Shaping the Peace, Re-evaluating Mideast Policy, Linkage, Iraq's Proposal

Securing the Peace: Secretary of State James Baker

(Excerpts from testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Feb. 7,1991.)

... The great international coalition that is now winning the war has also got to be strong enough to secure the peace ... Respect for the sovereignty of the peoples of the Gulf and the Middle East has to be uppermost ... Modern history has shown us that no single nation can long impose its will or remake the Middle East in its own image. After all, that is partly why we are fighting Saddam Hussain.

Yet among all the difficulties we face, one fact stands out: The peoples of the Gulf and indeed the entire Middle East desperately need peace ... We should therefore make every effort not just to heal the Persian Gulf after this war but also to try to heal the rest of the region, which needs it so very badly ...

After two wars in 10 years, this vital region needs new and different security arrangements, and in our view there are three basic issues to be resolved: first, the purposes or principles of the security arrangements; second, the role of the local states, regional organizations, and the international community; and three, in the aftermath of the war, the military requirements that will exist until local stability is achieved and whatever military requirements might exist thereafter.

I think we would find already ... a wide measure of agreement on the principles. They would include deterrence of aggression from any quarter; territorial integrity—there must be respect for existing sovereignty of all states and for the inviolability of borders; peaceful resolution of disputes—border problems and other disputes that have long histories, and there are many beyond the Iraq-Kuwait example, should be resolved by peaceful means as prescribed by the charter of the United Nations.

These principles must be put into action first and foremost by the local states so that conflicts can be prevented, and aggression can be deterred. We would expect the states of the Gulf and regional organizations such as the Gulf Cooperation Council to take the lead in building a reinforcing network of new and strengthened security ties.

No regional state should be excluded from these arrangements. Postwar Iraq could have an important contribution to play, and so could Iran as a major power in the Gulf. There is a role, too, I think, for outside nations and the international community, including the United Nations, to encourage such arrangements and to stand behind them. As for the United States, we have deployed small naval forces in the Persian Gulf ever since the Truman administration in 1949. We had and we continue to have very strong bilateral ties with Saudi Arabia and other local states. And through the years, we have conducted joint exercises with, and we have provided military equipment for our friends in the region.

The president has said that we have no intention of maintaining a permanent ground presence on the Arabian Peninsula once Iraq is ejected from Kuwait and the threat recedes...

A second challenge will surely be regional arms proliferation and control. This includes both conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction. The terrible fact is that even the conventional arsenals of several Middle Eastern states dwarf those of most European powers...

A third challenge will be economic reconstruction and recovery. An economic catastrophe has befallen the Gulf and the nations trading with it. As we have worked with the Kuwaitis in their moment of trial, so we shall look forward to cooperating with them in their hour of recovery ...

For the second time in a decade the people of Iraq will be recovering from a disastrous conflict. The time of reconstruction and recovery should not be the occasion for vengeful actions against a nation forced to war by a dictator's ambition. The secure and prosperous future that everyone hopes to see in the Gulf has to include Iraq...

I will urge consideration of a Middle East bank for reconstruction and development to support these objectives…

We will want to consult with governments both from the Middle East and from other regions about specific arrangements that might best serve the purposes of region-wide economic cooperation. Such cooperation would surely be helpful in reinforcing our overall objectives: reducing, one by one, the sources of conflict and removing, one by one, the barriers to security and prosperity throughout the area.

A fourth challenge is to resume the search for a just peace and real reconciliation for Israel, the Arab states, and the Palestinians. By reconciliation, I mean not simply peace as the absence of war, but a peace based on enduring respect, on tolerance, and on mutual trust...

The course of this crisis has stirred emotions among Israelis and Palestinians that will not yield easily to conciliation. Yet, in the aftermath of this war, as in earlier wars, there may be opportunities for peace if the parties are willing. And if they really are willing, we're committed to working closely with them to fashion a more effective peace process...

