Washington Report, April 4, 1983, Page 2
Policy
Israel: U.S. "Ally" or Not?
Recent confrontations in Lebanon between U.S. marines and Israeli
soldiers have sparked debate in Washington over a key question:
to what extent is Israel a friend and ally of the United States?
Secretary of State George Shultz has said on television that he
believes Israel is not only a friend and ally but is a "true
and trusted" one. He has also said that the two countries have
"common objectives" in the Middle East.
But many other U.S. officials behind the scenes are questioning
whether such statements actually conform with the facts of the U.S.-Israel
relationship as they are revealed by the record of recent months,
and even years.
As they see it, the frictions between American and Israeli troops
in Lebanon during the past few weeks are only the latest manifestations
of a current Israeli attitude that comes closer to hostility than
to friendship. Behind the behavior appears to be a desire to thwart
current U.S. objectives which Israelis view as being opposed to
their own.
The Israeli attitude is nothing new. For more than a quarter of
a century, there have been countless U.S. policies which the Israelis
did not like and tried to frustrate—with whatever means seemed
appropriate. For example, in 1954 Israel was unhappy at U.S. moves
to court Gamal Abdul Nasser, who only recently had taken overfull
control of Egypt. To destroy the budding friendship, Israeli agents
in Cairo set off bombs in U.S. Information Service libraries in
Cairo and Alexandria. The purpose, as Israeli officials eventually
had to acknowledge during a subsequent scandal known as the "Lavon
Affair," was to have the U.S. believe that it was Egyptians
who had committed these anti-American acts.
Two other major actions taken behind the U.S.'s back by Israel
were the 1956 attack on Suez and the 1967 bombing of the U.S.S.
Liberty. In the first, Israel joined Britain and France in a military
operation to topple Nasser, and kept its plans secret from the United
States. President Eisenhower publicly labelled Israel an "aggressor."
The attack on the naval vessel Liberty by Israeli planes and torpedo
boats took place during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war and killed 34
American sailors, wounding 171. The Israelis claimed it was a case
of mistaken identity. But survivors have testified that the attack
was deliberate—that the day was clear, the ship was flying
an oversized American flag that flew unfurled all day in eight knots
of wind, and that prior to the attack the ship was systematically
reconnoitered, at low levels and for seven hours, by ten Israeli
jets and flying box cars. One theory is that Israel wanted to prevent
the ship, which was an electronic eavesdropping vessel, from listening
in on some potentially embarrassing discussions of plans to take
over Syria's Golan Heights.
The Most Recent Divergences
The current problems which the U.S. is facing with Israel are an
outgrowth of the invasion of Lebanon last June and the presentation
of the "Reagan Plan" for the West Bank and Gaza last September.
Since early last summer, the two countries have been on divergent
paths in the region, and in the view of many U.S. officials the Israelis
have made this clear by their attempts to sabotage U.S. policies-and
not always very subtly. The problems over Lebanon—which Israel
had invaded on June 6 under the correct assumption that the U.S.
Administration would raise no serious objections—got started
after the U.S. concluded that Israel was engaging in an unnecessarily
brutal and bloody siege of the inhabitants of West Beirut. On July
4, the U.S. made its first public request to give the civilians
a break, by voting for a U.N. Security Council resolution calling
for the restoration of water, electricity, food and medical supplies.
The Israelis ignored it. From then on, as the siege continued, Israel
shunted aside U.S. appeals and rebuffed its "demands"
for a cessation of the bombings and a lifting of the siege and usually
did it in a way that made its disdain quite clear. For example,
after President Reagan announced on August 1 that it was "absolutely
imperative" for the Israelis to adhere to an agreed ceasefire,
they unleashed a record-breaking, 20-hour bombardment, and moved
their tanks into West Beirut for the first time. And on August 12,
when President Reagan phoned Prime Minister Begin to express his
"shock" and "outrage" at a particularly intensive
period of bombing and shelling that had broken up a delicate negotiating
session between U.S. envoy Philip Habib and the Prime Minister of
Lebanon that morning, Mr. Begin assured the President that the attack
had stopped. A few minutes later, Mr. Reagan was informed that the
attack was indeed continuing, and it did not stop until nightfall.
During most of its shelling and bombing—carried out with U.S.
weapons that had been provided for "defensive" use only—Israel
made liberal use of "cluster bombs," in violation of written
promises it had given to the U.S. in 1978 after it acknowledged
having "mistakenly" used these particularly deadly bombs
during a previous invasion of Lebanon.
