number of countries are in a state of economic chaos, with rising prices, high unemployment and mushrooming population growth combining to make life difficult for the average person. This frustration, coupled with tremendous economic stratification at both the national and regional levels, provides a ready audience for the Islamist pleas for social justice.

The Failure of Imported Ideologies

In addition, the spectacular failure of a variety of imported ideologies in the Middle East has contributed to Islamism's appeal. In Egypt, for example, Gamal Abdel Nasser's socialist policies led to the stagnation of the nation's economy and the kind of immense problems experienced by centrally planned systems around the world. Under Anwar Sadat, the move was to capitalism with the infitah, or "open-door," policy. The economic benefits went to a very select elite, mostly friends and associates of the president, while the vast majority of the population was unable to afford the expensive new consumer goods on the market. The chasm between the haves and the have-nots in Egyptian society grew to alarming proportions.

Islamism, on the other hand, is an indigenous movement, has not been tainted with the failures of other ideologies, and offers an appealing message to men and women who are able to exercise little or no control over their political or economic destiny in the face of the strains and inequalities of the modernization process. Islamism is also able to utilize religious symbols and language.

For the overwhelming majority of Muslims, Islam is not only the principal guide for their behavior, but also an important emotional source of identity, and appeals couched in religious terms are able to motivate believers like no others. It is no mistake that Saddam Hussain sought to cast the Gulf war in terms of believer vs. infidel in order to mobilize support for his position among Arab populations, even though the Ba'ath Party is avowedly secularist. This dynamic makes it difficult for state authorities to combat the Islamists' rhetoric: they must try to discredit Islamism without being seen as trying to discredit Islam.

Islamists have also alienated a large percentage of Muslims, however. Many see them as overzealous and fanatical, devoted to their maximalist positions and unable or unwilling to compromise. Women's groups and non-Muslim minorities in particular have voiced concern for their hard-won rights should the Islamists come to power. There is also concern over the lack of a fully articulated political plan beyond social issues. Even some Muslims who share the Islamists' concern over the marginal role of Islam in the formation of public policy and are similarly dismayed by the debilitating effect of blind imitation of the West on Muslim society are frightened and shocked by the sometimes violent nature of Islamism. If it is true that Islamism exercises an enormous appeal for a large number of Muslims, it is similarly true that this appeal is far from universal.

It seems clear that Islam is at a crossroads as the 20th century draws to a close. People across the Islamic world demand that their governments again uphold the faith, rather than merely pay it lip service. Yet agreement on exactly how this should happen, and on what form an Islamic society should assume, is nonexistent. This, then, is the task that Islamism faces. As Habib Boulares, a Tunisian cabinet minister and former special adviser to President Ben Ali, has noted, "Every true Muslim believes, in fact, that his religion addresses itself to all men and is valid for all time and all places. The challenge that the modern world hurls before Islam is quite simply for Islam to prove it."

Greg Noakes, an American Muslim, is the advertising director for the Washington Report on Middle East Affairs.