A fifth and final challenge concerns the United States. We simply have to do more to reduce our energy dependence. As the president has stressed, only a comprehensive strategy can achieve our goals. That strategy should involve energy conservation and efficiency, increased development, strengthened stockpiles and reserves, and greater use of alternative fuels. We must bring to this task the same determination we are now bringing to the war.

Shaping the Peace: Rep. Lee Hamilton (D-IN)

(Excerpts from remarks by the chairman of the Europe and Middle East Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee at the National Press Club, Jan. 24, 1991.)

... We will certainly win the war. We must now begin to shape the peace...

Prior to the present crisis, the US stockpiled military equipment and supplies in several Gulf states in order to establish a military presence quickly. In addition to pre-positioning, several air and naval facilities, particularly in Saudi Arabia, were built, allowing for the quick deployment of US forces. The US should seek further pre-positioning in the Gulf states. We should also expand agreements with Gulf states in order to have quick access to naval and air facilities.

The US and Gulf states should maintain military ties after the war is over, and continue close cooperation...

I doubt whether either public opinion or Congress would support the presence of US ground forces in the region once the war is over, but greater ground forces will probably be necessary. My preference would be to use forces from the Gulf Cooperation Council, other Muslim countries, the Arab League, or the United Nations. The American forces, as much as possible, should be small in number, offshore, and over the horizon. We do not want to be the region's police force.

We should play a supportive role, but the regional states must be the first line of defense. We should assist in building a stronger Gulf security system; that is, a tighter, more integrated Gulf Cooperation Council, with a boost from other key Arab states...

The United Nations should take the lead in organizing a post-war peacekeeping force in Kuwait; after all, the liberation of Kuwait is pursuant to UN resolutions. And a large component of that force should be made up of the Arab coalition partners ...

When the fighting stops we need to organize an international conference on weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. All parties must participate, including Iran and Israel. Unless every party in the region comes to the table, the conference is a non-starter. All weapons must be on the table. In short, Arab governments will not agree to restrictions on ballistic missiles and chemical weapons unless Israel agrees to comparable restrictions on its nuclear arsenal. The goal is the elimination of these weapons...

After the war we'll also face a number of political challenges and very rare opportunities for the United States, first, with respect to the Arab-Israeli issue. That will have to be addressed on both sides. Israel and the Arab coalition partners agree to that. Palestinians have to be given hope. The Gulf crisis has had a profound impact on the Palestinians. The Palestinian community inside and outside the occupied territories is divided. PLO chief Arafat's support for Saddam Hussain has reduced his credibility and damaged the Palestinian cause...

I do not know if it will be possible to hold a Middle East peace conference. Soviet-American sponsorship of talks may be easier than any international conference. I want to see direct talks between Israel and the Arab states. But for most Arab states, such talks may have to occur in a broader international forum.

Many Arabs apparently see us as crusaders.

The 1967 and the 1973 Middle East wars and the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon created opportunities for peace. This war will produce another chance. Now, what should we do about the Arab world? We're going to have a lot of problems in the Arab world after this war is over. One cannot help but think what these waves of American bombers are doing to the minds of young Arabs.

Many Arabs apparently see us as crusaders and acting for Israel. They do not see us implementing UN resolutions, but exercising American power to protect American interests...

So we need to help heal wounds and avoid vindictive policies against those who remain neutral or supported Baghdad. We need to help friendly states devise economic and political reforms, convince oil-rich states that they need to help poorer states and provide assistance and encourage the active participation of our allies in the post-war reconstruction...

It is my hope that we will emerge from this war with a greater sense of joint purpose and of commitment to address the difficult problems of the King Hussein of Jordan Middle East…

Re-evaluating Middle East Policy: Rep. David Obey (D-WI)

(Excerpts from remarks to the Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC, Feb. 5, 1991.)

[A year ago] the question being asked daily was, "How much should we cut from Middle Eastern aid?" Today the only question is: "How much more of our foreign aid budget should the Middle East devour?" My answer is "none until those dollars are provided in the context of a sweeping re-evaluation of basic policy. . . "

From the Arab world, we have the right to expect four important things. First, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the other oil-rich sheikhdoms simply must provide massive economic development assistance to their poorer Arab neighbors…

Second, every Arab nation must in the end be willing to explicitly recognize Israel and her legitimate security requirements. They must be willing to sit down in direct negotiations with Israel, under the US Soviet auspices or any other arrangement that works to conclude the unfinished work of the Camp David process.

