Ross Debriefing After Hebron Accord Casts Doubt on Final Withdrawals

by Eugene Bird

The Department of State’s designated hitter to handle Tel Aviv, Ambassador Dennis Ross, returned in mid-January from a triumphant three-week intervention in the collapsed Israeli-Palestinian negotiations with one clear resolve: “The U.S. will always be there for the parties but to the extent they can [negotiate] solutions themselves, we will now step back, I hope.” He expressed confidence that the process will continue and “it will continue to sustain itself.”

But the U.S. action in coming out clearly supporting Israel’s right to leave the Palestinians with only a small part of the West Bank marred the future beyond Hebron for the peace process. The intervention by State came in the middle of a frantic 12-hour Israeli cabinet meeting that ended in the resignation of Science Minister Ze’ev “Benny” Begin, the hard-line ideologue son of former Prime Minister Menachim Begin, and only an 11-7 vote of support for the retreat from four-fifths of Hebron.

“Specified Military Locations”

As the Israeli cabinet was meeting to discuss the Hebron agreement, a State Department spokesman was quoted on Israeli television as having said that Israel would be “negotiating” the actual extent of the three subsequent scheduled withdrawals during the next 18 months. Netanyahu was informed and immediately recessed the shouting match that was going on over this very point to call Washington: Israel claimed that the Oslo II agreement meant that Israel would decide the extent of the “specified military locations” and the borders to which its forces would withdraw before finishing final status talks.

The State Department immediately folded and adopted the Israeli interpretation of a very ambiguous Article XI, which states that “The specified military locations referred to in Article X, paragraph 2 above, will be determined in the further redeployment phases within the specified time frame ending not later than 18 months from the date of the inauguration of the (Palestine) Council, and will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations.”

Ambiguous? Yes, but the Department of State was shocked into announcing that it supported the right of “Israel alone” to decide how far to withdraw in the next 19 months. And within days, Netanyahu was assuring Jewish settlers that Israel would have to withdraw only from 10 percent of the West Bank, in disconnected areas around the cities. Presumably, he will use the reference to “specified military locations” to hold onto the other 90 percent.

The Department may live to regret its unilateral interpretation of the agreement, made under pressure and without consulting Yasser Arafat, to leave the Israelis in charge of vast stretches of Palestinian territory which the Palestine Authority has every reason to think it is regaining after 30 years. The Department acted to support Netanyahu in order to gain Israeli cabinet approval of the agreement, its sidebar note of understanding, and Christopher’s letters of assurance to each party. Already the chief Palestinian negotiator, Sa’eb Erakat, has made it plain that the Palestinians cannot accept this interpretation. Nor will peace come if the autonomy-plus that Netanyahu talks about for the Palestinians leaves them with only a small fraction of the West Bank.

Borders, Further Re-Deployment Not “Synonymous”

“Borders and further re-deployment are not necessarily synonymous,” Ambassador Ross emphasized twice in his briefings to journalists in mid-January. “But we have sought to focus much more on the process rather than on any issues,” he added. The Washington Report asked him if Christopher’s secret letters of assurance to the two parties included any assurances or warnings regarding settlement building. (The Israelis published their letter but the Palestinians did not publish theirs.) “No, they do not, but we have certainly addressed this and the question of Hamas to the parties,” Ross replied.

No More Hebrons?

For the future, Ross indicated that the U.S. will be stepping back from a Hebron-type involvement, during which the president and the secretary were on the telephone with Ross two or three times a day in the closing period. The U.S. special envoy made clear, however, that the U.S. was absolutely dedicated to moving the process forward along the Oslo road map, including negotiations with Syria.

Even before Ross’s return, outgoing Secretary of State Christopher met with a delegation from the Council of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations in a private luncheon at the Department of State and reassured them that the U.S. had not issued a “guarantee” but only an “assurance” to both parties that the U.S. would continue to pursue the peace process. The Jewish presidents were concerned that if the U.S. “guaranteed” the peace process would continue, it might not allow Israel freedom of action. In the strange world of the Jewish American establishment and its paranoia over Israel, there is insistence that the U.S. must continue its financial, military and political support of Israel, but must not attempt to impose its ideas on how Israel uses that support. Thus the Americans must leave Israel with the final determination of what constitutes compliance with the peace process.

Who Decides Extent of Withdrawal?

Keeping to a minimum Israel’s “specified military locations” which are exempt from the forthcoming withdrawals is important. The Palestinians want to maximize the withdrawal and bar the Israelis from claiming as military areas large tracts of the West Bank. Maps being circulated indicate that Israel aims to retain at least 50 percent of the West Bank after the pullout. Who is right? The Oslo II Article XI is ambiguous but clearly indicates that “negotiations” over these areas were intended, if not in the interim period then in the final status talks.

