A Pentagon-Sponsored Study Finds A Palestinian State Inevitable

By Omar M. Kader

The intifada has transformed the Palestinians from a docile population to an unstoppable political movement that will inexorably lead to a Palestinian state. These are among the conclusions of a Rand Corporation report, "The West Bank of Israel: Point of No Return?," sponsored by the office of the Secretary of Defense. The author, Graham C. Fuller, a former senior CIA official, states in unequivocal language that the intifada and subsequent political events "have now made the emergence of a Palestinian state on the West Bank inevitable."

Fuller draws a clear and convincing political map of conditions and likely scenarios facing the Palestinians, Israelis, and Jordanians, with the implications of each for the United States. The report is the result of two trips to the occupied territories, the first sponsored by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, a pro-Israeli think tank.

The Palestinians have taken control of their own fate, the report says, by creating a "new spirit among West Bank Palestinians that cannot be undone—a sense that they have taken their destiny into their own hands and have shown that they are capable of long, sustained resistance."

It would be a mistake to interpret this report as advocating an independent Palestinian state or, for that matter, promoting any specific policy. Any reader who has traveled to the West Bank or Gaza in the last year, however, will generally agree with the author's analysis.

The Palestinians

The "psychological role-reversal is the major new element created by the intifada," Fuller writes, and he points out that Israel is now an obstacle to peace, while the Palestinians have taken the "high ground."

The Palestinians now feel they have time on their side. Whereas Israel used to proclaim confidently that it was "creating facts" on the West Bank with settlements, the West Bankers are now "creating facts" with the de facto closure of the area and the creation of new Palestinian civil institutions. West Bankers can enter Israel with relative freedom, while Israelis cannot enter the West Bank. Eschewing their former rejectionist politics, Palestinian leaders now say that they want contact with Israelis, and they seek negotiations over the future of their state.

Further, the Palestinians have succeeded in reversing the role of violence and force by taking the initiative of demanding their human rights and independence, while forcing the Israelis to respond with a military show of strength, all the while under the watchful eye of the media.

Moves to consolidate a grip on Palestinian institutions is leading some, including Fuller, to conclude that schisms have developed among the Palestinians. Fuller lists five areas of tension between "external and internal" leadership:

distance between the PLO and those on the scene,
a generation gap,
tensions between youths and old elites on the West Bank,
a split between left and right wings in the occupied territories and
the Islamic movement which is reported to be under the influence of Iran, not the PLO.

These and other suggestions that tensions exist between the PLO and leadership in the occupied territories may be exaggerated. Fuller does acknowledge the dominance of the PLO in the process: "Most Palestinians now ritualistically say 'we are the PLO.' In one sense, this statement of allegiance alleviates the old dilemma of Israelis trying to find Palestinians to talk to who are not the PLO: now there are almost none."

Fuller pays considerable attention to the new spirit of those under occupation:

The intifada has not only changed the way the West Bank Palestinians think about themselves, it has also changed the way they think about the PLO, which had almost nothing to do with the outbreak of the intifada or its initial successes. On the contrary, it is the uprising that has had a major impact on the PLO leadership, forcing it to develop new political flexibility. The intifada is the direct cause of the major new political moves by Arafat, including the declaration of a Palestinian state, the planned establishment of a Palestinian government in exile, recognition of Israel's right to exist through acceptance of United Nations resolutions 242 and 338, and the renunciation of terrorism.

It can be argued instead that the intifada accelerated events, but did not change the direction the PLO has been pursuing for more than 10 years, a negotiated two-state solution. The PLO has sought a dialogue with the US, negotiations with Israel and offered land for peace for some time, without results. A case can be made that the intifada forced Palestinian demands onto the front pages, compelling American and Israeli policymakers to respond to issues they had largely ignored. Every element of the Palestine National Council's 1988 peace proposal was drawn from previous PLO offers. Fuller's report addresses the the role of the PLO in concrete terms. "The Israeli-American search for alternative leaderships to represent the Palestinians is to all intents and purposes dead. . ." The intifada has almost decisively eliminated those hopes for an alternative vehicle designed to block Palestinian independence. While the West Bank political community has its tensions with the external PLO leadership, it has not sought to separate itself from the leadership as long as the leadership is responsive to its needs.

The Israelis

If Israel decides to be a good neighbor to a future Palestinian state, it must change existing policy, Fuller explains. "The process of 'getting there' is critical, for it will characterize the relationship between the Jewish and Palestinian states." The process could be voluntary, ending in cooperation between the two states. Or, if the new Palestinian state comes into being with force and violence, it will "encourage further attempts to use force against the Israeli state."

If the intifada caught the PLO and the Palestinians by surprise, it devastated the Israelis. After 40 years of playing the role of underdog, projecting the image of a beleaguered population in a sea of hostility, the Israelis found themselves fighting two losing battles. The first involved the failed attempt to end the intifada and the second was a losing battle for a positive public image. For the first time in its history, Israel faces the prospect of being viewed as a fascist bully state, oppressing its minority citizens.

