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Washington Report, April 2, 1984, Page 2

Editorial

The Buck Stops Nowhere?

The other day, Secretary Shultz told reporters: "I think somehow or other we have to get over this notion that every time things don't go just to everybody's satisfaction in the Middle East, it's the United States's fault or it's up to the United States to do something about it."

Despite its somewhat petulant tone, this statement is of a kind that is sure to evoke sympathy from Americans who are tired of being "kicked around"—a common reaction when ill-conceived but well-meaning attempts to help others end up by turning sour and drawing criticism. On the other hand, coming as it does from the Secretary of State of a country which for decades has taken and implemented decisions of enormous consequence in the area, the statement seems to reflect either a lack of awareness of just how great this impact has been, or a subconscious desire to avoid accepting the responsibility for the enduring consequences of U.S. actions.

Yes, we do agree with Mr. Shultz that the U.S. should not be blamed for everything. But there is surely quite a lot it must be blamed for—including some of the acts that have taken place during Secretary Shultz's term and which have provoked the criticism to which he is reacting. Nor does it seem unreasonable for people to believe that the U.S. should "do something" to try to attenuate the problems that have come in the wake of these acts. We won't run down the whole list of them—but it does seem that the present Administration is not without responsibility for the fallout from such policies as its over-enthusiastic backing of Gemayel in Lebanon; its rash and futile use of the New Jersey's 16-inch guns; its brokering of a badly flawed Lebanon-Israel withdrawal agreement; its months-long, foolhardy and dangerous snub of Syria; its withdrawal of marines from Beirut in a way that was both precipitous (it was announced one day after the Druze and Muslims took over West Beirut) and untimely (it should have been done earlier); its creation of an unnecessary and provocative formal military relationship with Israel; its boosting of aid to Israel in the so far vain hope that this could generate a quid pro quo from Israel in the West Bank and elsewhere; and its pusillanimous retreat in Congress on its proposal for a military aid program to Jordan which it had called "important" only two days earlier. This is only a partial listing, but it should be enough to make it clear that those who complain about the U.S.'s Middle East policies are not just nit-picking.

Not that this Administration has any monopoly on myopic policies towards the region. It is now exactly five years since the Egypt-Israel peace treaty, spawned by President Carter at Camp David, was signed. Was this the brilliant job of peacemaking for which it was so widely hailed, by so many, at the time? Far from it. What emerged from Camp David was an agreement that permitted Prime Minister Begin to return to Egypt a piece of territory that he didn't really want all that much in exchange for the opportunity to keep forever a number of territories (West Bank, Gaza, East Jerusalem, Golan) that he wanted very, very much. This was not the kind of deal either Carter or Sadat had in mind—but they turned it into one by failing to provide for any form of linkage between the return of Sinai and the return of other territories. Begin, of course, did not want linkage—because this would have defeated the whole purpose of his coming to Camp David. Sadat had a naive faith that the U.S. ("it holds 99 percent of the cards") would somehow pressure Israel into giving up the other Arab lands. Carter, who had invested so much prestige in Camp David, had reached the point where he wanted any agreement rather than failure and began to sweep under the rug those issues which seemingly could not be resolved. Result: a separate peace for Egypt, which the Administration had said it did not want. With Egypt out of the military equation, Begin felt free to tighten his hold on the West Bank, annex Golan, and invade Lebanon. The terrible consequences, of course, are still being felt today.