Ozal Counting on Closer US Ties

By Sami Kohen

How far have Turkey's expectations from its Gulf policy been met?

Quite a lot, according to President Turgut Ozal.

Just a bit, according to his critics.

Impartial observers believe that Turkey has, after all, gained more than it has lost.

Ozal pushed Turkey onto the US side as soon as the Gulf crisis broke out. He had a strong argument to stand against Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. The UN Security Council had imposed sanctions to force Saddam Hussain to withdraw. This was in fact a logical and just policy for Turkey, which takes pride in the fact that it was one of the founders of the world organization, and which respects its principles and decisions.

Ozal, therefore, promptly closed Turkey's borders with Iraq and closed down the oil pipeline stretching from Iraq's Kirkuk oil fields to the Turkish port of Iskenderun. Logical as this might appear, many Turks were not happy. Iraq was a good trading partner as well as a neighbor. Turning against it would cause economic losses to Turkey, and could provoke political repercussions in the Arab and Islamic worlds.

What led the Turkish leader to ignore Turkey's traditional position of neutrality in conflicts between Arab or Middle Eastern countries was, of course, not only respect for the UN's high ideals and principles. Although he was convinced Saddam would lose the game, privately, Ozal was worried about Saddam's aggressive behavior.

Early last summer, when Turkey had a problem with Iraq (and Syria) over the flow of water from the Euphrates River, which originates in Turkey, Saddam Hussain launched a strong anti-Turkish campaign, inciting Arab opinion against Ankara. And when Turkish Prime Minister Yildirim Akbulut paid a visit to Baghdad to discuss these and other issues, Saddam Hussain informed him that NATO was dying and that Turkey's interests were not served by staying in it. Finally, Saddam was tolerating activities by Kurdish rebels of Turkish origin (PKK), who were using Iraqi territory for hit-and-run attacks inside Turkey.

All of these considerations went into Ozal's decision in favor of the US and its coalition allies. In fact, Ozal wanted to go further and dispatch Turkish troops to join the multinational forces in the Gulf. That, however, required an authorization from Parliament. Ozal could not get it, not only because of opposition from other parties, but also because of reluctance within his own conservative "Motherland Party," and among military leaders.

Ozal nevertheless found other opportunities to contribute to the allied cause. When military operations started, he allowed the US to mount air attacks against Iraq from the Incirlik air base in southern Turkey. He also deployed some 180,000 Turkish troops along the border with Iraq, forcing Saddam to maintain nine Iraqi divisions in the north.

These were valuable contributions, without formal Turkish participation in the war. Yet, they presented risks. There was fear that Iraq might retaliate with Scud missiles against the Turkish bases, or with an attack across the border. Ozal's critics were quite worried about it, but not Ozal himself. His conviction was that Iraq would not dare to strike out against Turkey, and he was right.

Although Ozal's policy was controversial at home, it was well received abroad, particularly in the United States. The Turkish leader was frequently on the telephone with President Bush. In some 40 telephone conversations, they built an intimate working relationship, plus personal empathy.

Ozal's trip to the US, during which President Bush invited him to Camp David, was an opportunity to probe the extent of this sympathy and friendship.

Ozal's Expectations

Ozal's expectations include:

Politically, further development of US-Turkish ties; diminishing such obstacles in US-Turkish relations as the Cyprus problem and the activities of the Greek and Armenian lobbies in Congress; achieving better understanding from the Europeans, which would lead to Turkey's acceptance into the EC as a full member; and a more active Turkish role in the Middle East, which would provide Ankara with influence in regional affairs.

Militarily, US support for the modernization of the Turkish armed forces, i.e. more assistance in new arms and equipment.

Economically, substantial aid from allies to compensate for revenue losses due to the Gulf crisis, and more trade with the US.

These expectations have not been totally met, and some of them may never be attained. However, some substantial progress already appears to have been achieved.

Politically, there is no doubt that US-Turkish relations have, as Ozal said, "entered a new era." The atmosphere has not been better for three decades. The question is how this will be reflected in substance. Ozal has been talking about "strategic cooperation" between the two countries, similar to that existing between the US and Britain and the US and Israel. These may be ideas for the future, but closer ties are certainly in sight. The Ozal administration firmly believes this will be beneficial to Turkey's interests, although some sections of Turkish public opinion think too much dependence on the US would not be useful.

There is no doubt that US-Turkish relations have "entered a new era."

Turkey's Gulf policy has had little impact on the attitude of the Europeans, and particularly the EC. Those who hoped that the EC would show more understanding and flexibility are now disappointed. But Ozal never had such high expectations. That is why his preference in developing ties with the West centers on the United States. Hence his ideas about "strategic cooperation" and a "free trade area" with the US.

As for the Middle East, many observers had attributed to Ozal the desire to grab Mosul and Kirkuk from Iraq during the Gulf crisis, intentions he officially denied. Now, Turkey faces a new and dangerous situation in Iraq, with Kurds active in the north and pro-Iranian Shi'i active in the south. Both are unfriendly to Turkey. Ozal wants to see Saddam toppled, but Ozal also wants a unified and stable Iraq.

As a result of the Gulf crisis, Turkey has been able to get some extra military and economic assistance from the US and other allies. Ozal seems happy with the modern weapons sent to Turkey during the war.

"This is one of our biggest gains," he says. The same cannot be said, however, about economic support. Turkey's losses in the Gulf crisis amount to $7 billion. Only $1.3 billion has been received so far, mostly in soft credits. An additional $4 billion has been promised. But Turkey is in urgent need of a minimum of $1 billion, which Ozal has asked President Bush to help provide (perhaps through commercial banks) as soon as possible. Otherwise, the ill effects of the Gulf war on Turkey's economy will be felt further, and this would give fresh impetus to criticism against the Ozal administration. Ironically, Ozal's popularity is at stake at home, even while it is at its peak abroad.

Sami Kohen is an editor of the Milliyet newspaper in Instanbul.