Who's In Charge?

By Dennis J. Wamsted

On March 11, the Administration told Congress it would sell a $354 million package of advanced weaponry to Saudi Arabia. That the Administration came forward with this proposal at all surprised many observers. Last month Congress succeeded in delaying indefinitely a planned sale to Jordan. Add to that fact the vocal opposition of a significant number of U.S. Congressmen to any further sales to any Arab country and it would appear that the Administration was courting certain defeat. On inspection of the package's contents, however, it's clear the Administration was only hedging its bets. Genuine concern for Saudi security demanded an arms sale. Healthy fear of the Israel Lobby (led by AIPAC the American Israel Public Affairs Committee) and its Congressional supporters necessitated watering its contents down. Even then its passage is anything but assured. Eloquent testimony to the Lobby's preeminence in the formation of U.S. Middle Eastern policy and its continuing stranglehold over the U.S. Congress.

The history of this proposal speaks volumes about the current state of U.S. Mideast policy making. Senior Administration officials report a decision to proceed with the sale was made in the second half of February, following the latest flare up in the Iran Iraq war. At that time, the State Department told Saudi Arabia's Ambassador to the United States, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, that the sale would be announced officially March 4. AIPAC promptly pressured the Administration to postpone the announcement. Secretary of State George P. Shultz then began bargaining with AIPAC Executive Director Thomas Dine and Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations Chairman Kenneth Bialkin. The process of watering down the package had begun.

On a similar move in March 1984, then Undersecretary of State Lawrence Eagleberger met with Dine to discuss two then pending issues: AIPAC-supported legislation mandating that the U.S. transfer its Embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, and an Administration plan to sell anti aircraft missiles to Jordan. Eagleburger offered a compromise he thought Dine couldn't refuse. The Administration would withdraw the proposed arms sale if AIPAC would drop its support for the Embassy legislation. Dine refused. The Administration later decided to withdraw the planned sale anyway.)

Although the U.S. media gave passing mention to these negotiations, the absurdity of the situation giving rise to them largely escaped comment. The absurdity, of course, is that the U.S. government finds it necessary to sit down and bargain with a non governmental lobbying group for de facto approval of an arms sales it deems essential to the security of one of the U.S.' most important friends in the Arab world.

Shultz got nowhere in his discussions with Dine and Bialkin. When they broke off after a week it was clear they had accomplished little except embarrass the Administration and further enhance the Lobby's image of invincibility. Sources say State did not even inform Prince Bandar until March 3 that the sale's announcement was being postponed well after he had assured his government it would take place March 4. In the words of one U.S. source, the Administration had "groveled" before the Lobby and come up with empty hands.

The Incredible Shrinking Arms Package

Composition of the package further underscores the Administration's fear of Lobby wrath. The current proposal is, for the most part, little more than a garage sale of military spare parts. It does manage to include some valuable items: 800 shoulder fired Stinger antiaircraft missiles, 1,700 air to air Sidewinder missiles, and 100 anti ship Harpoon missiles. But the real story is in what it doesn't include. Administration officials originally put together a much larger package for the Saudis, estimated at some $1.1 billion. In it were Blackhawk helicopter gunships, TOW anti tank missiles, advanced electronic components for Saudi Arabia's U.S. built jet fighters and, possibly, M 1 Abrams main battle tanks. An earlier Administration study had verified Saudi need for all these items. The same study had said putting them in Saudi hands would do nothing to alter the region's military balance. None of these items are in the current proposal. The Administration's fear of the Lobby and its Congressional supporters has put them all on a backburner.

The grim irony is that this decision, like the Administration's earlier decision to postpone indefinitely the sale of additional F 15 jets to Saudi Arabia, will almost certainly send the Saudis looking elsewhere to fulfill their legitimate defense needs. Recent reports from Brazil indicate the Saudis and Brazilians have already worked up a barter deal: Saudi oil for 1000 Osorio tanks. The U.S. decision not to sell F 15s led the Saudis to contract for British made Tornado jet fighters. U.S. companies could lose $12 billion as a result.

