Capitol Hill Quiet on Israeli-South African Ties

By Jane Hunter

According to the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, US aid to Israel could be suspended if Israel continues its military ties to the apartheid government of South Africa. However, while Israel's extensive military relations with South Africa have been well-documented, it is unlikely that Congress will hold Israel to the provisions of the Anti-Apartheid Act. If Congress was unwilling to raise any questions about US aid to Israel in the aftermath of the Pollard spy scandal, how likely is it that US aid to Israel will be cut over the Jewish state's military ties to the apartheid regime in South Africa?In all likelihood, Israel will make some superficial gesture to sever those relations, Congress will applaud Israel's resolve in opposing apartheid, and everyone will look the other way while Tel Aviv and Pretoria continue their symbiotic military relations. The first part of this scenario took place March 19, when Israel announced that it was reducing its trade and cultural ties with South Africa, cutting back on existing military contracts, and that no new military contracts would be negotiated between Tel Aviv and Pretoria. However, as one American journalist in Tel Aviv remarked, it would be hard to judge the seriousness of these announced military cutbacks since information about Israel's arms industry is highly classified.

Recent newspaper reports suggesting that Israel is reassessing its relations with South Africa in light of the Anti-Apartheid Act are therefore somewhat misleading. When last the subject of Israel's military links to South Africa was given any sustained media coverage, Israel was insisting that it honored the 1977 United Nations Mandatory Arms Embargo and sold no arms to South Africa. Now Israel is declaring that it has been selling arms to the apartheid government. Further, instead of saying it will stop, it is pointing out how much it will cost to give up this lucrative business.

Historical Background

Israel began selling arms to South Africa in the mid-sixties. Over the past two decades, the Jewish state has sold Pretoria's white government anti-tank weapons, ship-to-ship and air-to-air missiles, missile-armed patrol boats, radar installations, and a range of anti-insurgency gear from remotely-piloted planes to electronic border fending. In the last year, Israel reportedly sold South Africa 50 Gazelle helicopters and at least four Boeing 707s specially converted to serve as combined electronic warfare platforms and in-flight refueling aircraft. In addition, it has been reported that Israel's state-owned aircraft industries up-dated South Africa's aging Mirage aircraft into state-of-the-art "Cheetah" fighter-jets.

In 1976 Israel and South Africa, increasingly coming to grips with the prospect of long-term ostracism from the international community, signed a comprehensive series of political and military agreements. South Africa provided financing for Israel to carry out research and development on new weapons systems, and it also provided raw materials, mostly strategic minerals and uranium. For its part, Israel sold the weapons it developed to South Africa, or it permitted the white regime to build them under license, providing the technological input and advisers where necessary.

By 1984 Pretoria boasted that it had triumphed over the UN's arms embargo and had become an arms producer. Experts doubt that South Africa has achieved the level of self-sufficiency it claims, but they admit that it has made great strides toward that goal, and credit much of its success to liberal doses of Israeli weapons technology.

A not-so-secret member of the nuclear weapons club, Israel shared its expertise with South Africa in that field as well. In 1979 the two nations tested a nuclear warhead over the South Atlantic Ocean. Since then the two partners—neither of them has signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty—have collaborated on the testing of an Israeli Jericho II missile (capable of delivering nuclear warheads) in South Africa. Last October Mordechai Vanunu, the defecting Israeli nuclear technician, told reporters in London that South African engineers and scientists regularly work at Israel's secret nuclear weapons reactor at Dimona in the Negev Desert.

In addition to its 1977 resolution asking member-states not to sell weapons to South Africa, in 1984 the UN passed a resolution asking all governments not to buy weapons from the apartheid government. The UN continued to pass resolutions asking member states—often Israel was specifically mentioned—not to share nuclear weapons technology with South Africa.

In the US, where UN proceedings are seldom if ever reported, all this was not exactly a secret, but there was widespread tacit agreement that Israel's military dealings with South Africa were best not acknowledged, much less discussed. Newspapers referred to them as "alleged." Always solicitous of Israel, Congress gave this subject exceptionally wide berth. In 1985, Rep. John Conyers (D-MI) issued a report on Israeli-South African nuclear cooperation. Conyers' report established conclusively that the Israeli-South African nuclear detonation had occurred, and charged that in 1980 the Carter Administration had shelved an investigation of the test. After issuing the report, Conyers sought hearings on Israeli-South African nuclear cooperation. The hearings were promised by Howard Wolpe (D-MI), chair of the Africa subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, but they have yet to be held.

Legislation an Accident

The legislation which could force Israel to choose between its US aid and its arms deals with South Africa came as a complete surprise to AIPAC and pro-Israel Members of Congress. During hearings held by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on sanctions against South Africa, Republican Senators Charles McC. Mathias (MD) and Dan Evans (WA) proposed requiring the President to report to Congress on the military relationships between US allies and South Africa within 180 days of the passage of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986. The legislation directed Congress to consider terminating military aid to nations named in the report.

Knowing that Israel would be a major focus of the report, key supporters of Israel on the Foreign Relations Committee scrambled to cope with the provision. This feat was made more difficult because some of them, particularly Alan Cranston (D-CA), had styled themselves as leaders of the congressional battle against apartheid. After three separate votes, interspersed with a backroom session, the Mathias-Evans proposal was passed, with Cranston and Sen. Claiborne Pell (D-RI) voting against it, along with ultra-conservative Jesse Helms (R-NC) and other Republican opponents of sanctions against South Africa.

It was a near-total accident that the Mathias-Evans proposal survived the legislative process. With Congress in a rush to act on South Africa, the bill sped through the Senate, where debate was limited to prevent filibustering, and got a quick, almost unanimous sendoff in the House. After President Reagan vetoed the bill, both houses summarily overrode the veto. According to a Senate source, Israel's lobby, AIPAC, was as surprised as everyone else that although the bill had been voted on four times, not once had it been fully debated. AIPAC simply never had a chance to knock it out!

The Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 became law on October 2. The provision targeting military trade with South Africa appears as Section 508 in the final version of the bill, and the 180 days are up on April 1. The required report, rumored to be loaded with information of Israel's extensive relations with South Africa, is being prepared by the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

Close Ties Expected to Continue

The Anti-Apartheid Act forced Israel, Congress, and the administration into an uncomfortable position, but it seems clear that no one intends to treat the mandated review process as an adversarial affair. Israeli officials have already discussed the report's implications with Reagan administration officials and members of Congress friendly to Israel, and a number of House and Senate staffers have expressed doubt that Congress would act on the report.

However, Israeli leaders have let it be known that they might offer to refrain from signing new contracts with Pretoria after the current ones expire. They have stressed that terminating existing military contracts covering a four-year period would mean a loss of $500 million, not to mention costly law suits, and thousands of Israeli jobs.

In a recent trip to South Africa, Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin reassured officials there that the arms trade would continue. According to some reports Rabin's journey was made in response to a threat from Pretoria to "tell all" about its dealings with Israel. Rabin's trip to South Africa and Israel's vague offer to wind down its dealings with South Africa, are thought to be enough to satisfy the bare requirements of the law. During his mid-February visit to Washington, Prime Minister Shamir discussed Israel's ties with South Africa in light of the pending report, and most expectations are that Congress will do nothing to upset the "special relationship" between Israel and the US.

Jane Hunter is editor and publisher of Israeli Foreign Affairs, P.O. Box 19580, Sacramento, CA 95819.