After Selling Out Palestinians, Will Christopher Sell Out Bosnians Too?

By Ian Williams

Friday, Feb. 12 was a bad day for Palestinians, for the United Nations and for any hopes that the new U.S. administration would break from its subservience to Israel. To the shock and surprise of the Palestinian delegation, and indeed of many members of the Security Council, its president, Moroccan Ambassador Ahmed Snoussi, appeared to put the lid on Resolution 799, which had instructed Israel to return the 400 Palestinian deportees "immediately."

It is no wonder that the new U.S. ambassador to the U.N., Madeleine Albright, declared as she left the meeting that Snoussi had done "a fantastic job." During an informal in camera session late on Friday, the Moroccan ambassador announced that he would be calling in Israeli Ambassador Gad Yaacobi and then making a press statement. Some members of the Council assumed that there would be further Israeli concessions and that the issue would then be brought back for consideration. They were wrong.

After his meeting with the Moroccan, the Israeli envoy reiterated that as far as his country was concerned, it was a done deal. Israel's offer to return all of the expellees within a year, he said, was "consistent with the principle" of 799. When Snoussi met with the press, however, it became obvious that a massive fudge was under way.

Resumption of the peace process was the target, both ambassadors agreed, without explaining how the Palestinians could negotiate while 400 of their compatriots froze on a Lebanese hillside. Nor did the parties explain how the Palestinians can negotiate when the so-called "honest broker" has connived to give the Israeli party to the negotiation carte blanche to flout international law.

The looming threat of an American veto to protect Israel from U.N. Security Council sanctions, which are mandatory for U.N. members, had given pause even to those who saw the Israeli action as a kick in the teeth for the United Nations. In 1972, President Richard Nixon delivered the first American veto for Israel in the United Nations Security Council.

Interestingly, that first veto 20 years ago was on a resolution condemning Israeli raids on Syria and Lebanon because of the Olympic massacre at Munich airport. It was, the self-styled Israeli experts said then, the only way to combat terrorism.

Two decades of the same treatment have failed to effect a cure for "terrorism," even in the loosely defined Israeli sense, which excludes every Palestinian or Lebanese death at the hands of the Israeli forces.

However, even if it has done little to ensure Israel's security, there is no doubt that the addictive regime of vetoes has bred into Israel a contempt for international law.

It also has saddled the U.S. with a reputation for diplomatic double standards that reverberates far beyond the Arab-Israeli conflict. If used on this occasion, it would have been the first veto cast by any nation for two and a half years, but the 30th that an American ambassador had cast on behalf of Israel.

On his arrival at the U.N. for the first time, Secretary of State Warren Christopher had dismissed all queries about the veto—which Israeli sources claimed the new administration had promised them— as "hypothetical." Rabin, however, already had announced what Christopher later, in a slip of the tongue, called an "agreement."

Not only did Christopher subsequently give the impression that an agreement between the administration and Israel was somehow binding on the world body, he also dismissed the disastrous diplomatic effect of the "hypothetical" veto. Nevertheless, everyone present knew that if the U.S. reverts to vetoes to protect Israeli violations of international law, there is nothing to stop Russia from vetoing sanctions on Serbia for violations of international law. To resume the use of vetoes, to which no country has resorted since the end of the Cold War, is to resume the impasse that paralyzed most U.N. collective action for two generations.

Commenting on the current U.S.-Israeli "agreement," the new U.S. ambassador to the U.N., Madeleine Albright, told a delegation of the non-aligned members of the Security Council that it was a "finished deal." One hopes that she was just obeying orders, and not vindicating the judgment of AIPAC leader Steve Grossman, who was reported in the Jewish weekly Forward to be "on a high" about her appointment.

"Not Very Long" vs. "Immediately"

Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, who also visited Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, said that he "felt very strongly that the decision we took after consultation with the U.S. is consistent with 799. " He added that "10 months is not very long."

However, every member of the Security Council was well aware that, even on a Methuselan timescale, letting the deportees return within a year was not "immediate." In fact the threatened sanctions in the draft resolution had risked censure for their mildness rather than their extremity. The original draft called for sanctions against companies involved in the construction of West Bank settlements. Since both the U.S. and the new Israeli government, to some extent, oppose new settlements, one could easily ask, what's the beef?

The second part of the draft condemnation resolution was more controversial, calling for the exclusion of Israel from human rights conferences. For many delegates this shrieked of an old failed policy of isolation, and in view of the presence of some other fairly unsavory regimes at such conferences, some felt this also could be cited as an example of double standards.

In place of the proposed human rights conference exclusion, there emerged a proposal to order all of Israel's trading partners to strip it of its most-favored-nation status. However, in the end no one was keen to move that either, since the Clinton administration had domestic politics to contend with, and none of the other nations wanted to cause the new administration the embarrassment of a veto.

In this most member nations were more solicitous of Clinton administration feelings than was Israel. The nonaligned members were in almost continuous caucus, but all agreed that the ball was in the court of the Arab representatives on the Security Council. Unfortunately, these were Morocco, involved in its own problems over Western Sahara, and Djibouti. Neither of them considered themselves wealthy or politically independent enough to stand up to the U.S. or its European allies.

