May 4 and May 17: Not an Israeli Trap but A Palestinian Opportunity To be Seized

By John V. Whitbeck

Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu presumably believes that he has checkmated Palestinian President Yasser Arafat by scheduling Israel’s national elections for May 17 and June 1. This is soon after the May 4 date on which the now moribund “Oslo process” terminates officially, and on which President Arafat has repeatedly promised (or “threatened,” to use the term adopted by the American and Israeli press) to proclaim the establishment of the State of Palestine on the soil of Palestine.

While reading Mr. Netanyahu’s mind is scarcely an exact science, he appears to believe that he has cleverly trapped President Arafat in a situation in which his antagonist is damned by the West if he does and damned by his fellow Palestinians if he doesn’t. If Arafat does “proclaim” the state on May 4 (or, more precisely, reaffirms its existence, since it was already proclaimed on Nov. 15, 1988—and promptly recognized by over 100 other states), Netanyahu promises (or threatens) to “annex” most of the West Bank (all of “Area C” and perhaps “Area B” as well) and to send in the Israeli army to blockade the small pockets of land under Palestinian control in order to bring them to their knees. Netanyahu appears to believe that this would assure his re-election and has even suggested in a speech to the Likud Central Committee that President Arafat may now change his mind about acting on May 4 so as not to help him be re-elected.

Of course, if Arafat fails to act on May 4, he will forfeit his remaining credibility with his own people and, perhaps after considerable intra-Palestinian conflict, be replaced by someone less accommodating, less peace-oriented and hence more easily demonized (as Arafat once was) to the detriment of Palestinian aspirations for fundamental human rights and justice. Either way, Bibi, the brilliant strategist, wins—or so he appears to believe.

On careful analysis, however, it is far more likely that Netanyahu has checkmated himself, making May 4 an even more desirable date on which to reaffirm the existence of the State of Palestine on the soil of Palestine and ensuring that Palestinian statehood will be established in the most favorable circumstances imaginable.

Imagine that, on May 4, President Arafat were to publicly confirm that the State of Palestine, which was proclaimed in 1988, is legally sovereign in all the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel in 1967, including East Jerusalem. Arafat would also proclaim that the “Palestinian Authority” through which the state established its presence and authority on a portion of its national territory had ceased to exist with the termination of the “Oslo process.”

He would further declare that all Palestinian governmental institutions established on Palestinian territory as organs of the “Palestinian Authority” are now governmental institutions of the State of Palestine, and that the State of Palestine is appealing for diplomatic recognition from any states which have not already recognized it, and applying to further upgrade Palestine’s status at the United Nations to full member state.

Imagine further that, at the same time, President Arafat were to confirm his eagerness and that of the State of Palestine to negotiate with the new Israeli government soon to be elected, on an accelerated basis, all outstanding permanent status issues (including final boundary demarcations and an equitable sharing of an undivided Jerusalem). Palestine would negotiate with a view to achieving a new relationship between the two states and peoples based on peaceful coexistence, mutual respect and human dignity so as to finally provide both peace and security for both Israelis and Palestinians in the land both peoples love.

How would the international community react? The consistent support of the international community for Palestinian statehood was again demonstrated on Dec. 9, 1998, when the U.N. General Assembly adopted its annual resolution confirming the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination by a record vote of 162 (including all European Union states) to two (Israel and the United States), with only six abstentions, while adding for the first time the significant phrase “without excluding the option of a state.”

At the Security Council level, China and Russia already recognize the State of Palestine. In December 1998, the French Foreign Ministry organized a two-day symposium in Paris on “The Issue of the Palestinian State.” There French support for Palestinian statehood, on both legal and policy grounds, was made clear to all the Arabs, Israelis, Europeans and Americans invited to attend. A French diplomat cited the figure 140 for the number of states which currently recognize the State of Palestine.

A Meaningless Veto Power

It is difficult to believe that the United Kingdom, having consistently supported Palestinian self-determination in international organizations, would veto U.N. membership for Palestine. (Notwithstanding the British inclination to follow the United States blindly, if the U.S. chose to veto, a British veto would be unnecessary, while, if the U.S. chose not to veto, a British veto would be inconceivable.)

