Iran's Dispute With the UAE Over Three Gulf Islands

By Saeed M. Badeeb

The dispute over the islands in the Lower Arabian/Persian Gulf—Abu Musa, Tunb, and Lesser Tunb—is an old issue. In fact, the rivalry between Persia (now Iran) and the Ottoman Empire and the local rulers of the Arab Gulf sheikhdoms goes back to the 16th and 17th centuries. In 1935, Persia was renamed Iran by Reza Shah, who ruled the country from 1921 to 1941, when he was forced by the British to abdicate his throne in favor of his son Mohammed Reza Pahlavi (r. 1941-1979), because of his alleged sympathies with Nazi Germany during World War II.

During his reign, Reza Shah revived Persia's claim to a number of islands in the Lower Gulf, notably Abu Musa and Greater and Lesser Tunbs, which belonged to two small sheikhdoms of the Trucial States, now the United Arab Emirates. Understanding the strategic and economic importance of the Strait of Hormuz, Reza Shah sought to control as much as possible of this waterway. Additionally, red oxide was discovered in commercial quantities on the island of Abu Musa.

The Early Threat of Iranian Naval Power

As early as 1925, Reza Shah began to build a naval capability that could challenge the British domination of the Arabian/Persian Gulf region. By 1927, Iranian naval power represented a real threat to many of the Gulf islands belonging to the small Arab sheikhdoms of the Gulf. Emboldened by his naval power, Reza Shah occupied the island of Hinjam in May 1928, and also began antagonizing inhabitants of many of the other islands.¹

From 1929 to 1939, Iran and Britain engaged in unsuccessful negotiations over Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs. With the outbreak of World War II, talks were suspended and the status quo remained unchanged. However, the British announcement in 1968 that it would withdraw militarily from the Arabian/Persian region by the end of 1971 revived the Iranian ambitions.

The small Arab sheikhdoms, as well as Saudi Arabia, were alarmed by the British decision because of the potential threat of an aggressive Soviet Union, a revolutionary Iraq, and Iran's military buildup and its perceived expansionist policies.² The alarm was compounded by Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi's quest for Western recognition of Iran's regional influence and for a declaration by the United States, in particular, that Iran was the only regional power capable of filling the vacuum that would be created by the British withdrawal from the Gulf in 1971.

In 1969, President Richard Nixon announced the policy of reducing overseas U.S. military presence by aiding smaller nations to defend themselves through military and economic aid. In recognition of the strategic importance of the Gulf oil fields, the "Nixon Doctrine" called for close U.S. ties with the Gulf countries, particularly Saudi Arabia and Iran.

The shah wasted no time in building up Iran's military capabilities to assume the role of "policeman" of the Gulf. He also surfaced a number of territorial claims during this period, including one to Iranian sovereignty over Bahrain, an issue that was to cause great concern in the Gulf region.³

Before their withdrawal, the British sought to resolve territorial disputes between Iran and the Arab sheikhdoms. With international support, they persuaded the U.N. to create a commission to review and settle the Bahrain issue. In 1970, thanks to Saudi Arabian persuasion, the shah agreed to allow the United Nations committee to determine where sovereignty lay.

By the end of the year, the shah had accepted the United Nations decisions, based upon results of a referendum whereby the people of Bahrain chose independence over becoming part of Iran, that Bahrain should be an independent sovereign state.

Saudi Arabia, as the largest Arab country of the Gulf, wanted Iranian cooperation in effecting a smooth transfer of power from the British to the traditional Arab rulers of the small sheikhdoms. Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi agreed to participation in a Saudi-proposed conference of all parties to Gulf security. Before the conference could take place, however, the shah invaded the three islands of Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs on Nov. 30, 1971.