The message that U.N. resolutions are only enforceable against states without a patron among the five permanent Security Council members undercuts all the rhetoric about the New World Order and the new administration's commitment to multilateral security. For example, Libya's offer to hand over the two suspects in the bombing of Pan Am 103 to a neutral country for trial was not accepted precisely because the U.S. and Britain said that it did not meet the full Security Council resolution. Soon after that sanctions, which remain in force, were implemented against Libya.

Nasser Al-Kidwa, the PLO representative to the United Nations, was firm that the issue was not finished, and that his mission would push for further action. However, he now has to persuade someone on the Security Council to repudiate publicly the deed of its Arab president, and to go against the full diplomatic clout of the United States.

Legally, he is entirely right, but that seldom has helped the Palestinians in the past. In reality, there is little doubt that the issue has been killed in the U.N. It remains to be seen whether the media, or the masses in the Islamic world, will lose interest in the encampment in Lebanon as rapidly as did the representatives of their governments in New York. Perhaps Rabin will make a further gesture, since he could now pass it off as magnanimity, and thus undo the consequences of giving Hamas exactly what it wanted—its own veto on the peace negotiations.

One interesting aspect has been the demonization of Boutros-Ghali. The secretary-general is a man of strong, if somewhat capricious, opinions. At least one reason he was not a particularly successful foreign minister of Egypt was the memory of his trip accompanying Anwar Sadat to Israel before the Camp David agreement. His continuing cultivation of contacts with Israelis left many Arab diplomats a little unsure about him. On the other hand, Israel's Likud government made it plain that it had no particular objection to his appointment as U.N. secretary-general.

On the issue of the deportees, Boutros Ghali has been firm that the authority of the Security Council has been flouted, and that the Council should do something about it. His statements provoked accusations from Israel that he was reverting to his Egyptian and Arab roots.

When a delegation from the Council of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations protested to him about the threat of sanctions, Boutros-Ghali agreed with them that the main object was the peace talks. He politely but firmly told them, however, that the Rabin offer did not meet the requirements of 799. The leader of the delegation, Lester Pollack, later told the press that there was no evidence of anti-Israel bias in the secretary-general—he had always received them courteously and attentively.

Taking a cue from their Jewish counterparts, Columbia University Prof. Edward Said and Arab American Institute Director James Zogby also went to see the secretary-general. Once again, he agreed that the peace talks were the main thing, but that the lack of action on 799 could imply double standards. He also advised them that since the matter was in the hands of the members of the Security Council, comments should be addressed to those members. It is a good point. Just as Arab-American organizations have tried to emulate pro-Israel lobbies in Congress, it may be time for them now to start letting the missions at the U.N. know how they feel.

Perhaps, obliquely, Boutros-Ghali was warning Arab Americans that the Moroccans had their own agenda. The long-running dispute over Western Sahara now may be resolved to Rabat's satisfaction, with strong U.S. backing to reward Morocco for its role in defusing 799. Boutros-Ghali, however, can take some credit for having secured a partial climb-down by Rabin on the deportees. It is a minor victory, but victories of any kind are rare.

Bosnians: Palestinians of Europe

If it is any consolation to the Palestinians, they are far from being the only victims of double standards. The Slavic Muslims of Bosnia seem set to become the Palestinians of Europe. While most observers agree that the Vance-Owen peace plan is unsatisfactory, its defenders want to know what else can be done.

Since the European governments, by action and inaction, brought about the present situation, they should not, perhaps, be the ones to say this. But it is their insistence that maintains the immoral policy of refusing arms to the victim, which, they say, will prolong the instability.

The no-fly zone over Bosnia remains resolutely unenforced, and the Bosnians continue to die. The U.N. troops sent into the area to protect the victims have somehow become hostages to the Serbs. In Europe's last such brush with ethnic cleansing, its opponents demanded unconditional surrender of the aggressor. Now, half a century later, the powers want to impose a very slightly conditioned surrender on the victim.

Good News in Eritrea

Among the U.N's overextended and crumbling operations, at least one adjacent to the Middle East seems likely to be successful. A small team, led by former Lebanese journalist Salim Sanbar, has started work supervising the referendum on Eritrean independence.

The U.N. originally put the territory in Ethiopia, whose government promptly ignored all the conditions of the deal. Now the new Ethiopian government has accepted the right of the Eritreans to self-determination. The maximum strength of the team will be around 120. Its job is to ensure open access to the electorate for all parties. Sanbar set off to his new headquarters in February.

No one expects any difficulties in holding the referendum this April. Few doubt that the result will be an independent Eritrea. What happens after that is anyone's guess. There are reports that Israel, after arming and supporting the bloodthirsty Mengistu regime in Ethiopia which, until it was overthrown, denied Eritreans their independence, now is very interested in the new country, with its strategic position on the Red Sea.

An Israeli Peacekeeper

The week that UNSC Resolution 799 was sunk it was announced that the first Israeli had been appointed to the U.N. peacekeeping forces in Yugoslavia, thereby fulfilling an invitation by Boutros Ghali to Shimon Peres last year. Other Israelis are soon expected to help with election-monitoring operations around the world. Apart from the irony of a nation with a record 66 Security Council resolutions against it taking part in such operations, it will be interesting to see whether any Israeli peacekeepers turn up in Eritrea, or similar strategically important venues. In the New World Order, anything is possible if one has a strong lobby in Washington.

Ian Williams is a British free-lance journalist based at the United Nations.