Pakistan's Three Principal Problems

By M. M. Ali

When Gen. Douglas MacArthur, of World War II fame, tried to fight the Korean War his own way, President Harry Truman fired him. When Lt. Gen. Michael J. Dugan made politically indiscreet remarks to the press after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait last August, he was relieved of his position as Air Force commander. When French Defense Minister Jean-Pierre Chevenement's differences with President Francois Mitterand on the conduct of the Middle East war became irreconcilable early this year, Chevenement had to go. Such appears to be the chain of command and hierarchy of political authority established in countries where democratic traditions have evolved through the years. Even in controlled societies like the Soviet Union, if dissent is not resolved through internal discussion and debate, a Shevardnadze has to bow out.

Not so in Pakistan. The elected government of Pakistan, headed by Prime Minister Mian Nawaz Sharif, opposed the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. It offered a military force of 10,000 to protect the sacred places in Saudi Arabia, and, on principle, supported the UN stand on the issue. On the heels of the Pakistani government's decision, however, came the statement of General Mirza Aslam Beg, commander-in-chief of the Pakistan army, praising Saddam Hussain.

His was not a premature utterance in an unclear environment. His accolade for the Iraqi leader, voiced in November 1990, was studiously repeated in late January 1991. Although the general's views on such a volatile subject with international political ramifications were diametrically opposed to Pakistan's official policy, there was no parting of ways in Islamabad.

It was not surprising. Taking his cue from his predecessor, General Zia Ul Haq, Pakistani president Ghulam Ishaque Khan had dismissed the popularly elected government of Benazir Bhutto on Aug. 6, 1990, using the provisions of the Eighth Amendment of the constitution of Pakistan. Under the same constitution, Bhutto had another three years to go. From all indications, she had continued to enjoy the confidence of a majority of the members of the National Assembly, the highest elected legislative body of the country. A known major parliamentary procedure was sacrificed and a lone constitutional amendment was employed to dislodge a legitimate government. In the political scheme of things, there was no redress. Benazir sits in the opposition today.

Pakistan and India have never had cordial relations. They have gone to war with each other three times within the 44 years of their separate histories, and Kashmir continues to be a serious bone of contention between them. Their times of good relations are when neither is talking of belligerent confrontations with the other. It was against this background that Indian Foreign Secretary Muchkund Dubey visited Pakistan last December to meet with his Pakistani counterpart, Shahriyar Khan. Dubey, of course, took time to see US ambassador to Pakistan Robert Oakley as well. How does such a meeting fit in with the usual niceties of diplomatic protocol, and where does the US ambassador fit in with Indo-Pak bilateral talks?

Such dilemmas are symptomatic of Pakistan's now almost chronic political crises. It also appears that Pakistan is heading for a possible showdown on several matters. Whatever political equations emerge, they will have far-reaching implications for the country and the region. Mesmerized by the present larger Middle East catastrophe, the world may have little attention left for the Indo-Pak subcontinent, where more than a billion people live.

The Role of the Military in Pakistan

In valor, the Pakistan army is second to none. Despite limited resources, it has not hesitated to cross swords with its much mightier neighbor, India. Several Muslim countries look to Pakistan for military aid. Another aspect of the Pakistan army, however, is its role in domestic statecraft.

Every time a civil government or an elected administration has shown signs of faltering, the army has intervened. Major General Iskander Mirza, General Mohammed Ayub Khan, General Agha Yahya Khan, and General Zia Ul Haq, all have interrupted the democratic process in Pakistan to run the government with loyal soldiers.

Of modern Pakistan's 44 years of history, the military has ruled the country for more than two decades. Consequently, Pakistan's democratic institutions were never allowed to germinate and the army's presence is always felt.

The democratic government formed in 1988, as well as the one brought into being after the elections of October 1990, could not be put together without the tacit blessings of the army commander-in-chief. Therefore, it should come as no surprise that even while Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's government supports the UN resolution, his army chief expresses admiration for Saddam Hussain. Until the democracy that has returned to the country takes root, General Mirza Aslam Beg and his ilk will march to their own drummers, or, perhaps, speak what they believe to be the popular sentiment in the country. Who knows?

The Constitutional Anomaly

Dictators are great producers and all command performances are impressive. Authoritarian administrations generally are a sequel to mismanagement and dysfunction. Soon an aura of invincibility cloaks the person of the dictator, who may soon forget he is mortal. Some such leaders have tried to extend their rule for a lifetime. Others attempted to set up institutions to suit their own whims, or tamper with existing political systems to the detriment of the country.

The Eighth Amendment to Pakistan's constitution is a case in point. The late General Zia Ul Haq, having developed a fondness for power but being averse to submitting himself to the rigors of electioneering, used a partyless National Assembly and a handpicked prime minister to solve his problem. The amendment literally transferred the executive authority not to the popularly elected prime minister, but to an indirectly elected president. The amendment gave the president the power to appoint and dismiss the prime minister almost at will.

Zia Ul Haq is gone, but the legacy he has left behind threatens the political stability of Pakistan. Within three years, two elected prime ministers have become victims of the Eighth Amendment. A third one may be in peril too.

Parliamentary democracy is not new. It has been tried and tested at various times and in various places. Experience has shown that the executive authority cannot be shared equally by a president and a prime minister. If this co-relationship is not worked out, then the system is destined for recurrent crisis, as seems to be happening in Pakistan. The answer probably lies in getting rid of the Eighth Amendment itself. Meanwhile the drama is unfolding again in Pakistan.

The Dependence on Foreign Aid

Pakistan has been the recipient of US economic and military assistance for a number of years, although at present both remain suspended. Similarly, the Soviet Union has been the main provider for India. The selfliberaton of Eastern Europe, though a welcome development in most respects, has come as a rude awakening for both India and Pakistan. Withdrawal of Soviet troops in Afghanistan is another example of a welcome change that is also a matter of concern for Pakistan.

Both India and Pakistan need to reorder their economic priorities as well as make adjustments in their political alliances. Eastern European and the Soviet markets have suddenly opened up for the West. India can no longer export goods into Russia without competition. With the importance of Afghanistan reduced in the eyes of the United States, Pakistan is suddenly competing with demands on US resources being made by the newly freed countries of Eastern Europe.

The war in the Gulf, and the demands for greater freedom in the Balkan and Baltic states, promise new problems and complications for India and Pakistan. The US, despite the current cooling, still wields considerable clout in Pakistan. America's tightening ties with the Saudis create further strains on Pakistan. Saudi Arabia's King Fahd has been Pakistan's other major benefactor. In its international relations and economic ties, Pakistan is at a crossroads. It knows that one path leads to austerity measures and self-reliance—the difficult path. The other is to capitulate to external pressures and remain dependent—the easy way out. Whichever path it chooses, Pakistan's internal as well as external choices can further confound the problem.

M. M. Ali is a professor at the University of the District of Columbia.