Why Hussein is Right

When King Hussein announced in mid-March that he was not ready to enter into U.S.-sponsored negotiations with Israel on the future of the West Bank, the U.S. Administration was sent reelingnumbed by the second body blow to its Middle East policies in as many months.

The first, of course, was the defeat of its ambitious plans for Lebanon, which became clear when the U.S. withdrew the marines early in February in the wake of the Druse and Muslim takeover of West Beirut.

To explain its failure in Lebanon, the Administration allotted various portions of responsibility to the Syrians, the Soviets, and to Lebanese militias receiving Syrian support. Israel—which had set the stage for the whole scenario by its invasion of Lebanon and its later actions—was scarcely mentioned. The U.S.'s own mistakes were similarly downplayed.

After King Hussein's announcement declining the West Bank talks, the Administration had an easier time apportioning the blame: it pinned virtually all of it on King Hussein, charging him with having thrown a "monkey-wrench" into the "peace process." In this case, too, the roles of both Israel and the U.S. itself were minimized.

Other commentators, particularly on the floor of Congress, went much further in criticism of King Hussein: accusing him of chronic inconsistency, timidity, and even of not really wanting peace at all.

However, there are many seasoned observers in Washington who say that none of these criticisms hold up. The king's decision that the time was not appropriate for entering negotiations based on the September 1, 1982, "Reagan plan" had a number of immediate causes, but also grew from deep roots.

Some of the immediate causes were contained in an interview he gave to The New York Times on March 14, when he said:

The United States asserts that its present plan (the Reagan plan) is valid, but is it really? Israel has rejected it; Israel has changed conditions on the ground to the point where it almost makes no sense. We have another year of an election campaign in the United States; contenders must appeal for the favors of AIPAC and Zionism and Israel. Even this year has seen such drastic changes on the ground that within a year, any fragments of hope left of achieving a peaceful solution to the problem will be destroyed. So this is where we are, and that's why I say it's hopeless.

The king could have mentioned plenty of additional reasons—such as the recent Administration decisions to reward Israel for its outright rejection of the Reagan plan by giving Israel a record amount of grant aid and by establishing the first U.S.-Israel joint military committee in the history of the relationship between the two countries.

But what triggered Hussein's decision to make his announcement when he did, according to officials in Amman, were two letters from the Administration turning down requests he had made. In the first letter the Administration refused to support Jordan's draft resolution in the U.N. calling Israeli West Bank settlements illegal. In the second letter, President Reagan rejected the king's request for help in making it possible for moderate leaders in the West Bank, who are anxious to negotiate, to attend a forthcoming session of the Palestinian National Council at which negotiations will be discussed. Since, in the past, Israel had refused to allow these leaders to leave the occupied territories to attend such conferences, the king had asked Mr. Reagan if he would urge Israel to change its policy. "On the one hand," said an observer, "the U.S. has been urging Jordan and the Egyptians to encourage the Arafat moderates to take the diplomatic route—that's why it was so pleased that Arafat met with Mubarak a while ago—but at the same time the U.S. won't help in creating the conditions that can make that possible." Others were reminded of the Catch 22 predicament into which the Administration had thrust Lebanon's President Amin Gemayel last fall. After having encouraged Gemayel to take the views of his opposition into account by meeting with them in Geneva, the Administration refused to go along with the only thing that all the parties, including Gemayel, agreed upon at the conference: the need for the U.S. to help revise or abrogate the May 17 U.S.-Israel withdrawal agreement.

In the New York Times interview, King Hussein also expressed discouragement and frustration over his long-term efforts to reach a settlement with Israel:

As far as I'm concerned, the positions we have adopted over the years, of trying to establish a dialogue with Washington and the United States, of trying to contribute to the creation of a more balanced approach to the problem, which is in the interests of all the parties to this conflict, have failed.

You obviously have made your choice and your choice is Israel and support of Israel. That being the case, there is no hope of achieving anything.

In point of fact, we have given more than we have taken. We sought peace in the area; we were ready to try to work with the Reagan plan. Israel was the force that rejected it, that did not wish peace, yet we are portrayed as if we are the party that is opposed to peace. Apart from being unjust, it is also incorrect.

Is King Hussein right—or are his critics? Has he been inconsistent? Timid? Is he really an obstacle to peace?

