Syria's Shifting Alliances in Lebanon

By Charles Waterman

Syrian forces entered Lebanon in 1976 against a coalition of Palestinians, Sunni Muslim militias, socialist Druse, and assorted leftist militias. Syria's purpose then was to prevent an outright victory by members of this coalition, called the National Alliance, over their Maronite Christian enemies, then on the verge of defeat. Neither the Shi'ites nor the Iranians were a factor in that distant era.

The tacit Syrian-Christian alliance lasted less than two years. By 1978, Syria had shifted its support to the leftist-Muslim coalition opposing Lebanon's resurgent Christians.

Last month, Syrian forces re-entered West Beirut. The opposing forces were familiar—Palestinians loyal to PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat, socialist Druse, and members of the Lebanese Communist Party. However, a new element had been added: the Iranian-supported Shi'ite Hezbollah militia. And the beneficiary this time was the Syrian-allied Amal forces. This time around, Christians and the Lebanese central government merely watched the fighting nervously from their side of the Green Line which separates East and West Beirut.

In terms of Syria's interests in Lebanon, we are, in some respects, watching a re-run of 1976. One of the most conspicuous features of Syria's Lebanon involvement is the transitory nature of its alliances with the country's various warring factions.

The ease with which the Syrian regime is able to add, shift, and manipulate its clients points to motivations based far more on raw power-politics than ideology.

There is a grim logic, however, in Syria's seemingly fickle politics. A few principles are basic:

• An equilibrium of power (tuwazzan al-quwa', as expressed publicly by Damascus) between major Lebanese communities must be preserved.

• Every community or faction must deal with Damascus directly—even on issues affecting their own links to other groups in Lebanon. Accordingly, harmony among clients is not necessarily a positive factor in Syrian eyes, as it encourages uncontrolled maneuvering. In fact, friction and even violence between various clients is at times encouraged by Syrian intelligence. Attempts by major communities to negotiate settlements among themselves without Syrian participation are viewed with suspicion.

• Factions must ally themselves with Syria on both pan-Arab or international issues and also on intra-Lebanese matters. Factions normally close to Damascus risk retribution if they limit their collaboration with Syria only to international matters.

• Powerful non-Lebanese factions—such as Yasir Arafat's PLO—are not permitted to exercise independent policies in Lebanon which affect the Arab-Israeli confrontation and Syria's role in it.

The most dramatic example of Syria's application of the balance-of-power principles was the 1976 intervention referred to above. Syria's move came only after months of secret contacts with the Christian Maronite leadership. Yet after preventing a Christian defeat, Syria gradually realigned itself with the PLO and the Lebanese National Movement—a two-year process marked by Syrian bombardment of East Beirut and its surrounding Christian areas in the spring of 1978. Factors precipitating this realignment were the increasing strength of various Christian militias, their intensifying relationships with Israel, and the possibility that Egyptian President Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in November, 1977 portended a series of bilateral treaties with Israel—perhaps including a Christian-led Lebanon.

The complicated relationship between Syria, the Shi'ite Amal movement, the Druse Progressive Socialist Party, and the anti-Arafat Palestinian groups exemplified Syria's proclivity to deal separately with each faction—and to tolerate intense friction between them. As a result, each group's degree of intimacy with Damascus differs. Amal is highly dependent on Syrian benevolence, and has no significant alternatives. The same applies for the pro-Syrian Palestinian factions. By contrast, Walid Jumblatt's Druse receive meaningful support not only from Damascus but from the Soviet Union as well. They also sustain links with Israel. As a result, Syria and Amal have attempted to limit a Palestinian armed presence in Lebanon—including the Syrian-backed Palestinian factions—and prevent attacks on Israel's northern border. Frequent fighting between Amal and all Palestinian factions in Beirut has been the result, including a five-week Amal siege of Palestinian refugee camps during May and June, 1986, and its more recent manifestation, the "camps war" of the past four months.

The more independent Druse—while also Syrian-backed—have joined the fray on the side of Arafat's Palestinians and Sunni Muslims.

Instead of indicating Syrian impotence, such internecine fighting among clients is consistent with Syria's policy of separate links with each. Support to all of its battling allies continues—enhancing Syria's grip on each of them.

Syrian President Hafez al-Assad's relationship with Maronite ex-President of Lebanon Suleiman Franjiyyah exemplifies Syria's willingness to attack allies who differ on internal Lebanese matters. The long-term Syrian-Franjiyyah relationship has been based on similar international and Arab world views plus personal friendship—not on Franjiyyah's internal Lebanese politics, which are narrowly Maronite in scope. However, since the Lausanne Lebanese national dialogue conference of February and March, 1984, when Franjiyyah successfully opposed proposals by Syria's Abdel Halim Khaddam which would have strengthened the influence of Lebanon's Sunni Muslim Prime Minister at the expense of the Maronite Presidency, Syria has sought to punish Franjiyyah. Soon after Lausanne, the Syrian-backed Popular Syrian Party (PSP) forcibly took over the Koura region, comprising nearly half of Franjiyyah's area of influence—albeit the half containing a heavily Greek Orthodox populace. Similar clashes between Franjiyyah's Ma'radah militia and the PSP have continued intermittently, provoked by Franjiyyah's lukewarm reception of the December, 1985, Syrian-sponsored Tripartite Agreement with dissident Maronite leader Eli Hobeika for a Lebanese political settlement.

Damascus' mistrust of powerful, independent-minded foreign factions in Lebanon is clear in its adversarial relationship with Arafat's PLO—which lost its key role in Lebanon in the wake of Israel's 1982 invasion. The main ideological issues between Arafat and Assad, of course, transcend Lebanon and focus on Arafat's flirtation with the political peace process and with Jordan's King Hussein. But the immediate cause of the Arafat-Assad split lies in Lebanon, where PLO freedom of political and military action could draw Damascus into war with Israel under conditions not of Syria's choosing. Roots of the Arafat-Assad split include:

• Arafat's lack of responsiveness to Syrian wishes during the PLO's 1981 cross-border war with Israel;

• Syria's permitting the anti-Arafat Abu Nidal group to operate from Syria against Arafat's Al-Fatah guerrillas in Lebanon; and

• Arafat's harsh criticisms of Syria's feeble performance against Israel in the 1982 invasion, and his insinuations that Syria was intentionally undercutting the PLO by not firmly resisting Israel's offensive.

All of these events exacerbated existing frictions between Arafat and Assad. When combined with the two leaders' differences on the Arab-Israeli issue itself, they led to Syrian encouragement of anti-Arafat elements within the Palestinian movement to break away from Arafat's Al Fatah-dominated PLO.

There are, to be sure, a few new elements in Syria's recent intervention. The Beirut portion of the Shi'ite Amal movement is almost exclusively dependent on Syria, without an Israeli counterpoise as the Christians had in 1976. And, by confronting the Iranian-backed Hezbollah, Syria appears willing to oppose forcefully those calling for an Islamic Republic of Lebanon.

These elements may cause the current alignment to last longer than did the 1976 Syrian-Maronite coalition of convenience.

But history will in time win out. Syria's essential Lebanese policy represents a blatant exercise of divide and rule, balance-of-power theory. Understanding the rules of Syria's Lebanese game can be a life and death issue for those involved, and of supreme importance for external powers tempted to play a role of their own.

Charles Waterman, a retired US government official, writes frequently on the Middle East and US Middle East policy.