Slouching Again Towards Bethlehem: Summit II and Mideast Peace

By Robert G. Hazo

The latest Middle East peace initiative has not been the first of its kind to flounder and fail, but its collapse is more lamentable than the others. Arab-Israel confrontation has become ever more dangerous. The important consideration now is whether the demise of the "peace process" creates a new situation where the Russians and Americans might work together towards Middle East peace.

First, let's be clear about one thing. It wasn't Yassir Arafat's obstinacy, as the U.S. media are suggesting, that sunk this initiative. The main obstacle to a settlement is not Palestinian rejectionism, but Israel's refusal to grant the right of self determination to the Palestinians, even in the tiniest corner of Palestine. Why should the Palestinians recognize the Israelis' right to a state when the Israelis won't recognize their rights to anything at all? Palestinians hold that those who cherish nationality should be willing to concede the same right, and not ask Palestinians to betray their national identity.

Israel has made it abundantly clear it will not grant sovereignty. Henry Kissinger (whose positions on the Middle East are barely distinguishable from Israel's) says that the most Israel will give is something like the Allon Plan. Under that scheme less than ten percent of old Palestine would revert to conditional Arab control. Israel would still maintain outposts on the Jordan River and turn over only a few Holy Places in Jerusalem to Vatican or international control. Even these meager concessions would become impossible if the rightward drift in Israel continues, a prospect that seems likelier by the day as record numbers of Western Jews emigrate from Israel.

All signs, then, point towards Israel's best offer falling far short of what Arab negotiators could reasonably accept. We need to face this fact squarely and follow through on its implications. The latest impasse has again made clear that we are not just confronted with an especially knotty diplomatic problem which only patience and more flexible diplomacy can resolve. Two mutually irreconciliable claims invariably add up to one immutable deadlock. New elements must be introduced into the political equation.

(Continued from page 1)

Soviet American Summitry: The Glass Key

The next Reagan Gorbachev summit might possibly be the means to break the stalemate. At the first one, all regional conflicts in which we and the Russians had a stake, except the Middle East, were on the agenda. Not surprising, if you remember that we left the Russians out in the cold in our Middle East "peace process." Why not try one with the Soviets next time? After all, the Middle East is the regional conflict with the greatest potential danger for superpower confrontation. And President Reagan did put forward helpful peace proposals in September 1982 which effectively are still on the table in spite of Israel's negative reaction.

Despite all the rhetoric about the Soviet Union as the focus of evil in the world, in practice Reagan has been circumspect about getting into a face off with the U.S.S.R. He's limited his muscle flexing to alleged surrogates: Syria via Lebanon, Cuba via Grenada, Libya and Nicaragua. Over time, the President has not only toned down his rhetoric but become deeply impressed with the real prospect of an Armageddon: "A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought." Lately he seems preoccupied with building a "legacy": the strengthening of American prestige abroad, national pride at home, transformation of the economy and fundamental tax reform, if he can get it.

Reagan still needs a major foreign policy achievement to round off his legacy, and what area demands this more than the Middle East? His impeccable conservative credentials make him perhaps the only President since Eisenhower with a chance of leading the nation into a genuine rapprochement with the Soviet Union. He is also the only President since Eisenhower with enough domestic strength to withstand the political onslaught by the Israel Lobby that would greet any determined pursuit of a Middle East peace settlement.

Back in the U.S.S.R.: Gorbachev's New Ball Game

Russian willingness to deal with President Reagan on the Middle East is more than a pipe dream. Years of poor relations may have clouded our vision. It's clear our European allies do not fully share our own view of the U.S.S.R. as a relentlessly aggressive power. If they did they would invest more in their national defense than they do now. True, the Soviets might see a deal with us as strengthening "moderate" Arab states, the ones closest to the U.S. But they're also smart enough to realize that a real settlement would likely diminish the American military presence in an area relatively close to Soviet borders. With the debacle in Afghanistan continuing to drain Russian resources, Kremlin leaders must be wary of the havoc further Mideast involvement could wreak on their economy. Besides, an unsettled Arab Israel dispute is dangerous as hell, for them as well as us.

We are now dealing with a new Soviet leadership beset with unresolved problems inherited from the geriatric leadership that preceded it. By far the most pressing of these is the economy. Severe demographic and (possibly) political problems lie just down the road for the U.S.S.R. The Chinese border is a potential hot spot, requiring Soviet placement of powerful, and very expensive, military forces. The Eastern Europeans remain restive. The Soviets already maintain large military forces in most East European countries. In short, Gorbachev and Company already have their hands full.

The Soviet Premier's moves so far suggest he is truly interested in pursuing detente with the West and reducing tensions with China. In interviews he consistently emphasizes the dangers the world faces. He has offered a treaty of friendship to China. He cultivates European leaders, many believe to reduce tensions at home.

If Gorbachev really is sincere in proposing to eliminate nuclear weapons by the year 2000, the real reason is the sad state of the Soviet economy. He knows he cannot reinvigorate it as long as he's trapped in a debilitating arms race with an America at least twice as strong economically as his own country. Some observers even attribute Gorbachev's weeding out of the Kremlin hierarchy as a move to get rid of the superhawks.

If Gorbachev is determined to drastically slow down the arms race and achieve detente with the United States, he'll realize that it can't happen as long as the Soviet Union and the U.S. are backing opposite sides in the Arab-Israel dispute. Thus Gorbachev should be ready for a settlement. Reagan, to be sure, would be under heavy pressure from the Israel Lobby not to take any steps to limit the presently unlimited U.S. commitment to Israel. But could he resist not going for it, if he saw the chance of an overall settlement on a worldwide basis, with the Arab Israeli dispute only one part of it?

Yet, for anything really to happen, the United States has to muster the courage to take a determined lead. And it can only do that by rejecting decisively the extremist forces in Israel and facing down an Israel Lobby which by nature, it seems supports those, and only those, forces. That being done, the rest would be History.

Robert G. Hazo is Chairman of the Middle East Policy Association and Senior Public Policy consultant of the American Arab Anti Discrimination Committee.