Apparently, after accepting Bahrain's independence, the shah was determined not to emerge empty-handed from the British withdrawal. The largest of these islands, Abu Musa, was owned by Sharjah. The two others, Greater Tunb and Lesser Tunb, were owned by Ras Al-Khaymah. Both Sharjah and Ras Al-Khaymah, now part of the United Arab Emirates, were ruled by members of the Qawasim tribe, which at one time in history also ruled on the Persian side of the Strait of Hormuz under the Persian shahs. It was on that basis that the shah claimed the Qawasimi islands belonged to Iran. In fact, in 1881 and again in 1904, the British had rebuffed Persian attempts to occupy these islands. Since then their value was increased by the possibility of oil fields in their territorial waters.

The Iranian occupation was accomplished by a surprise combined operation of naval forces, air force helicopters, and a large force of army troops and commandos.

With no military force on the island to resist the Iranians, the ruler of Sharjah signed an agreement with Iran on the same day its forces seized the island. Major terms of the agreement provided:

(1) the flag of Sharjah would remain flying over the island, including the government buildings and the police post;

(2) the Arab citizens of Sharjah living on the island would remain under the authority of Sharjah;

(3) the "Muze Gas and Oil Company" would begin exploring for oil and other natural resources on Abu Musa island and within the territorial waters extending 12 miles from its coasts. Income from the natural resources found would be divided equally between Iran and Sharjah;

(4) Iranian forces would be stationed at an agreed-upon location on the island; and

(5) Sharjah would receive annual financial aid of 1.5 million pounds sterling. The aid would continue for nine years, or until Sharjah's own annual petroleum sales reached 3 million pounds sterling.

The Iranian invasion of the three islands was a shocking setback for Iran's relations with all Arab states. It also encouraged the arms race in the Gulf region, particularly among Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Iran.

Before leaving the Gulf in December 1971, the British had wanted all the Lower Gulf sheikhdoms to unite in a single country, which they thought would be a more viable state. Bahrain and Qatar declined, but several Trucial states, Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ras Al-Khaymah, Fujaira, Ajman and Umm Al-Quwayn formed the United Arab Emirates in 1971. Iran had no choice but to recognize it.

Against this historical background it could be said that the very recent crisis between Iran and the United Arab Emirates has not come out of a vacuum. The whole issue, as a matter of fact, is not new. Throughout the 20th century, Iranian-Arab Gulf sheikhdoms and states' relations have been sensitive and delicate. In recent history and before 1968, Britain was the protector of the small Arab Gulf sheikhdoms and the guarantor of security in the Gulf region. It constituted a deterrent against Iran's potential military expansionism, against Arab radicalism, and also against any Communist threat.

This is the historical background to the Abu Musa dispute, which Iran has exacerbated in 1992 by refusing entry to nonnative-born Arab residents, such as teachers, health workers, and technicians, unless they obtain an Iranian visa. The current confrontation is only the latest in a series of recent upheavals in the Gulf that include the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-88 and the 1991 war to liberate Kuwait. Both wars were costly and disastrous for all countries of the region, and will affect political stability and economic progress in the region for decades to come. The need for foreign protection, and intervention when necessary, became obvious to inhabitants of the region despite the fact that it was disliked by all.

To forestall another such catastrophe, the two concerned parties, Iran and the United Arab Emirates, must sit face-to-face to discuss the issue.

Further resort by Iran to military measures to solve this or any other problem in the Arabian/Persian Gulf will endanger all nations in the Gulf region and have enduring unpleasant consequences.

Mohammed Hussein ad-'Aidarous, Al-'Alagat al'Arabiah, al-lrar~iah, 1921-1971 (Arab-Iranian Relations, 1921-1971), Kuwait, Dar al-Salasil Publications, 1985, p. 77.
A Soviet dream in the 1960s and 1970s was to reach the warm waters of the Gulf and challenge the Western presence in the region. Revolutionary Iraq was also seeking influence and a strong foothold in the other Arab Gulf states.
The historical basis of Iran's claim over Bahrain was simply that it has a large Shi'i population. Two seats were reserved for representatives of Bahrain inside the Iranian Majlis, or parliament.

Saeed M. Badeeb, author of The Saudi-Egyptian Conflict Over North Yemen, 1962-1970, is currently a deputy minister without portfolio in the government of Saudi Arabia.