The report states that to Israelis, a Palestinian state is "becoming less of a psychological outrage than it has been in years past." Early Zionist leaders accepted a two-state solution, but Israelis have not discussed or studied its implications for them. Now that the idea of two states is not unthinkable, and the intifada has become unstoppable, Israelis will be forced to make tough decisions regarding peace.

Israel's concerns, states the report, are centered on security and terrorism. As peace talks become a reality, Fuller expects more terrorism directed at Israel and the Palestinians from rejectionists on each side.

While the report discusses differences between various Palestinians, they are mild compared to the ideological Grand Canyon that separates Israel's political factions. Hard-line military and political leaders are divided on how to handle the intifada. Some want it put down violently, while others desire a negotiated settlement. "Strikingly," the report states, "two of the most outspoken figures in Israel who believe that a Palestinian state is ultimately in the cards—and workable—are the two former chiefs of Israeli military intelligence, General Aharon Yariv and General Yohoshafat Harkabi.

The Jordanians

Jordan reduced its role in the West Bank when King Hussein renounced interest in the territories in July of 1988. Fuller sees the King as "a leader of real character, integrity and capability." He is, however, "in a nowin situation; the forces of history over the long run militate against perpetual Hashemite rule. Such a long-term observation, however, does not mean that one wishes to hasten history along, especially toward a period of undesirable turbulence."

If Israel contributes to unstable conditions, by forcing a population shift, it will tip the delicate balance in Jordan's budding democratic experiment. King Hussein's future is tied to the evolution of the intifada, creation of the Palestinian state and how Israel absorbs the massive influx of new immigrants.

The International Climate

The report discusses two international factors which could dramatically affect the direction of events in the occupied territories. One issue of concern is the role Iraq will play in the region, since it emerged victorious from its war with Iran. The second issue is a more flexible Soviet foreign policy.

The role of the Soviet Union is critical. Since the fall of communist governments, increased numbers of Jews are moving to Israel. Where they are settled is an issue of grave importance to Palestinians and Jordanians. The Soviet Union and the US have put Shamir on notice that they are opposed to settling immigrants in the occupied territories.

Fuller, like most, did not anticipate large scale Jewish immigration. Since the report was issued, however, massive numbers of Jews are expected to immigrate to Israel and some are ending up in the occupied territories. Israel expects between 100,000 and 200,000 immigrants this year alone.

Alarmed Palestinians fear a large influx of immigration into the occupied territories. The US is expected to pick up part of the costs of absorbing new immigrants. Senator Daniel Inouye, a devoted servant of the Israel lobby, is reported in the Jerusalem Post of Jan. 27 to be "considering a proposal for a one-time $500 million grant to help Israel absorb the up to 100,000 Soviet immigrants."

Two possible turns of events that could change everything in the area are war between Syria and Israel and, secondly, Israel's refusal to make peace.

Again since the report was written, the Soviet Union has urged Syria to change its military strategy from "parity" to "sufficiency" as a cost-cutting measure. It is Fuller's second "grim scenario" that is tied into Palestinian concerns about immigration.

If the Israelis refuse to move toward accommodation, it will force the leaders of the intifada to use tactics which may provide Israel with a pretext for expelling Palestinians from the occupied territories, making room for East European immigrants. Should the intifada leaders resort to violence, "Israel's internal mood would then turn particularly ugly and the presence of a hostile Arab population inside Israel would become politically nearly intolerable. These developments would set the stage for all the extremely negative consequences of an expulsion scenario: at the least, a US-Israeli confrontation, the severing of Egyptian-Israeli ties and the collapse of the Hashemite monarchy in Jordan."

This scenario is the outcome desired by such Israeli hardliners as Ariel Sharon and Deputy Foreign Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. They hope to force the Palestinians into violent actions, thereby allowing Israel to crush the intifada and expel Palestinians from the occupied territories, thus making room for more Jewish immigrants.

The United States

Finally, the report addresses the role of the United States. This country, the report states, will inevitably be involved, either by "omission or commission." Fuller suggests that the American Jewish community could play a significant role by urging the White House to be more active in the peace process. Although the United States clearly cannot dictate terms to Israel or to the PLO, it is important that US policymakers have some analytic sense of where events are ultimately heading, or can head. Without that sense of political direction—even if it is not publicly articulated—trust in a blind process between unwilling partners will not work. The United States must also determine the likely cost of delay. Perhaps in a world where US-Soviet relations are played at a less zero-sum level, some degree of East-West urgency has drained from the issue. But it would also be a disservice to all regional parties if the East-West struggle was the primary issue that formed the American agenda. The outcome of the present peace effort is still in doubt, but the elements required for peace are understood. This report, perhaps the most important American document to emerge to date from this conflict, should be read by all who are interested in peace between the Palestinians and Israel.

Omar M. Kader is a Palestinian activist in private business in Reston, VA. He is adjunct professor of political science at Brigham Young University and former executive director of the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC).