The Saudi Arms Fight: Round Two

By Dennis J. Wamsted

On April 8, the Reagan Administration formally notified Congress of its intention to sell a $354 million package of advanced U.S. weaponry to Saudi Arabia. Prospects for the sale, which seemingly had improved dramatically in late March when AIPAC (the American Israel Public Affairs Committee; the principal pro Israel lobby group) indicated that it would not actively oppose the sale, remain uncertain at present. For example, Senator Alan Cranston (D CA) and Representative Mel Levine (D CA) claim that, even without AIPAC's active assistance, they will be able to derail the proposed sale. What, in fact, is the outlook for the sale?

As indicated in the previous edition of the Washington Report, the sale is not militarily significant. The actual package includes:

Nine hundred ninety five Raytheon and Ford Aerospace AIM 9L Sidewinder air to air missiles, as well as associated spare parts, training, technical assistance, and support equipment. Price: $98 million.
Six hundred seventy one Ford Aerospace AIM 9P4 Sidewinder missiles, with spares and support equipment. Estimated price: $60 million.
Two hundred General Dynamics basic Stinger shoulder fired air defense guided missile systems with 200 missiles, as well as 600 additional missiles, support and training equipment, and spare parts. Price: $89 million.
One hundred McDonnell Douglas Astronautic air launched, anti ship Harpoon missiles with containers, spare parts, technical assistance and support equipment. Estimated price: $107 million.

In its policy justification, the Administration stressed that the packages "demonstrate the continued willingness of the United States to support Saudi Arabian efforts to improve the security of the country." The Administration also averred that the sale would "contribute to overall Middle East security," without altering the region's military balance.

Unofficially, Administration sources say the sale is vastly more important for its symbolic value than for its actual military benefit. In particular, U.S. government officials say the sale is necessary in order to deter Iran from extending the scope of the Iran Iraq war and to re establish tarnished American regional credibility in the wake of the Congressionally inspired postponement of the Jordan arms sale.

Bush Stresses Importance of U.S. Saudi Relationship

Vice President George Bush aptly summarized these concerns during his recent eight day swing through the region. At the beginning of his trip, in the Saudi capital of Riyadh, Bush noted that the U.S. Saudi relationship is "fundamentally important to the United States" and that the Reagan Administration is "committed to providing Saudi Arabia (the) weapons systems necessary essential, you might say for its defense and security." Several days later Bush also acknowledged that the Administration had been "embarrassed" when the pro Israel Lobby and its Congressional supporters forced the indefinite postponement of the long planned $1.9 billion Jordan arms sale. Implicit in Bush's remarks is the realization, shared by many within the Administration, that unless this sale is concluded, U.S. relations with moderate countries throughout the region and Saudi Arabia in particular will be permanently damaged.

The sale's Congressional opponents, meanwhile, have tried to center the debate around their allegations that Saudi Arabia supports Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi and is not pushing actively enough for a resolution of the Arab Israeli conflict. Senator Cranston, for example, claims that the sale should be disapproved because the Saudis have "sided with Qaddafi against the United States in every confrontation (and have) offered to make good Qaddafi's economic losses because of the American boycott." Similarly, Cranston's aide for foreign affairs, Gerald F. Warburg, said recently that the United States should not reward "a nation that has scorned basic American interests in the Middle East."

Representative Levine, House leader of the sale's opponents, claimed the package "is irrelevant to any legitimate security concerns Saudi Arabia might have." Representative Tom Lantos (D CA), a Jewish member of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, added that he had received a classified study from the General Accounting Office (GAO) indicating that, if the sale is approved, there is a "very high" probability that groups unfriendly to the United States will receive some of the weapons intended for the Saudis.

Despite the absence of active AIPAC opposition, it is clear that the Administration will have to work diligently to ensure that the sale is not derailed on Capitol Hill. The opposition's strength became manifest shortly after the Administration's official April 8 notification when Senator Cranston released a list of 61 Senate co sponsors of a resolution of disapproval. (Cranston would need to garner the support of just six more colleagues to override a presidential veto in the Senate.) Likewise, in the House, where collecting a two thirds majority on any resolution is more difficult simply because of the greater size of the chamber, Levine says 153 Representatives are co-sponsoring a similar resolution of disapproval.

Administration Confident of Victory On Sale

When push comes to shove, however, the Administration expects to prevail. Much speculation has centered on the reasons behind AIPAC's decision to remain "neutral" in the current debate. (To be sure, AIPAC is clearly opposed to the sale, as evidenced by a lengthy list of objections to the sale distributed at AIPAC's recently concluded convention.) Privately, many pro Israel Congressmen admit even they were surprised and somewhat angered by AIPAC's decision, particularly since the organization had previously spoken out strongly in opposition to the sale. It is likely that, since the sale consists of only small quantities of weapons of kinds already to be found in the Saudi arsenal, AIPAC decided to abstain from the current dispute in an effort to increase its influence in future legislative battles.

A number of sources predict that AIPAC will throw its influence behind an effort, also being orchestrated by Senator Cranston, to void the scheduled summer delivery of the AWACS planes sold to Saudi Arabia in 1981. Such a decision would inevitably provoke a major clash with the Administration. Indeed, one U.S. official has already warned that any delay in the delivery of the planes would "destroy" the entire U.S. Saudi relationship.

If that is the course AIPAC elects, it will certainly need every bit of influence it can muster. Even so, it is unlikely that under present circumstances AIPAC could effect such a massive turnabout in U.S. policy. In short, even though it is an election year, it is doubtful that the pro Israel Lobby and its Congressional supporters will be able to block the current proposal, and highly unlikely that it can thwart the scheduled completion of the AWACS deal.

Dennis J. Wamsted, of Washington, D.C., has lived and studied in the Middle East and writes frequently about it.