Third, the Arab world must deal with the Palestinian problem "on the level, " rather than doffing their hat to the cause and using it merely to embarrass the Israelis.

Fourth, there must be movement in the Arab world toward greater participation in decision-making by something broader than the political elites who dominate those states today.

We also have a right to demand of Israel one very big thing—a recognition of the right and necessity of the Palestinian people to have their own homeland on a major portion of the land that constitutes the West Bank and Gaza. Israel obviously has a right to insist in return on a similar unequivocal recognition of their rights by the Palestinians. Recent talk that the West Bank and Gaza can now belong to the Israelis for 50 years is dangerous nonsense and can not be tolerated by any American government determined to see to it that the blood of its citizens will never again be shed on Middle Eastern battlefields.

We need Linkage: King Hussein of Jordan

(Excerpts from an interview with ABC's David Brinkley, Feb. 10, 1991.)

... On principle and in fact, we have always been against the occupation of territories by war and their annexation regarding all the crises in this region and certainly, that applies to Kuwait. And our position has not changed an iota in that particular regard...

I was making, in my speech the other day, the comparison between what is happening to the Iraqi people, on the one hand, the war that unfortunately all our best efforts could not avert, and on the other hand, the state of curfew that exists and has existed since the beginning of hostilities in the occupied territories in the West Bank and in Gaza, where people are not permitted to leave their homes, even to achieve or bring about what they need for their very survival ...

We're very confused about what we feel is special attention paid to one problem and the lack of it on another, not that we have any doubt that the Kuwait problem, the Iraq-Kuwait problem, had precedence since it came about in the way it did. We need the linkage with something else. We need to know exactly where we are going. We need a commitment to resolve other problems.

Iraq's August 12 Proposal: President Saddam Hussain of Iraq

(The Washington Report has been asked by readers for information on Iraqi President Saddam Hussain's proposal of Aug. 12, 1990, which the Iraqi government and others have subsequently described as a withdrawal proposal or a peace proposal. Following are pertinent excerpts from a Reuters translation, as published by The Washington Post on Aug. 13, 1990.)

…I propose that all issues of occupation, or those projected as occupation, in the whole area should be resolved on the same basis and principles as put forward by the [United Nations] Security Council.

1. Laying down arrangements for withdrawal in accordance with one principle for an immediate and unconditional Israeli pullout from the Arab-occupied territories in Palestine, Syria and Lebanon, the withdrawal of Syria from Lebanon and withdrawal between Iraq and Iran, in addition to laying down arrangements for the case of Kuwait.

The military withdrawal should take place on a schedule that should apply in all cases ... taking into consideration Iraq's historical rights to its land and the choice of the Kuwaiti people.

An implementation of this withdrawal program should begin with the occupation that took place first ... and subsequently a successive implementation of all resolutions issued by the Security Council and the United Nations related to all these cases, until we reach the last case [Iraqi occupation of Kuwait].

The same measures adopted by the Security Council toward Iraq should also be applied to whoever does not abide by or respond positively to this arrangement.

2. To put matters ... in front of the world public opinion to judge under objective conditions and away from American pressure, we call for the immediate withdrawal from Saudi Arabia of American and other forces that have responded to its conspiracy.

These should be replaced by Arab forces whose volume, nationality, duties and areas of presence between Iraq and Saudi Arabia should be defined by the Security Council ... These forces should not include any from Egypt, whose government was used by America as a crutch in its conspiracy against the Arab nations.

3. There should be an immediate freeze on all resolutions dealing with sanctions and blockade against Iraq, and economic, political and scientific dealings between Iraq and world countries should be restored to normal ...

In all cases, and if America, its allies and small agents do not respond to our initiative, we will strongly resist, with the support of the good sons of the Arab nation and the great Iraqi people, its evil intentions and aggressive plots ...