Entering West Beirut
One of the U.S.'s fears throughout the siege of last summer was
the possibility of an Israeli invasion of West Beirut, which it believed
would only exacerbate the situation and cause even more massive civilian
casualties. For this reason, it mediated an evacuation of the PLO
guerrillas under which Israel gave the U.S. specific assurances it
would not enter that part of the city. On September 3, however, the
Israelis moved tank forces into -the Beirut quarter of Bir Hassan,
in clear violation of the agreements. On September 15, after the assassination
of President-elect Bashir Gemayel, Israel broke its word again and
occupied all of West Beirut. Its occupation troops showed little concern
for U.S. interests. Some of them set up an observation post, without
permission, in the U.S.-owned building destined to be the future U.S.
Embassy, and at one point an Israeli officer took a shot in broad
daylight at a U.S. marine guard on top of the present embassy building,
which had the American flag flying. Already, on August 7, Israel
had begun to send strong and unpleasant signals that it did not
want to have an American military presence in Lebanon. On that day,
two Israeli jet fighters made several mock attacks—passing
"dangerously" close and lasting for 15 minutes, according
to Pentagon officials—at two U.S. helicopters carrying an
American military liaison team to Lebanon for a meeting with Philip
Habib to discuss plans for the use of marines. When U.S. officers
on a similar mission landed in Lebanon the following day, Israeli
troops prevented them from going to meet Mr. Habib on schedule,
and drove trucks onto the landing zone to prevent the helicopters
from returning to pick them up.
The first group of U.S. marines sent to Lebanon stayed only 16
days, but when the President decided after the Shatila and Sabra
massacre to send the marines back, once again Israel made problems
long before the marines even arrived. The marines were to take over
the airport of Beirut, which Israel had agreed to evacuate. But
its troops went about their preparations for leaving the airport
at a deliberate, snail's pace. When the day came for the scheduled
marine landing, the Israelis had not gone yet, and U.S. naval vessels
with the marines aboard waited off shore. Only after three more
days of painstaking negotiations could they come in.
Taunting and Nudging
Ever since, Israeli troops have been making life difficult for
the marines in a whole series of incidents during which they have
taunted them, nudged them with their vehicles, confronted them with
their tanks, and accused them of acting as a "buffer" for
Palestinian guerrillas. They have also singled out U.S. officers serving
with the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization for harassment.
The commanding general of the U.S. marine corps said it was "inconceivable
to me why Americans—serving in peacekeeping roles—must
be harassed, endangered and degraded by an ally," and added that
he believed the incidents are "timed, orchestrated, and executed
for obtuse Israeli political purposes." It is believed by many
political analysts in Washington, both in and out of the government,
that Israel wants to discredit the marines as peacekeepers in order
to demonstrate that only Israel is capable of establishing a "security
zone" in southern Lebanon. But this is where U.S. and Israeli
viewpoints diverge sharply-since the U.S. believes, along with Lebanon,
that any permanent Israeli presence would make it impossible for Lebanon
to function as a stable and sovereign state, and would destroy its
economic viability as well by cutting it off from trade with the Arab
world. If to be allies means to have common policies, the U.S. and
Israel are not allies in Lebanon.
In the West Bank and Gaza, unlike
in Lebanon, there is no American "presence" that can lead
to direct confrontations. But the incompatibility of U.S. and Israeli
policies towards the area could not be more clear. The United States,
in a proposal submitted by President Reagan on September 1, 1982,
called on Israel to withdraw from the West Bank and Gaza and allow
those territories to be linked to Jordan. The proposal was rejected
immediately by Mr. Begin, who said that Israel's sovereignty over
the West Bank was a "simple historic truth (which) will never
change." His number-two man in the government at the time,
Defense Minister Ariel Sharon, said that "not only will Israel
not accept" the plan, "it will not discuss it." Sharon
may now be gone, but Mr. Begin still is not willing to discuss it
either.
As it has done so many times before with other U.S. plans, Israel
found a way to blow up the Reagan Plan by deed as well as word—and
to do it in a manner that would also humiliate the United States.
As part of his proposal, Mr. Reagan had asked Israel to put a freeze
on the building of settlements in the West Bank, in order not to
foreclose the solution he was proposing. But on the same day that
the Israeli government officially rejected the Reagan Plan, it also
announced that the building of ten new settlements—yes, ten—had
been approved for the West Bank. And ever since, Israel has been
accelerating the pace of its settlement of the West Bank to an unprecedented
level.
In short, Israel has been giving U.S. policymakers plenty of reason
to wonder: just what is an ally, anyway? |