How would the United States react? In January 1998, President Bill Clinton moved to within a subtle nuance of endorsing Palestinian statehood when he publicly told President Arafat that, in the American view, an essential goal of the peace process is that the Palestinians should be able to “realize their aspirations to live as a free people.” During his December 1998 visit to Gaza and his speech there, he moved closer still.

The United States will no doubt be urging (or threatening) President Arafat not to do anything on May 4. The reason is simple and understandable. An affirmation of Palestinian statehood and an application for full U.N. membership would force the United States to make a difficult decision it would rather avoid. The U.S. decision would either outrage the Israel Lobby in the United States and a significant minority of the Israeli public, or outrage the entire Arab and Muslim world, not to mention Muslim and Arab Americans.

The Arab and Muslim nations are in a state of unprecedented anti-American fervor, in light of America’s hypersensitivity toward Iraqi violations of international law and U.N. resolutions, and its passive acquiescence toward Israeli violations of international law, U.N. resolutions and the agreements Israel has signed with America’s blessings and encouragement.

However, if the United States had to make a decision, it would be more likely to do the right thing in the context of an impending Israeli vote on whether or not to return Mr. Netanyahu to power than in any other conceivable circumstances.

Americans believe, probably correctly, that the George Bush administration’s refusal to give former Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir the $10 billion in loan guarantees which he demanded in 1991 was instrumental in the Israeli electorate’s decision to replace him with Yitzhak Rabin in 1992. President Clinton and his Middle East “peace team” clearly have no desire to deal with Netanyahu one day longer than they are legally obligated to do so.

If, notwithstanding Netanyahu’s contemptuous trashing of the Wye River accords to which President Clinton and his associates devoted so much personal time and effort, the United States were to veto Palestinian membership in the U.N., then Netanyahu could credibly present himself to his electorate as “the world’s sole superpower,” to whom even the United States must kneel in humble submission.

If, on the other hand, after Netanyahu had made opposition to Palestinian statehood the first plank in his electoral platform, the United States were to permit Palestine’s admission to the U.N. as a member state, while virtually all other states (including those of the European Union) were extending full diplomatic recognition to Palestine, Netanyahu would be made to look ridiculous. He would be finished. If the United States made such a decision prior to the first round of the Israeli elections, it is unlikely that, in the expected multi-candidate field, Mr. Netanyahu would even qualify for the June 1 second-round run-off.

In the context of the American decision-making process, it is extremely fortunate that there will be an uncommonly long 18 months between this year’s Israeli elections and next year’s American elections. This should be perceived as diminishing the personal “political costs” of a pro-Palestine decision. Given an opportunity to ensure Mr. Netanyahu’s replacement by a more Rabin-like figure, it is most unlikely that the United States will forsake the chance and choose instead to put American citizens and embassies throughout the world at risk of an explosion of Arab and Muslim frustration and rage.

What could Mr. Netanyahu do? It is far from certain, particularly after Shimon Peres’ repeated declarations that a Palestinian state is in Israel’s own national interest, that he could find a Knesset majority to support “annexing” Palestinian lands in the waning days of a campaign in which he was in deep political trouble.

It is also far from certain that an Israeli defense minister would order the army to invade the West Bank for reasons which transparently relate more to electoral maneuvering than to national security—or that, if given, such orders would be followed. Furthermore, even if Netanyahu could carry out either or both of these threats, it is most unlikely, with polls repeatedly showing a majority of Israelis ready to accept a Palestinian state, that such provocative behavior would help, rather than harm, his electoral fortunes.

Israeli provocations would, however, be certain to outrage international opinion and strengthen sympathy and support for Palestine. So it is Netanyahu who would be damned if he does and damned if he doesn’t.

If President Arafat can keep his nerve and keep his promise, May 1999 will bring checkmate and early retirement for Binyamin Netanyahu and a giant step forward toward peace with some measure of justice and a better life for Israelis, Palestinians and all the peoples of the Middle East.

John V. Whitbeck is a Paris-based international lawyer who writes frequently on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.