Washington Report, April 2, 1984, Page 2
Editorial
The Buck Stops Nowhere?
The other day, Secretary Shultz told reporters: "I think somehow
or other we have to get over this notion that every time things
don't go just to everybody's satisfaction in the Middle East, it's
the United States's fault or it's up to the United States to do
something about it."
Despite its somewhat petulant tone, this statement is of a kind
that is sure to evoke sympathy from Americans who are tired of being
"kicked around"—a common reaction when ill-conceived
but well-meaning attempts to help others end up by turning sour
and drawing criticism. On the other hand, coming as it does from
the Secretary of State of a country which for decades has taken
and implemented decisions of enormous consequence in the area, the
statement seems to reflect either a lack of awareness of just how
great this impact has been, or a subconscious desire to avoid accepting
the responsibility for the enduring consequences of U.S. actions.
Yes, we do agree with Mr. Shultz that the U.S. should not be blamed
for everything. But there is surely quite a lot it must be
blamed for—including some of the acts that have taken place
during Secretary Shultz's term and which have provoked the criticism
to which he is reacting. Nor does it seem unreasonable for people
to believe that the U.S. should "do something" to try
to attenuate the problems that have come in the wake of these acts.
We won't run down the whole list of them—but it does seem
that the present Administration is not without responsibility for
the fallout from such policies as its over-enthusiastic backing
of Gemayel in Lebanon; its rash and futile use of the New Jersey's
16-inch guns; its brokering of a badly flawed Lebanon-Israel withdrawal
agreement; its months-long, foolhardy and dangerous snub of Syria;
its withdrawal of marines from Beirut in a way that was both precipitous
(it was announced one day after the Druze and Muslims took over
West Beirut) and untimely (it should have been done earlier); its
creation of an unnecessary and provocative formal military relationship
with Israel; its boosting of aid to Israel in the so far vain hope
that this could generate a quid pro quo from Israel in the
West Bank and elsewhere; and its pusillanimous retreat in Congress
on its proposal for a military aid program to Jordan which it had
called "important" only two days earlier. This is only
a partial listing, but it should be enough to make it clear that
those who complain about the U.S.'s Middle East policies are not
just nit-picking.
Not that this Administration has any monopoly on myopic policies
towards the region. It is now exactly five years since the Egypt-Israel
peace treaty, spawned by President Carter at Camp David, was signed.
Was this the brilliant job of peacemaking for which it was so widely
hailed, by so many, at the time? Far from it. What emerged from
Camp David was an agreement that permitted Prime Minister Begin
to return to Egypt a piece of territory that he didn't really want
all that much in exchange for the opportunity to keep forever a
number of territories (West Bank, Gaza, East Jerusalem, Golan) that
he wanted very, very much. This was not the kind of deal either
Carter or Sadat had in mind—but they turned it into one by
failing to provide for any form of linkage between the return of
Sinai and the return of other territories. Begin, of course, did
not want linkage—because this would have defeated the whole
purpose of his coming to Camp David. Sadat had a naive faith that
the U.S. ("it holds 99 percent of the cards") would somehow
pressure Israel into giving up the other Arab lands. Carter, who
had invested so much prestige in Camp David, had reached the point
where he wanted any agreement rather than failure and began
to sweep under the rug those issues which seemingly could not be
resolved. Result: a separate peace for Egypt, which the Administration
had said it did not want. With Egypt out of the military equation,
Begin felt free to tighten his hold on the West Bank, annex Golan,
and invade Lebanon. The terrible consequences, of course, are still
being felt today. |