Warriors at Suez

By Donald Neff. The Linden Press/Simon & Schuster New York, 1981. 480 pp. $17.95

Reviewed by John Law

For scholars and specialists—as well as for people who have read Kennett Love's herculean Suez: The Twice-Fought War, which appeared in 1969—there is little that is new in this book about the 1955-56 crisis in which Britain, France and Israel tried to topple Egypt's leader Gamal Abdul Nasser. But Mr. Neff has written a readable, coherent and vivid account of a period whose lessons are still relevant for the policy-makers of today. Everyone who could use a fascinating refresher course on what actually happened whether he is a specialist or not, should by all means read it.

Mr. Neff selects February 28, 1955 as the date of origin of the crisis. On that day, Israeli paratroopers launched a sudden night raid on an Egyptian army camp in Gaza, killing 38 soldiers and civilians. It was Nasser's anger and humiliation over this raid—which he was powerless to respond to, in part because he had been unsuccessful in procuring military hardware from the West—that led him to the Soviets for weapons. The anti-Nasser hostility which was provoked in the West by this move led eventually to a U.S. decision to renege on its offer to finance Nasser's cherished Aswan Dam. Seven days later, on July 26, 1956, Nasser retaliated by nationalizing the Suez Canal. Three months afterwards, Israel, Britain and France were at war with Egypt.

Paranoia and Deception

As soon as Nasser nationalized the Canal, the die of war had been cast. From then on, the leaders of Britain, France and Israel—each for different reasons—were determined to use military force to overthrow Nasser. Mr. Neff weaves a tale of paranoia and political deception, as Eden, Mollet and Ben Gurion plot secretly to go to war. The paranoia was reflected in Eden's growing hatred of Nasser, whom lie believed was alone responsible for every British setback in the Mideast; in Mollet's conviction that Nasser, rather than the Algerians themselves, was the main cause of France's difficulties in Algeria: and in Ben Gurion's obsession with the desire (amply documented) to include additional Arab territory within Israel's boundaries. An elaborate political deception was carried out as they went through the motions of seeking a peaceful solution even after they had made a firm decision to go to war; and then brought their bogus drama to a climax by arranging to have Israel attack first, so that Britain and France could enter the war on the pretext that they were putting an end to it. Throughout, they tried to keep the U.S. from knowing what they were up to.

President Eisenhower, who was hardly any more enamored of Nasser than any of the others, had begun to part ways with Britain and France, after the Suez nationalization, as his suspicions mounted that they were planning to use force to take over the canal. In his view, the nationalization of an Egyptian -incorporated company was deplorable but not illegal, and Nasser's demonstrated ability to keep the canal open and running efficiently on his own removed any justification, if there ever had been any, for such drastic action.

Putting on Pressure

When the war came, Eisenhower was incensed less at the perfidy of his allies than at Britain's and France's violation of the 1950 "tripartite agreement," which, in Eisenhower's words, committed those two countries and the U.S. "to assist the victim of any aggression in the Mideast." Eisenhower believed Egypt was clearly the victim of aggression, while the British and the French-far from acting as protectors -were, in fact, the aggressors. In seeking, both bilaterally and through the U.N., to effect the withdrawal of the invasion forces, Eisenhower made it plain he thought the honor of the U.S. was involved. Even when reminded that he might lose Jewish votes in the imminent elections, he said: "I don't care in the slightest whether I am re-elected or not. I feel we must make good on our word." By late December, the British and the French had withdrawn all their troops-but not until after U.S. pressures, which included a holdup on emergency oil shipments to Britain and France and a refusal to give Britain a much-needed $1.5 billion loan until it withdrew its troops. Israel was a tougher nut to crack. Ben Gurion first announced that Israel would never withdraw from either Sinai or Gaza, and then said he would settle for holding onto Gaza and Sharm al-Sheikh. He refused to budge from this position until Eisenhower, who was under constant pressure by Congress to let Ben Gurion have his way, indicated that "without prompt and unconditional withdrawal" the U.S. would back U.N.-imposed sanctions to cut off all aid to Israel. Eisenhower went on TV and asked rhetorically: "Should a nation which attacks and occupies foreign territory in the face of United Nations disapproval be allowed to impose conditions on its own withdrawal? If we agreed that armed attack can properly achieve the purposes of the assailant, then I fear we will have turned back the clock of international order." Ben Gurion backed down, and by March 16, 1957, withdrew the last of his soldiers.

John Law is an editor and journalist who covered the Suez crisis from its beginnings, and was in Cairo during the war.