Hezbollah’s Sheikh Nabil Qaouk: “As Long as There Is Occupation, There Will Be Resistance”

By JoMarie Fecci

Resistance activity in southern Lebanon has increased in size and scope over the past several months, ratcheting up the pressure on Israel to remove its troops. During the month of November, 1998 there were roughly 160 resistance operations in Israel’s so-called “security zone”—the largest number in a single month. The majority of these actions (approximately 114) were conducted by Hezbollah.

The Lebanese Shi’i militia’s record of unceasing armed resistance in the south has earned Hezbollah strong support among southerners, and a growing respect among many Lebanese of all faiths and regional origins.

“The whole Lebanese population adopts the resistance as their own—it is an expression of people’s will. Every time we succeed we feel there is more support. As support is increasing, resistance is increasing and Israel is deteriorating,” affirms Sheikh Nabil Qaouk, responsible for Hezbollah’s southern sector.

Estimates of Hezbollah’s active armed strength range from statements that the group has 5,000 to10,000 fighters to others that say the group has a hard core of 300 to 400 which can be expanded to up to 3,000 within several hours.

“During 1996 all southerners held arms and were ready to resist. All the south is with the resistance,” says Qaouk, shying away from confirming Hezbollah’s troop strength. Qaouk prefers to stress the universality of Hezbollah resistance in the south, where villagers live with the consequences of the nearby Israeli presence on a daily basis. Many young men from villages near the confrontation line become active in Hezbollah’s armed movement because they believe it is the only way to defend their homes.

Qaouk continues, “In general southerners know how to use weapons, and those who fight often build up experience. As long as there is an occupation, the resistance will continue fighting. It has succeeded in freeing much of the country and will continue until Israel leaves.”

For years, Hezbollah has been infiltrating the zone, harassing the IDF and Israel’s proxy militia, the South Lebanon Army (SLA). Starting in the early 1990s Hezbollah pioneered new tactics and began carrying out increasingly sophisticated operations. Typically, Hezbollah fighters operate in dispersed, small units in order to avoid becoming a concentrated target. They infiltrate into the zone and wait in ambush for days to hit Israeli patrols. When the attack occurs, support units hit Israeli strongpoints with mortars as the infiltration unit escapes.

As the resistance developed greater professionalism, the IDF has tried a series of tactics in an attempt to crush the groups operating in the south. The Israelis have not succeeded.

Since the massive Israeli assault on Lebanon in the spring of 1996, just before Israel’s national election, Israel has switched from high-intensity operations against resistance targets to an emphasis on special commando missions that countered the Hezbollah resistance guerrillas with Israeli guerrilla tactics. Israeli commandos would wait in ambush along known Hezbollah infiltration routes and prevent the Hezbollah fighters from getting close to Israeli and SLA positions. This tactic forced Hezbollah to concentrate on long-range rocket and mortar attacks.

But despite more reliance on risky deep-penetration raids, Israel was unable to reverse its fortunes. Such invasive tactics on the part of Israel inevitably led to higher levels of Israeli casualties.

Domestic Israeli support for such action was affected by the casualties—especially after the September 1997 fiasco at Insariyeh in Lebanon. What began then as a pinpoint operation for the Israelis suddenly turned into a hopeless battle for survival when the Israeli commandos were ambushed by large groups of Hezbollah and Amal fighters. The loss of all 12 Israeli commandos shocked the Israeli public.

“In Lebanon we are proud of our martyrs, and in Israel they are humiliated when their soldiers are killed,” says Qaouk, pointing out the difference in circumstances across the confrontation line. “When it comes to the cause, our men are ready for sacrifice. The occupation soldiers don’t have a cause. This land is not theirs and there’s nothing that calls upon them to sacrifice for this land.”

After Insariyeh, the IDF changed the emphasis of its tactics in the south again, leaning more heavily on the concrete defenses around IDF positions and concentrating on “force protection.” Because of Hezbollah’s effective use of roadside bombs, the number of Israeli-manned patrols has decreased, and Israeli troops are increasingly moved by helicopter rather than by truck.

Ironically, this has left the Hezbollah with greater freedom of movement to get in closer to Israeli positions. One of November’s bombs, which killed seven, was set off right in front of an Israeli position that had never before been hit by Hezbollah.

“Hezbollah knows the weaknesses of the enemy. It studies strategies of the enemy very well, and takes advantage of their errors. Israel is incapable of defending its soldiers in the south. Hezbollah is continually learning from experience and evolving its capabilities,” explains Qaouk, referring not only to the dedication and professionalism of Hezbollah’s fighters, but also to a growing capability to frustrate Israel’s technological edge.

“All their military technology has failed before the Hezbollah,” Qaouk says. “Take for example the Merkava tank, which is supposed to be a legendary Israeli weapon. Our resistance was able to create ways to destroy it, and this has left the world fascinated. Israel itself has admitted the Hezbollah’s supremacy in what concerns roadside bombs. We believe that Israel has tried everything and was shocked by its failure. As long as their occupation will last, they will suffer losses.”

On Dec. 27, 1998, the IDF suffered another significant morale setback when the SLA abandoned an important position near Jezzine because of the unceasing resistance attacks.

Crediting the sacrifices and determination of the Lebanese people for the gains in the south, Qaouk says, “The Lebanese believe that their freedom and security is a result of the pain and suffering of the resistance. There are university students who left school to join the fight. There are those who left their families, wives and children. They live in close proximity to death. They live in the hills and must bear cold and rain and sleep on snow. But they are sacrificing in order to face up to the enemy.”

While the greatest achievement for the resistance would be the eventual withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon, Hezbollah continues to stop short of offering any concession or negotiation that might encourage such a withdrawal. Like all Hezbollah officials, Qaouk makes no statement about the group’s intentions in case Israel does remove its troops.

Explaining the reluctance to offer any kind of guarantee to Israel, Qaouk says, “Israel has attacked Lebanon and is trying to demand a price for withdrawal. We refuse any political gain for Israel from the occupation of our country. It is the leaders of Israel who are causing pain and suffering for all those living in the region. Israel should LEAVE—free our country unconditionally. As long as there is occupation, there will be resistance.”

JoMarie Fecci is a New York-based free-lance photojournalist.