Capitol Hill reacted negatively to the Administration's proposal. Senator Alan Cranston (D-CA), perhaps Israel's staunchest supporter in Congress, opposed the sale on the Senate floor immediately after its announcement. By the next day, Cranston was claiming he already had 50 Senators lined up to block the sale..

(A similar demonstration of the Senate's unquestioning support of Israeli wishes occurred during the Presidency of Gerald R. Ford. Displeased with Israeli policy, Ford publicly called one day in 1975 for a "reappraisal" of U.S. Middle Eastern policy. Less than 48 hours later AIPAC had in pocket 76 Senatorial signatures on a letter opposing the reappraisal. The Senators urged Ford to just stand by Israel and forget the questions. That was it for the "reappraisal." Later Senator Charles Mathias (R MD) was to write of this nadir of policy making: "Seventy six of us promptly affixed our signatures although no hearings had been held, no debate conducted, nor had the Administration been invited to present its views.")

Things were no different in the House of Representatives, where Congressman Mel Levine (D CA) took to the floor to announce he would lead likeminded colleagues into battle against the proposed sale. That Levine and Cranston were in the forefront of opposition to the sale came as no surprise. In January, Levine sponsored a letter in the House opposing any further sales of advanced weaponry to Saudi Arabia. Cranston has consistently opposed U.S. weapons sales to any Arab country. Both men are confident they can block the proposed sale. AIPAC shares their optimism. One AIPAC spokesman even went so far as predict that two third majorities in both the House and Senate would block the sale.

Both Camps Gird Themselves for a Fight

The mechanics of the coming legislative battle are simple. Congress has 50 working days, from March 11, to consider the proposed sale. If it doesn't take any action during that period, it's no contest and the sale automatically goes forward. If Congress passes a joint resolution of disapproval, the sale is temporarily blocked and the ball passes to the President. He can either sign the joint resolution or veto it. If he signs it, the sale is dead. If he vetoes it, it's Congress' turn again. If Congressional opponents of the sale can't muster the two thirds majority in both chambers necessary to override the veto, victory to the Administration and green light for the sale. If they can: end of game, no sale.

Here's how it looks like this one will go. Congress most likely will vote to disapprove. President Reagan will veto. The House will override, leaving the ultimate decision in the hands of the Senate. Right now it's a tossup, with both sides claiming they can win.

Administration officials vow they're not going to sit quietly on the sidelines while the fate of the Saudi sale gets decided in Congress. Already they're busy stressing that that the Saudis are "our friends" and that they have "legitimate concern about the Iranians." Administration officials also warn that failure to approve this sale would hurt U.S. interests worldwide. Letting the Saudis down would send out the "wrong signals," "seriously eroding" U.S. credibility with its long time friends and allies. The President himself, the officials claim, is ready to fight for this one.

Nonetheless, doubts remain about Administration determination. Similar phrases were also used in the debate over the failed Jordanian arms sale. President Reagan had given his personal assurances to King Hussein that he would fight for a sale to Jordan. But, following protests from AIPAC and its Congressional supporters and pleas from several Republican Senatorial leaders, the Administration postponed the package indefinitely. Thus, there's a very real likelihood that vociferous opposition of AIPAC during an election year may spell doom for yet another Arab arms sale, forcing its withdrawal or "postponement" without benefit of either veto, vote, or discussion. The Administration's record of standing up to the Israel Lobby just isn't one to inspire confidence. Among all the ifs, though, there is one certainty: If the Administration folds without pulling out all the stops this time, the United States will have lost what little credibility it's been lucky enough to retain thus far with its moderate Arab allies in the Middle East.

Dennis J. Wamsted, of Washington, D.C., has lived and studied in the Middle East and writes frequently on it.