Let's Test His Sincerity

By Allan C. Brownfeld

Any consideration of a role for the Soviet Union in the Middle East peace process must be made within the context of understanding traditional Soviet goals in the region.

These have included use of the region as a vehicle for reaching warm-water ports and the gaining of greater control over oil supplies, which could enhance political, economic, and military power and leverage over the West. Also, Moscow has sought to exclude the US as a major power in the region and to use the Middle East as a launching pad for gaining greater influence throughout the Third World. Moscow is also concerned with preventing the area's problems from spilling over into the southern territories of the Soviet Union itself.

In recent years, the Soviet Union has used two instruments to expand its influence in the Middle East: arms transfers and support of terrorism. Its major successes have been with the region's most radical states: Syria, South Yemen, and Libya. Col. Qaddafi, while a useful customer for Soviet arms, has little acceptability in the region and this limits Moscow's ability to expand its influence through him.

Among Moscow's targets have been traditional, pro-Western Arab states such as Egypt. With pro-Soviet, pro-Libyan regimes in Ethiopia, Sudan, and Northern Chad, there has been concern that Egypt would be encircled by hostile countries.

Now, with the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, Mikhail Gorbachev's standing in official Muslim circles will be strengthened. Saudi Arabia, for example, has said that it would consider opening diplomatic relations with Moscow after the Soviet withdrawal. For his part, Mr. Gorbachev speaks of a new and more conciliatory Soviet posture.

US officials, while properly wary, believe that Moscow might play a constructive role in the Middle East because of its influence with such hardline Arab states as Syria. Some in Washington argue that the US and the USSR together can mediate a peace settlement more easily than the US can arrange formal negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians.

The Soviets seem to have decided that the way to exercise influence is to be a catalyst for change, rather than stand in the way of progress.

Another change in Moscow's approach to the Middle East is its recent dialogue with Israel. The Soviets seem to have decided that the way to exercise influence is to be a catalyst for change, rather than stand in the way of progress. While the Soviets once seemed to encourage PLO intransigence, they now appear to have backed Yasser Arafat's decision to take the steps needed to open talks with Washington.

The US should test Moscow's sincerity in this matter. For the USSR to enter the peace process, it must take a number of steps. One is to recognize Israel. The Soviet Union cannot be a mediator if it has relations with only one side. Another is to stop support for terrorism. A third is to encourage its client-states in the region to abandon their policy of total rejection of a compromise peace settlement. If Mr. Gorbachev is indeed a different kind of Soviet Leader with different goals, these steps should not be difficult for him to take.

Allan C. Brownfeld is a nationally syndicated columnist and associate editor of the Lincoln Review and America's Future.