The record does not show this. It does reveal, however, a remarkably high level of inconsistency in U.S. policies and an inability to implement them, as well as a pattern of Israeli rejection of peace initiatives that both the U.S. and Jordan supported. Back in November, 1967, King Hussein was not only an early backer of the famous U.N. Resolution 242, but he was also in New York then and helped draft it, working closely with members of the U.S. delegation. American officials assured Hussein that the language of 242—even though it did not in the English text call for "full" withdrawal—meant that Israel would withdraw completely from the West Bank except for "minor reciprocal border rectifications." Israel, at the time, opposed the resolution.

In 1969, Jordan endorsed and supported the U.N. peace mission of Ambassador Gunnar Jarring, which aimed at implementing Resolution 242. Israel fought the Jarring mission every step of the way, and eventually killed it.

Jordan also accepted the U.S. "Rogers Plan," put forward by U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers in the same year, which affirmed that any changes in borders "should not reflect the weight of conquest and should be confined to insubstantial alterations required for mutual security." Israel scoffed at and then ignored the Rogers Plan. Soon afterwards, Mr. Rogers's boss President Nixon, at the behest of the President's national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, gave it a quiet burial. They had, in fact, never really believed in it—even though it was publicly and officially proclaimed by their own secretary of state.

Early in 1969, before the Rogers Plan, King Hussein had come to Washington and given a speech at the National Press Club. Speaking officially for both himself and Egypt's President Nasser, he announced what the two leaders were prepared to offer to Israel. This included, in King Hussein's words:

The end of all belligerency.

Respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of all states in the area.

Recognition of the right of all to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of war.

Guaranteeing the territorial inviolability of all states in the area through whatever measures necessary, including the establishment of demilitarized zones.

Accepting a just settlement of the Palestine problem.

In return, King Hussein said, "our sole demand upon Israel is the withdrawal of its armed forces from all territories occupied in the June 1967 war, and the implementation of all the other provisions of the Security Council Resolution (242)."

He concluded: "The challenge that these principles represent is that Israel may have either peace or territory—but she can never have both."

King Hussein has consistently stuck with this policy ever since. But Israel has consistently treated it with contempt, and the U.S. has generally ignored it.

After the October, 1973 war, Jordan endorsed U.N. Security Council Resolution 338, which called for direct negotiations with Israel in implementing Resolution 242. It was on the basis of Resolution 338 that Secretary of State Kissinger carried out his much publicized shuttles and succeeded in mediating "disengagement agreements" between Israel and Egypt and between Israel and Syria. But when Jordan asked the U.S. to negotiate a similar disengagement along Jordan's frontier with Israel, the request was denied.

When Sadat went to Jerusalem, King Hussein fully endorsed the peace proposal which the Egyptian president made to the Knesset—one that called for both the recognition of Israel and the right of the Palestinians to self-determination. King Hussein was then—and still is—much criticized for not accepting the results of the Camp David agreements. But he saw what both Sadat and President Carter seemed not to see or not to consider important—that the results did not obligate Prime Minister Begin to provide true, meaningful autonomy (much less self-determination) to the Palestinians in the West Bank, and that Begin had no intention of giving it to them. He turned out to be right. In addition, the fact that the Camp David agreements gave Jordan a "role" in the implementation of it, even though Jordan had not been consulted, did not help matters.

Since Camp David, Jordan has had to endure frequent affronts in its relationship with the U.S. Because of King Hussein's coolness towards the treaties, President Carter twice refused to meet with him at the White House. The king's armed forces have also been subjected to demeaning restrictions on U.S.-supplied equipment, even though unlike Israel, which has frequently violated its agreements with the U.S. on the use of its weapons Jordan has scrupulously honored its own agreements in this area for more than 25 years. The U.S. would not sell Jordan Hawk missiles except on condition that the missiles be set into concrete emplacements so that they could not be moved. Today, the Administration will not permit Jordanian pilots to fly the transport planes that will form a part of a proposed rapid deployment force that it wants to help Jordan establish. And Congress—even before the king announced he was not ready to enter negotiations with Israel—was telling him he could not be trusted to receive Stinger antiaircraft missiles, although Israel has the U.S.'s most sophisticated weapons in abundance. The Administration, apparently convinced that King Hussein's recent announcement was another example of his inconsistency and hesitations over wanting peace, has now decided to go along with Congress.