A Formidable Opponent: Stereotypes and Iraq's Capabilities

By Michael Collins Dunn

The principle of "knowing one's enemy" goes back to the earliest theoreticians of conflict. And, while the US and its coalition allies clearly understood the challenge posed by Iraq, the general public seems to have been surprised by Iraqi capabilities once the war actually began. Despite months of hearing about a one-million man army, 800 combat aircraft and 5,500 tanks, many people seemed genuinely surprised that the war did not end in a matter of days.

At the end of Day Five of the Gulf war just past 120 hours of air war, with no ground conflict at that time, this writer was asked to spend an hour taking calls on C-SPAN, one of a number of media stints since the shooting started. Towards the end of the hour, a caller insisted that although she I strongly support[s] President Bush and our forces in the Gulf ... I don't understand why it's taking so long. "

A couple of days later, US Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney cited a newspaper headline proclaiming "War Drags On.

That was Day Seven.

Ludicrous By Day 12

By Day 12 it had become ludicrous. The Washington Post's Bob Woodward had written a front-page article discussing preliminary Bomb Damage Assessments (BDA in the jargon) which struck many readers familiar with military realities as a sign that the US and coalition forces were in fact accomplishing their mission quite successfully. But many in Washington read the article quite differently: most Iraqi airfields still had some operational capacity, many Iraqi Scud launchers had escaped destruction, and at least some of Iraq's basic infrastructure still survived. (This was less than two weeks into the war, remember.)

Some have suggested that, in this age of instant gratification, a war lasting longer than a week or two is simply more than people can handle. Grenada and Panama were popular enough, because they were over quickly. The dead were dead before the public knew the war had begun. There was no nervous concern for the future.

There may be some validity to this, but if the United States had gone to war with, say, a Western European power, no one would have even expected a quick resolution. This war. The presence of US and allied forces in the Gulf, escorting Arab tankers and neutralizing the Iranian navy, helped, but the Iraqis deserve credit for what they accomplished. For some reason they have not generally received it, except from professional military analysts. This suggests that the problem stems from the natural assumption that a Third World nation is no military match for a modem technological power. There is not necessarily a cultural bias here, since the difference between the best weaponry that the US has and the best that Iraq has is enormous. But all that means is that, in the long run, the better-armed state is most likely to win. It does not mean that the other side will fold immediately. (The British, in their war over the Falklands with Argentina, may have made the same assumptions. Though their victory was inevitable, when the first British ship was sunk there was shock.)

If the United States had gone to war with, say, a Western European power, no one would have even expected a quick resolution.

There may also be a lingering stereotype here: that Arab armies cannot fight well. The legacy of Israel's defeat of the Arabs in 1967 was a profound stereotyping, in Israeli, Arab and Western minds: Arab armies could be defeated in no time at all. The 1973 war, in which Egypt launched a surprise attack and took Israel's much-touted Bar Lev line in hours, eradicated the negative psychological image from most Arab minds, and from some Israelis as well. But the notion may persist among some Westerners.

One sign of this is a stubborn refusal by many, including many in the media, to pay attention to how the Iran-Iraq war ended. That war was not an unmitigated victory for Iraq. No war in which a country of 17 million loses half a million men can be called a victory. It also is true, however, that Iraq destroyed the Iranian army as a fighting force in the last weeks of the war, and Iraqi forces were deep inside Iranian territory when Saudi Arabia and other Arab states persuaded Iraq to stop.

Yet one continues to read that the Iran-Iraq war ended in "stalemate. " It did not. Had it continued another month, some analysts believe, Iraqi forces would have taken some major Iranian cities. Kermanshah might have fallen in days. The Iraqi army fought well, destroyed its opponent, and won the war. The presence of US and allied forces in the Gulf, escorting Arab tankers and neutralizing the Iranian navy, helped, but the Iraqis deserve credit for what they accomplished. For some reason they have not generally received it, except from professional military analysts.

Iraq is not a country to fold when struck a blow, or to give up without a right.

Going into the Gulf war of 1991, Iraq's armed forces were in fact impressive in size and capability. Their artillery was not only prodigious in quantity, but it had greater range than anything in the US arsenal. Their best tanks were very good indeed. Their best troops were well-educated, tough and battle hardened. Iraq's command-and-control system was multi-layered, high-tech, and several times "redundant" (meaning that when one system is knocked out, others back it up). The ability of Iraq to keep transmitting radio and some television, to keep some electricity running, and to continue to dispatch orders from headquarters to troops in the field after weeks of intensive bombing proved that the Iraqis were well-prepared for the Jan. 16 attack.

As it showed in the early days of the war, Iraq is not a country to fold when struck a blow, or to give up without a fight. While some of its tactics have been desperate and unjustifiable—unprovoked missile attacks on civilian targets, mistreatment of prisoners of war, and the unleashing of an oil slick of no tactical value—Iraq has been a formidable opponent.

The military planners in Operation Desert Storm recognized Iraq for what it is: an opponent with a well-armed, experienced army. Yet after all the months of demonization of Saddam Hussain and talk of what a threat Iraq posed, many Americans were still surprised that the war did not end in days. When Iraq briefly held the border town of Khafii in a probe against the coalition forces, many were surprised that Iraq could actually take the offensive.

If this is a symptom of the lingering stereotype that Arab armies cannot fight, this is most unfortunate. Egypt and Syria in 1973 and Iraq for eight long years showed they would fight, and could fight well. All who believed the Iraqis would not fight this time should have a very different image at the war's end.

Michael Collins Dunn, Ph.D. is senior analyst of The International Estimate, Inc., a Washington based consultancy, and Middle East editor of its biweekly newsletter, The Estimate.