March 1995, pgs. 18-19

Will Iran Respond to Rising Internal Opposition with External Aggression? Two Views

Poor Iranians Support Regime Despite Economic Chaos

By George Cave

That the Iranian economy has been in continuous decline since the onset of the Revolution can no longer be obscured by the Islamic Republic of Iran.

It is hard to recall an era in which Iranians have experienced such a long and precipitous economic decline. The rich live well, as they always have, but they are a tiny percentage of the population.

By contrast, the lower classes have never been well off, but they have benefited from initiatives of the Revolutionary government. To its credit, that government has drastically reduced the infant mortality rate among the poorest Iranians. It also has provided this class with better educational opportunities, and has made housing loans available on a scale never seen under the shah's regime.

It is the entire middle class that suffers the most. Iranians on fixed incomes, such as government officials and military officers, have been forced to take second jobs to support their families adequately.

Improvements in health and medical facilities available to the lower classes have contributed to Iran's rapid population growth. Current government policies, however, have created an economic situation which Iran's oil revenues are insufficient to offset.

Mismanagement, the lack of an effective economic policy, and widespread corruption have resulted in economic stagnation. Claims by Iranian senior officials that the economy is in excellent condition do not reflect financial reality. Iran's reserves have dipped below $5 billion. Its external debt is now in excess of $30 billion.

There is a growing belief among the merchant class that the root cause of Iran's economic problems is the lack of broad, effective economic interaction with the West in general and the United States in particular. These people were euphoric last spring when rumors erroneously spread in Tehran that the U.S. embargo on Iran was about to be lifted, and that a resumption of commercial relations would soon follow.

If the Pahlavi monarchy collapsed when conditions were better, why hasn't the current government collapsed? The shah's government collapsed largely because the people who might have been expected to support him stood aside and let the Revolution happen.

Earlier, the military hierarchy that supported the shah in his 1963 confrontation with Ayatollah Khomeini and his allies was modeled on the peasant/landlord relationship which had prevailed in Iran for centuries. By 1979, however, far-reaching sociological changes had occurred in the military as the result of the rapid expansion of Iran's armed forces in pursuit of the shah's dream of a dominant Iranian role in the Persian Gulf and, eventually, the Indian Ocean.

The military members from the lower classes were not prepared in 1963-64 to play a role in internal political developments. In 1979 they were.

The stability of the Iranian regime, therefore, is based upon its acceptance by the lower classes. Because under the shah these people were disenfranchised, their only recourse was to religious authority. Historically, Iran had been ruled by an imperial elitist minority. The majority of Iranians viewed the government as an institution to be avoided. Their salvation depended upon their being good Muslims and this meant adherence to clerical authority.

This attitude underpins the current government. The Islamic Republic may not be the best government, but because it is Islamic, poor Iranians can identify with it, even if their support has waned since the death of Ayatollah Khomeini.

In Iran today, religious authority is personified by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Husayni-Khamenei's view of Iran's problems as the struggle between secular influence and religious authority. This is the underlying theme in all his public utterances. Internally, emphasis is placed on protection of the Revolution. The motivating force behind Iran's foreign policy is the export of the Revolution and the conversion of both Sunni Muslims and others to Shi'i Islam.

The Majlis is determined not to produce another shah.

Iran therefore is the major supporter of fundamentalist movements in the Muslim world. It views Palestine as the preeminent fundamentalist issue, and supports the use of violence in its opposition to the Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement.

Iran's recognition of Islamic control of the holy land as a key fundamentalist issue has put Iran in conflict with the non-Muslim world and those Muslim states who support the peace process. This, the continued demand for Salman Rushdie's execution, and assassinations in Europe of Iranian opposition leaders help explain Iran's on-again off-again relations with several European states.

The current struggle between secular influence and religious authority in Iran is best exemplified by the satellite dish crisis. An Iranian who has a satellite dish has access to three different satellites. There are approximately half a million satellite dishes in Tehran alone, and recently they began appearing in all of the cities and major towns in Iran.

The government, at the insistence of Supreme Leader Khamenei, submitted a bill calling for a ban on the production, importation, sale and use of these dishes. In December, the Majlis approved the ban.

Even though the government has succeeded in eliminating satellite dishes, however, it is in no position to do anything about the large number of VCRs in widespread use even among Iran's poorer classes.

The major political problem may not be the increasing secular influence in Iran, but the lack of a truly functional executive. Ultimate power rests with the Majlis, which is determined not to produce another shah. Therefore the constitution was changed at the time of the last Majlis elections, splitting the executive into two offices. These are the office of the president, who can serve only for two terms of four years each, and the office of the supreme leader, who serves for life.

The weakness of the executive was recognized by current president Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. When Ali Akbar Nateq Nuri became speaker of the Majlis, in his first speech he declared the main aim of the current Majlis must be to strengthen the executive. To date no steps have been taken in this direction, however.

The supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, has attempted to strengthen his position by assuming the mantle of the spiritual leader of all Shi'i. This position has been in dispute since the death of Grand Ayatollah Khoei. The Iraqi Shi'i accept Ayatollah Sistani as the rightful heir to Khoei's mantle. Much to the chagrin of Ayatollah Khamenei, Sheikh Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, the spiritual leader of Lebanon's Shi'i majority, has thrown his support to Ayatollah Sistani.

The 1996 Majlis elections and/or the 1997 presidential vote may therefore produce a political crisis in Iran. The current system has proven to be a cumbersome way of devising and implementing policies. Either it must change, or the government will be changed.

George Cave is a retired U.S. government official who worked for many years in Iran and on Iranian affairs in Washington, DC.