The legal adviser to Shimon Peres during the Oslo negotiations, Joel Singer, now a lawyer in Washington, has advised Prime Minister Netanyahu that the Oslo Agreement on withdrawal was based on the 18- year-old Camp David negotiations with regard to the pull-back from areas in the West Bank. The Israelis had insisted then and later at Oslo that only Israel would decide on the extent of the interim pull-back.

Singer admitted that final or permanent status issues would include discussions on borders, possibly meaning further pull-backs. What is unexplained is the statement by Ambassador Ross that “borders and further re-deployment are not necessarily synonymous.” Does this mean that Israel may demand to leave troops in place across the eventual Palestinian border in “specified military locations”? No one knows.

No Change of U.S. Administrations

The 23 days of continuous negotiations by Ross were analogous to Christopher’s final weeks of negotiations under Carter over the Iran hostages in early 1981 except that Ross did not face an incoming president of the other party. All parties this time, particularly Israel, realized that they would be dealing with a President Clinton (and possibly a Dennis Ross) for the foreseeable future. That may have contributed more to the “centering” of Netanyahu than any other factor, no matter how brilliant Ross may have been.

It is of course an old Israeli tactic to declare large tracts of Palestinian farmland and barren hills “military zones,” and they have continued to do this, repeatedly, even since Oslo. The lands have little or no military value. But seizure of the lands enables Israel later to use them for settlements and, of greater immediate importance, deny those lands to Palestinian builders and municipalities.

Israel: Planning 50 Percent Peace?

One Israeli source estimates that Israel already has designated almost 50 percent of the West Bank for military control and use, even though these thousands of square kilometers have only a few thousand troops on them. The prime minister’s own office confirmed this after the Hebron withdrawal when its spokesperson suggested that Israel would indeed retain about 50 percent of the West Bank after the interim redeployment.

If that is so, there is going to be no clean “land for peace,” but rather years of fratricidal warfare and crisis-ridden negotiations by the two peoples locked in a struggle for the rocky heights of the West Bank. And the Americans seem to do little but hold Israel’s coat. Even the U.S. claim of being the only and exclusive broker in the peace process is stretched thin by our heavy commitments to Israel, both financial and strategic.

Ross, in his briefing on Hebron, made much of the need for keeping to the interim period multi-stage withdrawal schedule but gave a slightly different schedule from what has been published. It calls on the parties “within 12 months of the first withdrawal to complete all three stages and by mid-1998 in any case.” Israel and most press sources claim Aug. 31, 1998 (even Sept. 1, 1998 in one publication) as the new deadline for Israel to finish its interim redeployments. Which dates are operative: March 1, 1998 , June (mid-1998), or the end of August 1998? One does not know.

Oslo III Important to Israeli Politics

Oslo III (the Hebron agreement) is an important breakthrough for the Likud centrists. who some claim really do exist separately from the religious right in Israel. The Hebron breakthrough also is important for the Labor hawks such as General Ehud Barak, expected to succeed Shimon Peres by June of this year. Hebron makes a splendid platform on which to form a government of national unity, if Netanyahu chooses to go that way. The ambiguous agreement and its sidebar assurances from the U.S. appear to legalize the important drive for creating new facts on the ground all across the West Bank either as “expansion” of existing settlements or by creation of further military “locations.”

For the moment, the peace process will continue and the “centering” of Netanyahu and Israeli politics will remain a U.S. priority. But the basic drive for filling the land of Judea and Samaria with as many Jewish families as possible will also continue. All paid for by Uncle Sam.

Christopher, Departing, Suggests Cut in Aid!

In his parting speech at Harvard the same week as the Hebron agreement was made, Secretary Christopher touched on the necessity of cutting back aid to Jordan, Israel and Egypt if there is no increase in the foreign affairs budget. There will, however, almost certainly be an increase in that budget because Clinton already has asked for an increase of almost $4 billion for 1998. If he gets it, it means that there will be no decrease in aid to the Middle East peace parties, particularly Israel.

SIDEBAR

Netanyahu Sends Jerusalem Picture With No Dome of the Rock

During the same week the Hebron accord was being passed in the Knesset, the office of the prime minister of Israel sent a picture of a framed model of the Old City of Jerusalem to the Greek Orthodox prelate on the occasion of Greek Christmas. The only trouble was that the picture failed to show the Dome of the Rock, the major Muslim shrine, and instead had a stylized Jewish Temple on the site. Apologies were made.

Prime Minister Binyamin (Bibi) Netanyahu is reported to have begun studying Arabic seriously. Does this mean he hopes to invite Yasser Arafat to address the Knesset in return for an invitation for Bibi to address the Palestine Legislative Council? Don’t hold your breath.